While direct state funding of political parties has been a prominent theme in cross‐national research over the last decade, we still know little about party strategies to access state resources that are not explicitly earmarked for partisan usage. This article looks at one widespread but often overlooked informal party practice: the ‘taxing’ of MP salaries – that is, the regular transfer of fixed salary shares to party coffers. Building on notions of informal institutions developed in work on new democracies, the theoretical approach specifies factors that shape the acceptability of this legally non‐enforceable intra‐organisational practice. It is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering 124 parties across 19 advanced democracies. Controlling for a range of party‐ and institutional‐level variables, it is found that the presence of a taxing rule and the collection of demanding tax shares are more common in leftist parties (high internal acceptability) and in systems in which the penetration of state institutions by political parties is intense (high external acceptability).

Two states can have several bilateral agreements between them, some of which are legally binding and others are not. Is there a discernible pattern to how states structure the chronological sequence of binding and non-binding agreements governing a specific issue area? For example, do states prioritise a framework treaty to establish the foundation of their cooperation and let bureaucrats iron out details in non-binding instruments? Or do they first experiment with low-commitment agreements before eventually settling on a more permanent treaty? This paper explores these questions using the example of space governance, which is characterised by a high number of bilateral agreements. Examining space agreements between 287 state dyads, it argues that a combination of power asymmetry and trust levels influences the likelihood of certain types of sequences of binding and non-binding agreements. These findings are particularly relevant to the literature on informal governance, regime complexes, and space politics.

Crises constitute a fascinating context in which to investigate the resilience of institutional arrangements, or their breakdown and change, and to shed light on the interplay between formal and informal institutions in this process. The papers in this symposium focus on crises from political power grab to economic shock and natural disasters. They focus on the differing impact of different crises or investigate the specific impact of one form of crises on formal and informal institutions or the negotiation process that allow them to coexist. Bringing them under one roof emphasises the diversity of lenses through which institutions can be conceptualised and operationalised. It also highlights some of the issues preventing meaningful comparisons across frameworks. Importantly, it also allows us to trace an agenda for research towards improving our understanding of when and how crises lead to change. We argue that an often under-studied aspect that could help to move towards a clearer taxonomy is to articulate more explicitly the agency of actors and the distribution of power within society and social groups.

Taking inspiration from the work of Douglass North, much institutional research attempts a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. North often associated ‘formal institutions’ with rules enforced through a legal system. It is suggested here that this lead should be followed and refined. In which case ‘legal system’ and ‘law’ require definitions. An alternative claim, that ‘formal’ basically means ‘written down’, is arguably less useful. Stressing the importance of clear definitions in this area, this paper considers a case where slight modifications yield strikingly different results. Some options concerning the meanings of ‘culture’ and their relation to institutions are briefly noted. Changes in, and interactions between, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions are considered, with illustrative examples. Contrary to some authors, informal institutions can sometimes change rapidly, in some cases in response to state legislation.

Constitutional courts operate under a framework of formal and informal rules. While formal rules have been extensively studied, our understanding of informal rules remains limited. Courts often rely on internal practices, traditions and unwritten customs developed over time, posing a significant challenge due to their hidden nature. Numerous constitutional courts lack detailed voting protocols in their statutes and internal regulations, leaving essential aspects to the court's discretion, such as, inter alia, the voting order, deliberation style, outcome versus issue voting and tie-breaking protocols. By employing a case study of strategic breaching of informal voting protocols in the Mexican Supreme Court, this article highlights the complexity of enforcing informal voting rules given that external actors may be unaware of them, along with other factors. Even when informal rules are broadly known, certain circumstances may diminish the efficacy of informal sanctions addressing their breach. Thus, key judicial players, such as chief justices or judge-rapporteurs, may take advantage of the informal rules of voting protocols to advance their policy preferences.

Constitutional conventions are traditionally understood as socially binding, usually unwritten, rules of constitutional importance based on precedent which cannot be enforced before courts. This traditional approach has several limitations, because it debates the normative quality of conventions rather than how to find them and where the real power lies. By doing so it is disconnected from scholarship on informal institutions in social sciences. Moreover, scholarship on constitutional conventions focuses predominantly on common law countries and conventions concerning political branches. This article pushes the boundaries in both directions. It shows how constitutional conventions can be conceptualized in civil law jurisdictions, and also identifies informal practices and constitutional conventions governing the judiciaries. On a broader level, it argues that constitutional conventions as a normative concept can help to filter the informal practices and differentiate between simple repetitive behavior on the one hand and conventions as a subset of informal institutions on the other.

Most scholarly writings focus on the harmful effects of informal institutions. This article explores the positive influence of informal judicial institutions on the fundamental values of judicial systems. It develops a framework for assessing such institutions. The paper argues that the normative evaluation of informal judicial institutions is highly context-specific. Depending on their historical trajectories, different jurisdictions may emphasize different interests. Because of this, when evaluating informal judicial institutions, balancing the same values may yield different results in different jurisdictions. The recent trend towards formalization, supported by supranational institutions, goes hand-in-hand with the spreading narrative of good governance, emphasizing principles such as transparency or inclusion, principles that generally stand in tension with informality. This article cautions against emerging supranational templates insensitive to local practice.

The Israeli democracy regulates the operation of the judiciary through the constraints of formal rules that check the political actors, the individual judges, and the judiciary. Basic laws, laws and regulations prescribe the operation of every subject. Yet beyond these formal rules, informal institutions and practices are sometimes equally important in the operation of the judiciary, as they are in any constitutional system. In Israel, some of these informal institutions are crucial for the flourishing of democracy and the rule of law, through their protection of judicial independence from external political interference. The imminent possibility that political actors may set some of them aside is nothing less than a potential transformation in the constitutional order. Over the past few decades, judges and court administrators have introduced other internal informal institutions in the administration of the Israeli Judiciary, which qualify formal judicial accountability mechanisms in ways that may prove to be detrimental to democratic principles. This article discusses informal institutions that are important in the operation of the Israeli judiciary, separating the former external kind that are conducive to the rule of law—such as the illegitimacy of political and partisan considerations in judicial appointments—and whose disregard may signal democratic decay from the latter internal kind that may prove detrimental to the courts—such as opaquely changing who is responsible for court administration. Lastly, the political attempt to change informal institutions, detailed herein, can be seen as a harbinger of the current attempt to change formal institutions in the constitutional status of the judiciary in Israel.

While informal institutions significantly affect the functioning of courts, they also change the powers, position, and influence of individual actors in judicial systems. This Article analyzes how the presence of informal judicial institutions and practices reshapes the influence and importance of roles individual actors play in the functioning of the judiciary. The aim of this Article is three-fold. First, it maps the actors of informal judicial institutions and practices. Second, it stresses the importance of looking at actors who are not formally involved in particular judicial processes and recognized as decision-makers but have the ability to influence the judiciary informally. Third, it shows why it is necessary to keep in mind that also collective bodies can take part in informal judicial institutions and practices.

This introductory Article provides a conceptual umbrella for the Special Issue on Informal Institutions and Democratic Decay. It offers conceptual clarity to studying informal institutions and explains their relationship to other concepts such as constitutional conventions or judicial culture. The article summarizes findings of the Special issue in four key observations. First, it shows that it is impossible to understand the functioning of courts without understanding the informal rules that shape courts’ governance and decision-making. These informal rules (institutions) appear within courts (internal), between courts and other actors (mixed) and among non-judicial actors with effects on courts (external judicial institutions). Second, it identifies a strong trend of formalization of rules, sponsored mostly on the supranational European level .Third, it explains why reforms of formal rules are often not sufficient to trigger behavioral changes and highlights the role of informal institutions in created commitment of actors to key democratic principles. Fourth, it argues that informal judicial institutions significantly impact the quality of democracy.

This article uses the case study of Slovakia and its lackluster experience with a judge-dominated judicial council to demonstrate that formal institutions have only limited impact on the ideational level. We show that the transformation of the Slovak post-communist judiciary relied on the presumption that judges‘ interests are automatically complementary to principles of the rule of law. Therefore, the majority of implemented reforms insulated the judiciary from the political branches of power, but allowed strong hierarchical relationships inside the courts to exist. In contrast to international expectations, judicial authorities used judicial empowerment to create or strengthen competing informal practices, which helped them to maximize their power. We argue that the lack of internalization of judicial independence might explain why institutional self-governance reforms failed to trigger changes in the professional role conception of judges in regimes riddled with deeply embedded informal institutions. In order to tackle this problem, we propose that future research on the relationship between institutional safeguards and decisional judicial independence should focus on the process through which actors internalize new institutional incentives.

Even at long time horizons, modern outcomes are in some sense bounded by history. Culture shapes how people interact and as it propagates across generations, groups with more common ancestors face less frictions to cooperation. This, in turn, affects institutional and technological diffusion, implying a society's history plays a crucial role in the causes of sustained long-run economic growth. To test this, we follow other studies by proxying for historical effects with genetic relatedness, which yields a temporal proportionality of shared common ancestry. Measuring cultural traits are more challenging. We develop a new systematic measure through network analysis of Wikipedia. Connectivity statistics over the encyclopaedia's hyperlink-directed network captures unique features of cultural relatedness. Further, as we index pages, we can coarsen the network into specific topics. The results show how history correlates broadly over a range of cultural factors. Differences across the coarsened networks demonstrate not simply that history matters, but where it matters less.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? In a companion paper (Voigt (2023). Journal of Institutional Economics, 20), I survey studies showing that geographical conditions can have direct and long-lasting effects on social norms. This paper goes one step further: It surveys studies that show how different geographical conditions affect both religious beliefs as well as traditions of family organization and how these, in turn, affect social norms.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

This JOIE symposium features some of the most influential papers presented in the seventh version of the conference on The shadow economy, tax behaviour, and institutions. Accordingly, it brings together contributions from several disciplines and schools of thought in the social sciences and the humanities exploring such issues as the role of formal and informal institutions in understanding the shadow economy, the importance of social aversion in the motivations for tax compliance, and the dual nature of corruption. This introduction lays out the scope of the symposium, summarises the preceding literature on the topic, and provides a brief outline of each contributing article, noting that, although each paper focuses on a different economic and cultural context, they share several elements in common with alternative theories addressing the institutional, psychological, and sociological aspects of tax law compliance and other appropriate behaviours.

This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.