In democracies, electoral mandates are meant to shape public policy. But how much leeway do elected representatives actually have to implement it? Influential scholars think that (horizontal and vertical) institutional hurdles, budget constraints and political pressure dilute mandate responsiveness, but empirical evidence for this important claim remains scarce. This article provides a theoretical model and an empirical account of the extent to which different types of constraints limit the capacity of governing parties to set their electoral priorities on the agenda. Using fixed‐effects Poisson regression on German electoral and legislative priorities over a period of over three decades (1983–2016), we conclude that policies reflect electoral priorities to a greater extent than scholarship has acknowledged so far. We do confirm, however, the constraining effects of Europeanization, shrinking budget leeway, intra‐coalition disagreement and low executive popularity. We elaborate on the implications for theories of public policy, democratic representation and comparative politics.

Advocating more repressive law and order policies along the slogan ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ in their election manifesto, Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and Gerhard Schröder in Germany were elected in the late 1990s. Once in power, however, only New Labour substantially toughened law and order policies, whereas the German Social Democrats did not change the legal status quo, to a similar extent, during their mandate. This article tackles this puzzle, arguing that the preferences of the ministers and the formal and informal rules shaping the balance of power in government are crucial to understanding why two governments that initially advocated similar policies adopted a rather different policy stance. The results are based on meticulous process tracing and a series of elite interviews concerning two major topics in the realm of law and order during the 1990s: policies directed at sexual offenders, and policies responding to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

This study attempts to answer the question: When do civil society organizations (CSOs) function as a bridge between the informal political sphere and the formal political sphere by changing the political attitudes of their members? To answer this question, I used the Japanese General Social Survey 2003 (JGSS 2003). My main findings involve the effect of the face-to-face interactions that the CSO members have with government officials. The findings suggest that while CSO members without such interactions are no more psychologically politically engaged than non-members, the members with such interactions are. The findings have an empirical importance to those who study Japan since the country is currently undergoing CSO–government relationship reform and the number of CSOs is growing rapidly in the recent years. The study also has a theoretical importance to civil society scholars since this study attempts to unfold the mechanism in which CSOs’ positive effects on the members’ political attitudes are produced.

This article addresses a question that sits at the heart of democracy studies today: What do we mean when we speak about a “crisis of democracy”? The article opens with introductory clarifications on the meanings of the concept of crisis—namely its root in medicine, and on three contemporary perspectives of democracy—trilateral, deliberative, and crisis. These perspectives are analyzed using monoarchic and diarchic distinctions. Next, the article lists the main discourses about crisis in recent political theory literature. In conclusion, the article proposes an answer to the question of what we mean by crisis of democracy by arguing that it is not democracy in general but one form of democracy in particular that is in crisis—a parliamentary democracy based on the centrality of suffrage and political parties.

This study applies a hierarchical clustering approach to identify social enterprise models that have appeared in a setting of public sector-led incubation. Within such a context, a high degree of conformity ought to be apparent due to the coercive isomorphic pressures associated with public sector patronage. We nominate South Korea for our analysis, given that the rising number of social enterprises in the country is closely related to a regulatory intervention. Based on an analysis of 468 social enterprises, we find, contrary to expectations, that distinct clusters of government-certified social enterprises have emerged, namely social utility niche, job outsourcing, market opportunity, and integrated balanced models. We typologize these models according to their strategic orientation, mission focus, and institutional alignment. In doing so, we contribute to social enterprise research by illustrating how organizational pluralism may manifest when the growth of a population of social enterprises is directly linked to public sector intervention and regulation.

The lexicon divides into parts of speech (or lexical categories), and there are cross-cutting regularities (features). These two dimensions of analysis take us a long way, but several phenomena elude us. For these the term ‘split’ is used extensively (‘case split’, ‘split agreement’, and more), but in confusingly different ways. Yet there is a unifying notion here. I show that a split is an ADDITIONAL PARTITION, whether in the part-of-speech inventory or in the feature system. On this base an elegant typology can be constructed, using minimal machinery. The typology starts from four external relations (government, agreement, selection, and anti-government), and it specifies four types of split within each (sixteen possibilities in all). This typology (i) highlights less familiar splits, from diverse languages, and fits them into the larger picture; (ii) introduces a new relation, anti-government, and documents it; (iii) elucidates the complexities of multiple splits; and (iv) clarifies what exactly is split, which leads to a sharpening of our analyses and applies across different traditions.

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral ‘cost of governing’. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti‐political‐establishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti‐political‐establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by ‘bringing the party back in’. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.

This article reflects on the importance of the relations between state and society in policy-making in the area of public health. Several studies in various sectors such as health, education, and social services have made similar observations on organizational dynamics and the institutionalization of different models of partnerships or contracts, often based on the analytical model of three sectors. Individuals and their networks of relationships, however, remain an almost unexplored dimension in these types of research. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to analyze the movement of HIV/AIDS activists to governmental organizations working in this same field. The analysis raises questions concerning the forms of individual and institutional learning that help to maintain the distinct character of innovation of the Brazilian policy. Professionals who cross the borders hold a different profile once they have accumulated experience working with grassroots and local NGOs, and have also had the chance to be trained and enhance their technical and managerial capacities, since the government has supported NGOs for a long period. When combined, these experiences allow them to maintain relationships with social movements and give them the ability to navigate through the government bureaucracy and handle technical information about fighting AIDS epidemics, making it possible for them to negotiate strategic collaborations reflecting the interests of different groups. Hence, they constantly reflect on the differences between government and social spaces, and keep questioning and modifying their roles in the light of potential and existing complementarities.

Recent studies have drawn attention to the political contingencies of the media's political agenda‐setting influence, finding, for instance, that issues from the media agenda are more likely to attract attention if a party enjoys ownership of the issue. Supplementing the debate on why political parties respond to news, it is argued in this article that ownership is only part of the picture and that policy responsibility, together with news tone, constitutes a stronger explanation of news politicisation. Opposition parties respond to bad news because they reflect negative developments in social problems for which the government could be held responsible. The government responds to good news that reflects positive developments in social problems because this could politicise policy success, but is also forced to react when news explicitly address government responsibility and thereby threatens its image as responsive and competent. Furthermore, it is shown that news tone and policy responsibility condition the incentive to politicise owned issues from the media agenda. Thus, opposition parties will not politicise owned issues when news is good because this could draw attention to government success, while government is unable and unwilling to prioritise owned issues when news is bad and instead is likely to make use of its ownership strengths when news is good and the pressure to respond is low. The arguments are tested on a large‐N sample of radio news stories from Denmark (2003–2004). Opposition response is measured through parliamentary questions spurred by the news stories, while government response is indicated by references to these stories in the prime minister's weekly press meeting. Results confirm the expectations, suggesting that parties care more about the tone of news stories and the type of attention they might produce, rather than what type of issues they could serve to politicise.

The drive to welfare reform has revolutionalized the relationship between the state and the third sector in many countries. But this article argues that, if we are to understand the impact of the changing role of the state on the third sector, then we must first understand the dynamics of the relationship between national and local government. It compares two countries—the U.K. and Italy—where national-local government relations have developed in different directions, and suggests a number of avenues for further analysis of this three-way relationship.

Research on nonprofit advocacy in non-Western settings is still rather limited. In this article, we address this limitation by examining the advocacy practices of nonprofit charitable organizations in Singapore, a non-liberal democratic city-state in Southeast Asia with a history of colonial rule. We ask the following questions: What are the key environmental and organizational factors that influence the scope and intensity of advocacy activities of nonprofit organizations? In particular, what is the effect of the political context on the advocacy strategies and tactics among these organizations? To answer these questions, we present a three-factor explanatory model of nonprofit advocacy incorporating cause, capacity, and context. The research methodology entails a survey of nonprofit executives from a random sample of Singapore human and social service organizations. Our findings shed light on how the various aspects of the political context—perceived opportunities and threats from government intervention and dependence on government funding—shape nonprofit advocacy in a non-Western setting.

How did Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) globally address the needs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic? In this study, we examine the roles CSOs played during the first 18 months of the pandemic, their main challenges, and how the pandemic changed CSOs’ roles in society across 39 countries and economies. Using inductive thematic analysis analyzing responses from global philanthropy experts in two consecutive studies (2020 and 2021), we find that CSOs played fourteen roles, of which we discuss the six most mentioned: providing social assistance; responding to health care needs; coordinating and collaborating with government and business; mobilizing funds to address societal needs; raising awareness and combating misinformation; and advocating. Challenges for CSOs included reduced revenue and difficulty reaching beneficiaries. We found these challenges led to innovative ways of operating and new arrangements between civil societies and governments, which may have opened opportunities for a more active role of CSOs.

This article examines Jean Blondel's contribution to the development of European – and more generally of contemporary – political science. He is primarily associated with the European Consortium for Political Research, of which he was Founding Director 1970–1979. Crucially important although the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) is, this undervalues the considerable intellectual influence he has exerted over the discipline at crucial points in it is evolution, primarily in terms of comparative research, classification, and data collection. His institutional and intellectual achievements have made him one of the most influential political scientists of the late twentieth century, fittingly recognised by the award of the Johan Skytte Prize in 2004.

Traditionally, it is assumed that the executive strongly controls Parliament within the Belgian political system. The absence of a federal government following the 2010 elections had three consequences on the activity of the Belgian Parliament. Some actions were put on hold, and essential reforms were delayed. On other issues, however, Members of Parliament took the lead, developing ad hoc majorities that cut across earlier cleavages between majority and opposition. Third, however, parties continued to vote along the majority of the caretaker government. While it could be expected that this situation, in the long run, might lead to a stronger position of Parliament vis-à-vis government, it is to be expected that traditional power relations will be restored once a full government has been formed.