Questions about aid reduction and its implications are crucial to understanding the future of civil society in many low- and middle-income countries and in post-conflict states. Local civil society in these contexts is often heavily influenced by foreign donors. This article provides an introduction to this theme issue about aid reduction and local civil society. The objective of the introduction and issue articles is to examine the causes of aid reduction and donor withdrawal, the impacts on local civil society organizations (CSOs), and any resulting change in local civil society. We ask: What are the global trends in aid reduction? What impacts does aid reduction have on local CSOs? How do local CSOs respond and adapt? The contributions in this issue demonstrate that aid reduction is indeed global in scale and that impacts and adaptations are often strikingly similar across countries and regions. These similarities form the basis for building new theory but also prompt new questions about the global effects of aid on civil society.

This article seeks to understand how the Indian state exercises control over transnational ties between foreign and domestic actors by examining the national legislative practices that determine receipt of foreign funds and the data on foreign funding flows to NGOs (a database of more than 18,000 associations). The article shows how legislative practices of democratic states serve to reduce foreign influence. Issue characteristics are also shown to determine state response to externalization, blocking transnational ties in “high politics” areas such as minority claims. Finally, within state imposed restrictions, religious rather than secular organizations remain dominant transnational actors in India. The study contributes evidence to suggest that contrary to the arguments of world polity theory and many transnational social movement scholars, states continue to remain powerful actors limiting transnationalization.

Much of the literature on local civil society organizations and foreign aid focuses on the short-term consequences of funding cycles and contract conditions, but treats foreign aid at the macrolevel like a largely stable condition, as though countries receiving foreign aid will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Empirical evidence of aid reduction, however, suggests that this approach neglects long-term phenomena. This article examines aid patterns on a global scale and explores their potential consequences for civil society organizations. Working from World Bank data, we identify general patterns in country-level aid reduction. We examine the frequency of country-level aid reduction, the magnitude of reduction, its duration, and whether aid reduction tends to be rapid or gradual. Mapping these patterns establishes that country-level reductions in aid are a regularly occurring, global phenomenon. Moreover, even as global ODA levels increase, instances of country-level aid reduction are also increasing. Our findings lay the foundation for building new, generalizable theory about aid reduction and allow us to identify pressing questions about the consequences for civil society organizations in need of further research.

Research on the determinants of foreign aid tends to focus on the relationship between donor country priorities and recipient state characteristics, but donors also make decisions about which organizations and programs within countries will receive assistance. Although NGOs increasingly have been recipients of foreign aid, few data are available to investigate which organizations within a given country receive that funding. Donors may prioritize structural characteristics of NGOs or their local ties—or they may seek a combination that blends concern about efficiency and accountability with an interest in developing national civil society. We use original data from Cambodia to explore whether aid is likely to go to managerial organizations (professionalized NGOs and NGOs that utilize modern management tools) or to organizations that are embedded in the domestic context. We argue that managerialism provides legitimacy for NGOs by signaling capacity and accountability to donors, increasing the likelihood of government funding. We argue that local embeddedness also confers legitimacy by aligning community ties and networks to rights-based development, increasing the likelihood of government funding. We find general support for the managerialism argument, but donor agencies do not prioritize direct funding for “indigenous” NGOs—not even among those with high levels of managerialism.

This paper examines whether three sets of factors—humanitarianism, the South Korean government’s official aid, and concerns regarding performance—affect South Korean CSOs’ decisions regarding aid recipients and the amount of aid to them. The statistical results of these two-stage analyses show that South Korean CSOs take into consideration different sets of factors at each stage of their aid allocation decisions. While humanitarianism and ODA allocation are consistently important at both stages of South Korean CSOs’ aid allocation decisions, performance concerns for aid effectiveness and efficiency (language and religion) matter especially at the second stage. Governance level of a developing country has a positive relationship with aid allocation decisions, while the direction of influence changes when only recipient countries are included in the regression analysis. These findings suggest that concerns regarding accountability and autonomy of CSOs in the context of their growing engagement in development cooperation may be unwarranted.

While US private philanthropic foundations are small in comparison with other international donors, the Ford Foundation was an important international actor and the biggest player within international philanthropy for almost 50 years. US-funded think tanks and research centers articulated various iterations of a development paradigm, but these paradigms shifted over the same 50 years. What are the driving forces behind these shifts? Why, for instance, were US foundations working directly with government officials in the 1950s while in the 1990s working mostly through non-governmental organizations? This article seeks first to trace the major shifts in the way the Ford Foundation engaged in international development and second aims to explain how and why these shifts took place. In order to conduct this research, I relied on archival research, such as annual reports, minutes from congressional hearings, and internal unpublished reports, and interviews with former high-level employees at Ford Foundation. In addition, I coded and analyzed a database of more than 40,000 grants from the Ford Foundation from 1951 to 2001. The article analyzes the Ford Foundation through four mechanisms of change: internal leadership, external regulation, displacement by competitors, and domestic pressures. These four factors are set against the backdrop of wider shifts in international politics.

This paper introduces the concept of symbolic rule of law promotion, which consists of repeated enactments of policy and initiatives equated with advancing the rule of law despite no evidence suggesting actual progress. To demonstrate its existence, US rule of law promotion in Afghanistan is examined as a “least likely” crucial case, from the end of President Obama’s Surge in 2014 to the Taliban’s return in 2021. During this time, Afghanistan— a major foreign policy priority—received the most US rule of law aid of any country globally. Unlike earlier attempts that sought to use the rule of law policy and practice to achieve substantive goals and adapted over time, US rule of law endeavors from 2015 to 2021 were symbolic. Decision makers consistently pursued rule of law strategies, and practitioners implemented initiatives that lacked any prospect of success. Previously unsuccessful strategies and programming were replicated alongside partnerships with disinterested, uncooperative stakeholders. More broadly, symbolic rule of law promotion has potentially significant implications for understanding the persistence of underperforming long-term rule of law efforts elsewhere. To increase the prospects of success, it shows the need to engage with non state justice authorities, support robust accountability mechanisms, and take concerns about state legitimacy seriously.

As authoritarianism has spread globally, government efforts to stifle civic space have increased dramatically. Among the most alarming tactics has been the spread of restrictive laws targeting NGOs. While such laws threaten the core objectives of many foreign donors, they have become especially common in aid-dependent nations. How do foreign donors react to this assault on their local and international implementing partners? On the one hand, democracy-promoting donors might push back, ramping up support for advocacy in defiance of draconian measures. Alternatively, when aspiring autocrats make it difficult to work with local partners, donors might back down, decreasing support for democracy promotion. Testing these arguments using dyadic data on aid flows, an original data set of NGO laws, and a variety of research designs, we find that the donors most committed to democracy promotion back down in the face of restrictive NGO laws, reducing democracy aid by 70 percent in the years after laws are enacted. Our findings suggest that donor behavior creates strong incentives for backsliding governments in aid-receiving countries to use legislation to crack down on civil society.

How does China use development finance to gain influence in international organizations? Leveraging the exogenous rotation of ASEAN and African Union Chairmanship, I estimate the effect of regional leadership on Chinese commitments. Results suggest that Chinese projects are politically motivated only when the lending and recipient entities are linked to the Chinese and host governments. Governments that assume the Chair received seven times more commitments from Chinese government agencies relative to non-Chair years, a $90 million increase for the average project. By contrast, there is no evidence to suggest that Chinese banks act as agents of Beijing. Moreover, I find a consistent null relationship between temporary UN Security Council status and Chinese finance, unlike established findings about Western donors, suggesting that China is deliberately seeking regional influence. These results underscore the importance of considering the specific actors involved in China’s economic statecraft.

This article examines the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the degree of personalism in dictatorships. We contend that aid leads to higher personalism since it is a windfall that accrues to the government and does not require cooperation from elites to obtain it. Contrarily, we posit that FDI is linked to lower levels of personalism because it reshapes elites’ incentives and influence as they may acquire new preferences, connections, and exit options, thus constraining dictators. Using data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI, and a latent index of personalism in autocracies, we find no robust evidence that ODA or FDI are correlated with personalism, but have some effect on some of the index’s components.

A secret pact between the Solomon Islands and China, mainly concerned with internal security in the islands, has sparked new US-China competition in the Pacific Island countries. The United States, Australia, and New Zealand worry about a future Chinese base in the Solomons and elsewhere, whereas most Pacific Island countries worry about environmental and economic problems and want to stay clear of the US-China rivalry. Omitted from most analyses is the overwhelming US naval and air superiority in the Asia Pacific, and the neglect of the United States and its allies of Pacific Islanders' concerns. Belatedly, the United States is trying to get back in the game, while China already is presenting the PI countries with a blueprint for economic recovery and environmental protection.