Chapter 6 addresses the second theme outlined in the introduction. It first analyses whether the capacity to impose discipline as an organizational requirement for the status of party to an armed conflict implicitly presupposes the capacity to impose penal sanctions over members of the armed group. Moreover, it discusses to what extent an obligation to punish conduct with penal sanctions can be derived from the doctrine of command responsibility under ICL and whether the customary law duty to prosecute and punish war crimes, as applicable to states, can be extended to armed groups. The chapter argues that while courts and penal sanctions administered by armed groups might be a legitimate way to ensure respect for IHL and to avoid individual criminal responsibility on the basis of command responsibility, this conclusion does not translate into a positive obligation of armed groups as a collective to employ penal sanctions, let alone to set up judicial institutions. This conclusion notwithstanding, the chapter points out that there is increasing state practice requiring armed groups to ensure accountability within their ranks.

Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the topic. It demonstrates how the administration of justice by insurgents is one element of rebel governance and can play an important part in a group’s strategy to challenge the authority of the state. The chapter then explains that international law does not contain any rule that governs recourse to the use of force in an intra-state setting and is, therefore, ‘neutral’ towards rebellion. However, it also shows that international law contains rules that impose limits on how insurgencies may be fought in NIACs, most notably through the regime of IHL. Based on this introduction, the chapter then sets out the core research questions that the monograph aims to answer, namely whether armed groups enjoy a legal capacity to operate courts and pass penal sentences and, if so, whether international law might require them to do so under certain circumstances.

This short chapter contains the overall conclusions of the book. Its aim is to put into perspective the conclusions reached in the previous chapters and to briefly reflect on their impact on the broader system of international law.

Chapter 5 complements Chapters 3 and 4 by analysing how the standards identified in those chapters translate into the framework of ICL. It explains that while the passing of sentences without providing for necessary fair trial standards can amount to a war crime (and, potentially, a crime against humanity if sufficiently widespread and systematic) not every violation of the judicial guarantees required by IHL entails individual criminal responsibility. The chapter argues that this nuanced approach maintains incentives for armed group members to comply with fundamental fair trial guarantees without being unduly penalized for not meeting standards considered unrealistic in the context of a non-state entity engaged in armed conflict. However, it also explains how a discriminatory interpretation of the nexus requirement, as applied by international criminal tribunals and advocated for by institutions such as the ICRC, might render criminal certain acts of rebel governance, in particular the punishment of common crimes in territory under armed group control, while the same acts may be carried out with impunity by state authorities.

Chapter 2 begins by addressing some vital preliminary legal issues, including the status of armed groups as international legal persons and the binding force of international law on such actors. The chapter argues that the concept of international legal personhood is best understood as a descriptive term rather than a prerequisite for entities to incur international legal obligations. It further explains that IHL, international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) contain relevant obligations governing the conduct of trials and passing of penal sentences during NIAC. It demonstrates that whereas the direct application of IHL to armed groups as distinct collective entities is today widely accepted, the direct application of IHRL – despite strong normative arguments in favour – remains disputed and underdeveloped. Finally, this chapter aims to define entities referred to as ‘armed groups’, and clarifies who exactly is bound by the obligations applicable to them.

Chapter 4 builds on the findings of Chapter 3 by analysing the remaining requirements for the passing of penal sentences, including institutional requirements such as independence and impartiality, as well as more specific due process guarantees prescribed by CA 3, AP II and customary law. The chapter argues that despite the contested direct application of IHRL to non-state actors, IHL incorporates customary human rights law principles and standards of due process developed for states and indirectly provides for their application to armed groups. It explains that while these standards might not have the same potential to ‘outlaw’ armed group trials as the requirement of a ‘regularly constituted’ court, they are nevertheless difficult to meet by non-state actors in practice. This conclusion notwithstanding, the chapter also argues that proposals to downgrade the fair trial standards expected from armed groups should be rejected, as they might equally water down fair trial guarantees expected from states and undermine the principle of belligerent equality.

Chapter 3 outlines the types of trial situations and penal sentences that are covered by the protective scope of the relevant IHL norms, in particular in relation to the nexus requirement – which requires a link between the conduct in question and the armed conflict – and the extension of IHL to intra-party conduct. The chapter then proceeds to flesh out the meaning of the core IHL provision applicable to penal proceedings, namely CA 3 and its requirement of a ‘regularly constituted court’. It argues that this phrase is best understood as incorporating the requirement that a court be ‘established by law’ and that the term ‘law’ in this context is not limited to ‘state law’. Finally, the chapter explains that international law neither explicitly prohibits nor explicitly permits the passing of penal sentences by armed groups and, therefore, armed groups enjoy the legal capacity to pass sentences in the form of a so-called weak permission. This conclusion entails that individuals participating in the passing of penal sentences on behalf of armed groups may be lawfully prosecuted for their actions under domestic law.

As gold prices have soared, the Amazon and its inhabitants have had to bear the brunt of a rampant, environmentally destructive gold-mining rush. Small and medium-sized illegal, informal, and other irregular forms of so-called artisanal gold mining, as well as large-scale corporate gold mines, cause major and multifaceted socioenvironmental–health–human rights crises. The dynamics of the gold-mining boom are important to understand the key political economic sectors behind forest degradation and deforestation and to highlight how RDPEs work. The overall situation in the Amazon is presented, analyzing the causes of gold mining and the violence, especially in Peru, Brazil, and other key regions. The triple frontier between Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil is also analyzed as the irregular gold-mining RDPE is one of the most important drivers of deforestation. In this region, gold-mining operations are led by ex-guerilla groups in Venezuela, paramilitaries and other armed groups in Colombia, and, increasingly, by the First Capital Command and other drug factions from southeastern Brazil in Roraima’s Yanomami Indigenous lands.

Chapter 3 proposes an original conceptual framework built on gender and security studies and supported by existing international legal standards and norms to reframe the interpretation of the refugee definition and better reflect the nature of violence in armed conflicts. In doing so, it reasserts the Refugee Convention as the cornerstone of international protection. This chapter claims that the ongoing dynamics of violence in situations of armed conflict provide a more valuable lens to interpret the Refugee Convention definition where persons flee armed conflicts as it focuses on the nature of violence, including its continuum, features, application, direction, motivation and impact. A micro-level analysis of this type also enables the identification of gender dynamics that are essential in understanding violence in armed conflicts. The framework outlines the knowledge that should be incorporated into the process of interpreting the refugee definition to ensure effective protection of refugees fleeing armed conflicts. The chapter is broken down into the characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts and how these features relate to the refugee definition, including the temporality of armed conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, weak states, and the objectives, gendered strategies and tactics of fighting parties.

Competing claims of authority and persistent instability have had a profound impact on national politics in Libya. Yet despite national fragmentation, efforts to empower local governance bodies through a process of decentralization could contribute to what will be a long-term process of rebuilding the Libyan state. In the absence of capable and unified national institutions, local authorities, primarily municipal councils, have emerged as among the most trusted governing bodies in Libya. Such reliance on local solutions to national problems should not be interpreted as a rejection of the national state but rather a rejection of the centralized state. The challenge facing Libya’s political elites is how to accommodate this trend while acknowledging the long-term necessity of an efficient national state capable of managing and redistributing national resources and overseeing a responsible system of local governance. While this chapter argues that tangible progress toward decentralization could play a major role contributing to the stabilization of Libya, it recognizes that local processes are likely to remain that way – localized rather than systematic – absent a unified national stabilization effort that can integrate small-scale successes into a comprehensive political agreement. For all its promise, local governance alone cannot carry the burden of stabilization in Libya.

This chapter analyses the international humanitarian rules on veterinary personnel. It distinguishes between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts and examines the legal consequences of violations. The chapter also reflects on the anthropocentric nature of international humanitarian law and discusses how this body of law might take better account of the interdependency of the fate of the human race with the fate of the other animal and plant species with which it shares the planet. It finally recommends lines of investigations on the legal protection of veterinary personnel.

International human rights law applies at all times to protect civilians, even though the status of civilian does not exist in the same way that it does under international humanitarian law (IHL). The law binds primarily States, which become party to human rights treaties; they are also bound by rules of customary human rights law. But the duty to respect fundamental human rights also applies to international organisations, including the United Nations, and arguably also to armed groups and corporate entities, as the chapter describes. The human rights duty to investigate suspicious deaths is also considered.