The concept of Humanity is defined as the character of the human species, and it is distinguished from other similar concepts: humankind, humanness, human rights, human obligations, human dignity, and human mutual love. Humanity encompasses the spirit of general reason, and Marcus Aurelius is cited as a prime example of this spirit. The purpose of social and state institutions, of the arts and sciences is to humanize. This is borne out by Lucretius, Homer, Shaftesbury, Lessing, Diderot, and Swift, and citations of their works are given as testimony. Lessing’s Emilia Galotti is read as an example of how morality is realized in the theatre. The chapter closes with a poem by Ludwig Gleim as an example of human goodness.

The progressive digitalization of industries and services has direct effects on the organization of labor. Telework is foremost a consequence of the general increased use of information technology in our professional and private lives. The organizational changes of labor due to digitalization however challenge the functionality and effectiveness of labor law. The employer’s comprehensible concerns, that teleworkers might pursue private interests at home, serve in practice as a justification for implementation of closed meshed monitoring measures. Hence, we face a significant paradox: even though teleworkers enjoy a putative higher degree of autonomy because they are not present at premise and therefore not subject to the employers’ physical authority, they are exposed to a higher degree of dependency rooted in digital control measures. Data protection acquires increasing importance for workers. Labor protection in many cases cannot be separated from data protection. This chapter argues that this evolution is not sufficiently mirrored by the law, and then analyses in its first part the existing shortcomings and loopholes exemplified by the problem of digital surveillance of telework. In its second part the chapter seeks to identify possible legal mechanisms to create or even foster interaction between labor and data protection law.

In its opening clause, the preamble to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) asserts the strong affinity between the concepts of human dignity and human rights. “Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” the declaration grandly begins, “is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Preambles are repositories of lofty rhetoric, but they are also expressions of shared values and basic ideological assumptions. The expansive political claims of the UDHR find justification in the idea of human dignity. Moreover, the Declaration itself helped to cement the place of dignity in the modern discourse of rights, and the importance of dignity as a source of moral justification remains a lively theme in explorations of the origins and normative basis for human rights claims. In the words of Jeremy Waldron, for instance, “Dignity is intimately connected with the idea of rights – as the ground of rights, the content of certain rights, and perhaps even the form and structure of rights.”

Is there anything in the ancient world that deserves to be called a “right” in the subjective sense? The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre stated quite apodictically that “there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400,” concluding from this that even if there were such rights, “no one could have known that there were.” Until relatively recently, historians would have agreed with MacIntyre. The prevailing view was that in antiquity we look in vain for what has come to be called subjective rights – that neither the concept of rights nor the word “right” could be encountered in the ancient world in its subjective sense.

There is growing global interest in how AI can improve access to justice, including how it can increase court capacity. This chapter considers the potential future use of AI to resolve disputes in the place of the judiciary. We focus our analysis on the right to a fair trial as outlined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and ask: do we have a right to a human judge? We firstly identify several challenges to interpreting and applying Article 6 in this new context, before considering the principle of human dignity, which has received little attention to date. Arguing that human dignity is an interpretative principle which incorporates protection from dehumanisation, we propose it provides a deeper, or “thicker” reading of Article 6. Applied to this context, we identify risks of dehumanisation posed by judicial AI, including not being heard, or not being subject to human judgement or empathy. We conclude that a thicker reading of Article 6 informed by human dignity strongly suggests the need to preserve human judges at the core of the judicial process in the age of AI.

This chapter introduces the vision of contract law adopted in this book, based on two concentric spheres: an inner sphere encompasses an economic realm rooted in values such as freedom and sanctity of contract, reflecting a non-interventionist approach that can accommodate imbalanced transactions and an outer sphere shaped by public policy concerns, which embodies social values such as the protection of relational autonomy and human dignity. The chapter justifies the structure of the book, the choice of legal frameworks examined, as well as the relevance of this study for disability equality and contract legal research.

This chapter highlights the interconnection between economic and social values in the contractual realm, rooted in a perception of people as holder of rights and a broad interpretation of autonomy and human dignity that looks beyond individualistic values. With a focus on grossly asymmetrical contracts, it promotes an understanding of vulnerability in the contractual context based on the circumstances of the transaction, rather than on people’s medical conditions. The chapter reflects on the merits and drawbacks of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) as a potential benchmark for promoting a vision of contract law that responds to both economic and social concerns and recognises the equality of all human beings. The second part considers how English contract law could be brought closer to the equality vision promoted by the UNCRPD, proposing an understanding of the contractual realm based on concentric economic and social spheres, shaped by fluid boundaries, and reflecting on the relevance of contract law as part of a broader set of measures to ensure a fairer society.

This chapter brings together the idea of bridges between economic and social concerns. The discussion reinforces the need to recognise the outer sphere of contracting in holding these connections together, recognising the role of contract law in protecting both economic values (including freedom and sanctity of contract) and social values (including relational autonomy and human dignity). A suggested path to succeed in these endeavours is to embrace the idea of complementarity in contract law, which enables us to accept the coexistence of ideas that may appear, initially, to be mutually exclusive. The idea of complementarity in contract law enables us to see economic and social values not as antagonistic, but as coexisting parts of interconnected spheres.

The third bridge is explored in chapter five and focuses on the connection between constitutional values and private law. The analysis concentrates on the values of autonomy and human dignity and their interplay with the principle of freedom of contract in English contract law. The discussion also reflects on the link between the UNCRPD, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, and English contract law, and suggests that rather than looking for a seamless bridge that links the UNCRPD directly with English contract law, we should look for steppingstones connecting the UNCRPD, the ECHR, the HRA and domestic private law. This chapter also discusses the values of participation and inclusion, with a focus on the idea of influence vulnerability explored in the previous chapter, and reflects on the need to enhance the influence of persons with disabilities and DDPOs in shaping legislative developments in English law, including consumer contract law.

This title explores the foundational theoretical aspects of international human rights law, delving into the philosophical underpinnings and conceptual frameworks that shape our understanding of human rights. It examines the historical evolution of human rights ideas, the influence of various philosophical traditions, and the ongoing debates about the nature and universality of human rights. This section also addresses the epistemological ruptures between philosophy and law, and between law and justice, highlighting the challenges in reconciling these perspectives within a coherent human rights framework. It discusses the contributions of different schools of thought, such as natural law, positivism, and sociological approaches, to the development of human rights theory. By critically analyzing these theoretical foundations, this title aims to provide a deeper understanding of the principles and values that underpin international human rights law and to highlight the complexities and nuances involved in defining and protecting human rights in diverse cultural and legal contexts.

A pragmatic approach to international human rights law involves discussing its premises, principles like human dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity, and structural principles such as democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law. The chapter also examines the conditions, matters, and actors involved in the discussion. It explores how these principles are applied in practice and the challenges faced in their implementation. The chapter emphasizes the importance of a pragmatic approach that considers the practical realities of applying human rights principles in different contexts. It also discusses the role of various actors, including states, international organizations, and civil society, in promoting and protecting human rights.

The right to freedom of thought is not explicitly mentioned in the German Basic Law. This chapter examines whether and how freedom of thought might be implicitly protected in the Basic Law (GG), focusing on the right to freedom of belief, conscience and religion (Article 4 GG), the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 5 GG), the right to human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the general right of personality (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) GG). Freedom of thought is sometimes mentioned in the literature in connection with freedom of belief, conscience and religion and freedom of expression and information as a necessary precondition for the formation of convictions and opinions. Inner freedom is an inherent aspect of human dignity, but only extreme forms of interference with the inner freedom of the person constitute a violation of this right. The general right of personality protects the prerequisites of personal freedom and self-determination and therefore could provide the most comprehensive protection for a person’s inner freedom. It is therefore argued that while freedom of thought is within the scope of protection of these four rights, it can be rooted in the general right of personality in particular.

This chapter contains answers to the Questionnaire on Constitutional Democracy for Chinese Liberal Intellectuals, which covers the basic concepts and institutional designs of constitutional democracy. China’s most pressing task is not making a new and better constitution, but rather formulating social contract through implementing the existing constitution, which does pay lip service to many political natural law precepts. Unlike many admirers of the American presidential system, I advocate for a Westminster-type parliamentary system, which has largely been borrowed by the current Chinese constitution, to be embedded in a federal framework for future China.