The Abortion Counseling Service, a U.S. feminist organization better known as Jane, provided safe, affordable abortions to 12,000 women in Chicago during the pre-Roe era (1969–1973). Remarkably, beginning in 1970, its members, women and non-medical professionals, clandestinely performed the abortions themselves. Yet the group’s distinctive practice of political dissidence has not been carefully theorized. The article argues that Jane’s efforts were exemplary of anarchic direct action and feminist mutual aid. Their approach involved action that was “direct” in the specific sense of being unmediated and reflexive in character. Jane also enacted key mutual aid principles in their attempts to construct a community of care governed by relations of solidarity rather than charity. This account of how Jane “took” the right to abortion opens up a way of thinking about feminist organizing for reproductive justice that focuses on meeting immediate needs rather than seeking legislative change.

This critical commentary engages Jeff Jackson’s reading of John Dewey’s approach to participatory democracy and direct action—both are fundamental issues in democratic theory today. I probe Dewey’s texts for what I reason to be a more precise reading of his views on social movement action. I go beyond Jackson’s assertion of a role for direct action, to theorize it as an intrinsic element of participatory democracy.

This critical reply addresses William Caspary’s commentary on my use of John Dewey to elevate the theory of participatory democracy above deliberative democracy within contemporary democratic thought. In this reply I will defend my reading of Dewey against Caspary’s claim that Dewey is not the supporter of “nondeliberative” direct action that I take him to be. I will also explore the similarities and differences between my and Caspary’s views on the consonance of participatory democracy with practices of direct action, and I will expand on my own critique of deliberative democratic thought.

Since its inception, the inter-state dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation has generally been praised for effectively protecting the rule of law in international trade relations. While the relatively recent dismantling of this system does not necessarily mean the end of the WTO nor of the binding nature of its rules, the current crisis may be a good opportunity to reconsider the role of the rule of law in international trade relations and the ways in which it could further be accommodated. One suggestion, occasionally raised in the past, would be strengthening the enforcement of WTO rules by opening it to private action, either before national courts or through international adjudication. After all, the latter has been widely available to foreign investors covered by thousands of international investment agreements in force for decades. This contribution recalls the reasons behind the current lack of private enforcement of WTO law and argues that developments in international trade relations and experiences with investor-state dispute settlement are likely to work against rather than in favor of its introduction in the foreseeable future. Increased transparency and institutionalisation of non-state actors’ role in trade enforcement is therefore recommended instead.