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In this chapter I argue that self-defense is permissible against an unjust attack, but that any lethal harm must be, in Aquinas’s phrase, praeter intentionem, outside the intention of the defender. I argue that public authorities must also not intend death, but that because of the nature of the political task, public officials are capacitated to use force to a greater extent and in greater measure than are private individuals.
In this Chapter I argue, contrary to Aquinas and modern day defenders, that capital punishment is unjustified killing. Capital punishment is not required by retributivism, and Aqunas’s arguments defending the practice are unconvincing.
Everyone recognizes that it is, in general, wrong to intentionally kill a human being. But are there exceptions to that rule? In Killing and Christian Ethics, Christopher Tollefsen argues that there are no exceptions: the rule is absolute. The absolute view on killing that he defends has important implications for bioethical issues at the beginning and end of life, such as abortion and euthanasia. It has equally important implications for the morality of capital punishment and the morality of killing in war. Tollefsen argues that a lethal act is morally permissible only when it is an unintended side effect of one's action. In this way, some lethal acts of force, such as personal self-defense, or defense of a polity in a defensive war, may be justified -- but only if they involve no intension of causing death. Even God, Tollefsen argues, neither intends death, nor commands the intentional taking of life.
This short piece addresses how the possibility of humanity’s creating the technological singularity challenges and reshapes a host of traditional debates in the philosophy of religion about the significance of God’s status as creator.
Chapter 4 surveys a wide range of friendly and hostile interstate relations in ancient societies, where war was often the normal state of affairs. Notwithstanding the numerous conflicts, polities tried in the end, through alliances and diplomatic relations, to establish peaceful relations in view of political stability and economic prosperity. The chapter analyses hospitality rules regarding foreigners, treaties between polities and the establishment of diplomatic relations, which emerged as an international system in the ancient Near East during the mid-fourteenth century bce. An alternative to diplomacy in conflict management, typical of the Greek world, was arbitration and mediation with the help of a third party. In a final section, the chapter outlines how states, when diplomacy failed, started a war procedurally. In conclusion, the chapter argues that, in the absence of an international court, the enforcement of diplomatic rules and treaties was in many ancient societies ensured by the supranational authority of the gods.
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