This chapter explores the relationship between international trade and sustainable development, with a particular focus on climate change. It traces the evolution of the multilateral trading system from its origins in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the present day, highlighting the shift from a focus on trade liberalisation to a broader commitment to sustainable development. The chapter examines how the World Trade Organization has grappled with integrating environmental concerns into its framework, including the development of ‘greening’ jurisprudence, institutions, and rules. It proposes a reform agenda to further align the trading system with global sustainability goals, emphasising the need for alignment with climate change commitments, harmonised sustainability standards, reformed subsidy approaches, governance and institutional reforms, and a focus on equity and justice.

This chapter examines the legal framework of contingent protection measures in international trade, focusing on anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards. It outlines the relevant WTO rules, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and explores the justifications for these measures. These trade remedies, while protectionist, address concerns of unfair trade practices and market disruption. The chapter also addresses the challenges posed by non-market economies and the evolving role of subsidies. Finally, it discusses the economic, political, and geopolitical rationales for contingent protection, highlighting the tension between fairness and efficiency in international trade.

This chapter explains the reasons for the stalemate in the WTO negotiations on domestic agriculture support, public stockholding (PSH) for food security purposes, and fisheries subsidies. The negotiations are crucial for achieving Sustainable Development Goals related to zero hunger, food security, sustainable agriculture, and marine resources. In agriculture, members are divided on disciplining trade-distorting support and addressing historical asymmetries. The PSH negotiations are contentious owing to disagreements on a permanent solution and calculation of the external reference price. Fisheries subsidy negotiations have stalled on the issue of over-capacity and overfishing subsidies, despite progress on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

A framing case study discusses European Union trade rules that ban the sale of all products made from seals. Then the chapter provides an overview of international trade law. The chapter discusses: (1) how states have historically promoted international law, including major concepts and the evolution of trade institutions; (2) major obligations under contemporary trade law, including rules for market access and treatment standards; and (3) major exceptions under trade law that allow states to restrict trade to prevent unfair trade, safeguard economies from unexpected shocks, protect competing values (like human health and the environment), and preserve national security.

This chapter explores the contested terrain of “subsidies” as applied to the Gulf region’s energy policies by multilateral organizations. It reviews how the Gulf states navigate the definitions and regulations established by international bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the International Energy Agency, and reviews the region’s defense of its energy pricing regimes in the face of international scrutiny. The chapter also analyzes how these low and regulated energy pricing frameworks, viewed as integral to the Gulf’s social contract and industrial strategy, present a challenge to established international norms and trade policies. Furthermore, this analysis extends to the strategic positioning of Gulf states within global forums, where they strive to align their energy practices with international trade standards while safeguarding their development priorities. By doing so, Gulf states aim to shape the future direction of global energy governance in a way that accommodates their specific economic and developmental needs.

Research in political science, economics, and public policy has primarily examined two types of government housing programs. The first involves low-income public housing in advanced industrialized nations like the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, where beneficiaries receive subsidized rental housing or housing benefits without property rights. In contrast, research from cities in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia has focused on policies that grant land titles to residents of slums and informal settlements, providing property rights without additional housing benefits. I focus on a third type of program, understudied yet prevalent in low- and middle-income countries, including India: subsidized homeownership. It is theoretically distinct from rental programs or those accommodating informal settlements because it involves a large in-kind transfer and property rights. I argue that these initiatives uniquely influence how citizens invest in the future, escape poverty, develop agency (or what I call dignity) in social relationships, and wield power in local politics. To support this theory, I outline a multi-method study across three different programs.

Chapter 7 explains the range of policy tools decision-makers can use to correct incentives for an oversupply of environmental “bads” and an undersupply of environmental “goods” in markets. There are two critical steps to address the underlying causes of environmental mismanagement. Step 1 involves removing existing policy distortions. Step 2 explains how policy options can be used to correct market failures and compares and contrasts these options. Market-based instruments provide incentives for producers and consumers to reduce or eliminate negative environmental externalities through markets, prices, and other economic means, e.g., Coase Bargaining solutions, cap and trade, taxes, and subsidies. Regulatory-based (command and control) instruments rely on setting a standard, such as emissions or technology adopted, backed by penalties to modify economic behavior. In the absence of government intervention to correct market failures, private sector measures, such as liability, information disclosure, and voluntary agreements, have a role in correcting environmental problems.

This chapter departs from the assumption that, notwithstanding that transparency is an essential element of competitive allocation of limited rights, it is also a diffuse concept. There are many different transparency obligations, and not all obligations have the same effect on the realization of public interests. Based on an overview of the different types of transparency obligations, this chapter explores the relation between the various types of transparency obligations and traditional market goals on the one hand, and transparency obligations and other general interests on the other. The purpose of the analysis is to answer the question of how these transparency obligations should be designed to balance the various interests that are pursued with competitive allocation of limited rights, whenever transparency is concerned.

Regulating subsidies and state enterprises is a challenging exercise since, arguably, no other area touches more directly on the state intervention in the economy and on the various ideas and interests surrounding it. Taking stock of the acquis in regulating subsidies and state enterprises in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), this chapter aims to develop a conceptual framework to help think about new rules, using the notions of principles, standards, and rules, as well as those of institutions, procedures and remedies. The chapter also delves into the process necessary to produce such rules. Using this conceptual framework, the gist of the analysis is that, to a large extent, there is no need to reinvent the wheel but to build upon the status quo under the WTO and many PTAs – which, importantly, already reflects the common agreement of many governments. In terms of process to follow to generate new rules, the importance of transparency, knowledge-generating activities and epistemic communities is duly underlined.

Subsidies are among the most prevalent government measures to support the domestic economy. This chapter argues that the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), while regulating trade distortions caused by subsidies, is largely agnostic of how subsidies can also help address important twenty-first century challenges. These include policy goals like the green transition, economic recovery, and research and development support. First, we outline existing trends in countries’ resort to subsidies against the backdrop of WTO rules. Second, we explain why and how PTAs are a powerful instrument to address the ‘focal point shift’ from the alleviation of trade distortions to the promotion of public goods in subsidies regulation, also considering global value chains (GVCs) dynamics. Our approach balances regulation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies, placing emphasis on the former, while being wary of new forms of distortive industrial subsidies. Third, we examine subsidy-related norms currently escaping multilateral rules and make a case for their inclusion into PTAs. We conclude that PTAs’ flexibilities make them best-suited for future-proof subsidies regulation and innovation in WTO agenda.

In this chapter, we first provide a general overview of energy and climate policy goals and their main instruments. We underline the common goals between energy and climate policy, as well as possible conflicts in objectives. In the next part, we illustrate monetary market-based instruments such as pollution taxes, product taxes, and energy taxes, as well as subsidies and pollution permit trading systems. We also discuss, using figures, the implications of behavioural anomalies on the effectiveness of these types of policy instruments. At the end of the chapter, we introduce non-monetary market-based instruments, giving some weight to nudges. At the end of the chapter, we discuss issues in developing countries related to the topics discussed in the chapter.

There are many different types of regulatory instruments and tools. Chapter 6 classifies and examines regulatory tools according to their underlying technique or ‘modality’ of control or source of influence, examining five such modalities in turn: command, competition, communication, consensus and code (or ‘architecture’). This chapter also considers algorithmic regulation and the role of reputation as a form of regulation.

This chapter analyzes the regional and sectoral differences in how cities and municipalities engage in climate change networks. Over the past 20 years, an increasing number of cities, regions, companies, investors, and other non-state and subnational actors have voluntarily committed to reducing their GHG emissions. Such actions could help reduce the implementation gap. Along with the increase in commitments and the growing number of venues through which non-state actors can cooperate in order to govern climate change, it is necessary to track and evaluate such efforts. This chapter assesses the voluntary commitments made by Swedish municipalities, regions and multistakeholder partnerships to decarbonize by reducing GHG emissions. It finds large differences in which cities and municipalities that engage in networks. Large and urban municipalities in the south and along the eastern coast are well represented, whereas more rural municipalities along the Norwegian border are less represented in the data. The findings are discussed in terms of climate justice, highlighting the importance of having everyone onboard to create acceptance and reduce inequality in the transformation toward decarbonization.

Explains the several dozen policy tools governments have used in the past and use today to impose effective industrial policies on their economies.

Chapter 16 establishes the concept of an externality, a situation where a decision carries additional costs or benefits to a party not involved in the decision-making process. The chapter classifies several types of externalities and explores how and why they lead to undesirable outcomes. Then potential solutions to externalities as well as their strengths and weaknesses are discussed: subsidies, taxes, regulation, and the assignment of property rights. The chapter ends with a discussion of cost–benefit analysis and its role in evaluating interventions aimed at combatting externality problems.