This chapter delves into the foundational sources and principles underpinning Chinese property law. It defines property rights and highlights their features, emphasising the distinctions between property rights and personal rights in the Chinese legal context. The core of the chapter explores the sources of property law, which include the Constitution, national legislation, administrative regulations, local regulations, judicial interpretations and civil customs. This section underscores the significant influence of Roman law and German civil law traditions on Chinese property law. Next, the chapter discusses the basic principles of property law: the principle of numerus clausus, which restricts the types of property rights to those defined by law; the principle of equal protection, which ensures that state, collective and private property rights are equally protected; and the publicity principle, which mandates that property rights must be publicly recorded to be enforceable against third parties. Finally, the chapter addresses the classification of property, distinguishing between corporeal and incorporeal property, as well as between movable and immovable property.

How do you find a linguistic variable? This chapter will discuss the key construct in the variationist paradigm – the linguistic variable. It will detail its definition, describe what a linguistic variable is, how to identify it, and how to circumscribe it.

The chapter provides a novel detailed analysis of one of the most discussed chapters in the Aristotelian corpus, namely An. 2.5. The central claim is that in An. 2.5 Aristotle lays down his programmatic definition of perception as a complete passive activity. He does so by classing the perceptive capacity with capacities that are already fulfilments (entelekheiai) of their subjects and by showing how this classification is compatible with perception being passive (i.e. a kind of being affected). By working out the concept of complete passive activity Aristotle fills in a conceptual gap left open elsewhere in the corpus (most strikingly in Metaphysics Θ.6), where both completeness and passivity are taken for granted but without showing how the two features can cohere. In An. 2.5, Aristotle, thus, succeeds in capturing how perception differs not only from manifestations of non-passive complete capacities (such as the art of house-building), but also from passive processes (as exhibited in the inexhaustibility of the perceptive capacity and the object-directedness of perception). His definition is programmatic in the sense that it analyses the explananda without, however, yet providing any explanantia.

The chapter describes how forms of ill-treatment other than torture have been defined over the last 85 years since they were prohibited in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The core elements are described of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are described in turn with the distinctions between these terms and the definition of torture highlighted. The distinct features of other ill-treatment under international humanitarian law are also described.

The introduction offers a historical overview of terrorism through the ages and describes the development of international counterterrorism law. It discusses the interplay between terrorism and international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. It also introduces some of the controversy surrounding terrorism as a term.

No unitary definition of terrorism exists in international law and it is unlikely that States will agree upon one in the future. Chapter 1 describes how and why definitions differ in peacetime and in armed conflict and between international terrorism and domestic terrorism. Each of these scenarios evinces particularities in the contours of terrorism under international law. The chapter also explains why the United Nations Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism has not been successfully concluded.

The Introduction makes the case for why it is important and timely to return afresh to ancient greek epic, despite or even because of the huge amount of scholarship that already exists on this genre. After a brief overview of the current state of the field, it outlines the main points of innovation and interventions of the volume, focusing on its thematic structure, its emphasis on the lesser-known authors or dimensions of Greek epic, and its integration of ancient material and modern responses to it. It ends with a brief overview of the sections of the volume and draws out the connections between the chapters within them.

This chapter is centred on the controversial epic ‘sub’ genre of the epyllion. Verhelst first underlines the scholarly debates surrounding epyllion as a category and then turns to look more closely at poems which themselves could be termed ‘epyllionic’, starting with the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, and moving through the Hellenistic age (Theocritus’ Idyll 24, Moschus’ Eros the Runaway, and the Batrachomyomachia) to late antiquity (the Orphic Argonautica and Colluthus’ Abduction of Helen). Verhelst focuses not just on the aesthetic dimensions of these poems, but also on the characters contained within them: ‘small’ characters in small epic (children, Hermes, eros, frogs and mice) and foreboding cameos by ‘large’ figures like Achilles. Verhelst shows how these texts manipulate their mythological, primarily Homeric, models to put grand epic heroics into a new perspective, be it comical or dark, and suggests how characterisation, size and speed are key ways to understand how these poems negotiate their own position in relation to Homer and the epic tradition, as ‘shrunken’, but not diminutive epic.

This chapter explores the complex relationship between epic and the tricky genre of lyric. Spelman begins with brief historical orientation and then focuses on broader and more theoretical questions of genre, which have been given new impetus by Culler’s Theory of the Lyric. Taking ‘lyric’ in a broad sense to include iambos and elegy as well as melic poetry, Spelman considers some of the most famous and important lyric passages (especially drawing from Pindar and Sappho) that engage with Homeric epic, the Homeric Hymns and the Epic Cycle. Spelman ultimately examines how and whether lyric works out a definition for itself in contradistinction to epic—and whether such a definition can offer us a more nuanced understanding of what epic itself is.

Part II presents the definition of orthorexia nervosa and a proposal of its new definition (‘Salussitomania’) due to the inaccurate etymology of the term Orthorexia Nervosa. It includes diagnostic criteria sets for orthorexia nervosa (proposed by Setnick, 2013; Moroze et al., 2015; Barthels et al., 2015; Dunn and Bratman, 2016) to depict key features of orthorexia nervosa, global study distribution on orthorexia nervosa as well as the divergence and overlap of orthorexia nervosa and other mental disorders, namely anorexia nervosa, obsessive-compulsive disorder and avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder, to enable a differential diagnosis. A summation of the highlights is included at the end of this chapter. The commentaries of the invited international experts (Dr Caterina Novara, University of Padova, Italy and Dr Hana Zickgraf, Rogers Behavioral Health, USA) provide valuable insights on orthorexia nervosa.

This chapter explains and discusses the definition of public sector innovation. Public sector innovation includes two concepts or terms: (1) public sector and (2) innovation. The first concept, “the public sector,” refers to the general government organizations owned and funded by the government and may include or exclude state-owned enterprises. The second concept, “innovation,” refers to novel ideas or practices implemented organizations. Thus, novelty and implementation are two key terms defining innovation. Therefore, public sector innovation refers to innovative activities in the public sector, and this chapter provides information about it. In addition, this chapter discusses how and in what ways innovation differs from public management reforms, organizational change, invention, creativity, entrepreneurship, and improvement.

‘Early Christian Philosophers on Concepts’ by George Karamanolis integrates some of the themes encountered in previous chapters into the broad theological perspective of the early Christian thinkers, according to which explorations in every area of philosophy are ultimately intended to reveal aspects of God’s relation to His creation. It is argued that the position of the early Christian philosophers on concepts is part of their perceptual realism and their stance against scepticism. Karamanolis examines three case studies: the theories of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa. In all three cases, he maintains, concepts are treated both as mental representations and semantic/linguistic items through which we grasp reality. Clement develops his view on concepts in the context of an anti-sceptical elaboration of his thesis that knowledge of the world is propositional and attainable by humans, while Origen and Gregory of Nyssa defend more sophisticated theories of concepts in connection with their respective epistemologies. In every case a theological question motivates the Christian author’s stance with regard to the nature and formation of concepts.

Most people who regularly use the Internet will be familiar with words like “misinformation,” “fake news,” “disinformation,” and maybe even “malinformation.” It can appear as though these terms are used interchangeably, and they often are. However, they don’t always refer to the same types of content, and just because a news story or social media post is false doesn’t always mean it’s problematic. To add to the confusion, not all misinformation researchers agree on the definition of the problem, or employ a unified terminology. This chapter discusses the terminology around misinformation, guided by illustrative examples of problematic news content. It also looks at what misinformation isn’t: what makes a piece of information “real” or “true”? Finally, we explore how researchers have defined misinformation and how these definitions can be categorized, before presenting the working definition that is used throughout this book.

This conclusion sets out a definitional framework for a prohibited ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter according to the type theory developed in this monograph. It sets out the contextual elements of that provision and the elements of a ‘use of force’ that are identified and discussed in greater detail in earlier parts of the monograph. Finally, it offers some reflections on the legal nature of this framework and its potential as a tool for scholars and practitioners to assess whether forcible incidents meet the threshold of a prohibited ‘use of force’ between States under international law.

This introduction highlights the prevailing uncertainty regarding the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It sets out the key research questions that this monograph addresses regarding the meaning of ‘use of force’ under jus ad bellum, including if ‘force’ means physical/armed force only and whether kinetic means or the use of particular weapons required, if a (potential) physical effect is required and the required nature of such effects, if there is a de minimis gravity threshold, and if a coercive or hostile intent is required. It also explains why the definition of prohibited force matters and its consequences under international law, including with respect to the gap between ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) and ‘armed attack’ under article 51 as well as the rise of grey zone operations. Finally, it sets out the aims and contributions of this monograph and an outline of its structure.