This article examines the ethnic and gender quotas that have been applied to Burundi’s Constitutional Court since 2019. It shows that while gender quotas aim to make the court reflective or to remedy past injustices, ethnic quotas serve multiple roles: securing ethnic peace, de-escalating conflict or confirming power balances. Our analysis challenges scepticism about judicial quotas and independence, arguing that quotas do not inherently undermine legal merit, particularly when constitutional values are at stake. However, the position-sharing model poses risks to judicial independence, potentially diminishing court legitimacy. We highlight the complexities of combining ethnic and gender quotas, and we develop a typology of courts with such quotas, categorizing Burundi’s Constitutional Court as a blend of reflective, affirmative action, position-sharing and power-sharing. By examining Burundi’s experience, the article contributes to the debate on judicial quotas in segmented societies and the impact of identity-based representation on constitutional design, post-conflict governance and judicial independence.
