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In this chapter, we rely upon two experiments to demonstrate that the public withdraws acceptance of executive actions implemented through contravention – over the objection of a court – but only if that court has a high level of judicial independence. But, if executives contravene a low independence court, it is as if the court had not acted: there is no difference in the public’s level of acceptance. Additionally, we find no evidence in any of our quartet of countries that judicial approval improves the public’s acceptance of an executive’s policy. Contrary to fears that citizens may blindly follow courts and adjust their opinions based on a court’s ruling, we find no evidence that even widely-respected courts are able to increase citizens’ support for an executive action by endorsing it.
In this chapter, we examine the effects of judicial review across citizens. We find that, when courts enjoy high levels of judicial independence, their rulings’ efficacy is amplified among citizens who have a strong regard for the rule of law; when citizens have low levels of support for the rule of law, the effect of a court’s ruling is muted. For courts that lack judicial independence, even those citizens who hold the rule of law in the highest regard are unaffected by a court’s determination that that an executive’s behavior is unconstitutional. Additionally, we explain how the efficacy of judicial review varies based on the public’s approval of the executive whose policy the court reviews. Notably, we find that the public opinion constraint on executives comes from their supporters, not their opponents. These findings point to an important implication: political sympathy for the executive may not necessarily be the Achilles heel of judicial efficacy it is often portrayed to be.
This chapter ties together our theory and analyses to draw general conclusions and to chart the path for future research. We discuss the implications of our findings for the broad set of research areas we engage, including theories of judicial independence, models of executive unilateral action, and the relationship between the rule of law and democratic entrenchment. We highlight strengths and weaknesses of our findings and research design and suggest paths for other scholars to move this research forward. We see many additional opportunities to interrogate our theory and its implications in other places, on other issues, and in other settings to facilitate a broader understanding of when and how courts are efficacious.
This chapter presents our research design. First, in recognition of our theory’s emphasis on judicial independence, we select four cases – the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland – that vary in their levels of judicial independence but share important political, legal, and socio-economic characteristics. We use surveys of elites and the public to demonstrate that variation in judicial independence is observed by experts and citizens alike. Second, the chapter establishes the crucial role the COVID-19 pandemic plays in our research design. The global pandemic presented a unique and fleeting opportunity to probe citizens’ reactions to rule-of-law violations because it produced real threats to the rule of law in ways that were felt simultaneously and similarly around the world. Third, we discuss the benefits of using survey experiments for a study like ours. Finally, we introduce the four countries in detail, describing their general political characteristics, the institutional characteristics of their constitutional courts, and their handling of the pandemic.
Even where a public consensus exists about the appropriate bounds of constitutional action, citizens’ capacity to punish executive overreach is not guaranteed. People often lack information about possible constitutional transgressions, and imposing meaningful political penalties for overreach requires coordinated action among citizens. We argue that courts are key to overcoming these obstacles: under the right conditions, courts, through the use of judicial review, are uniquely positioned to alert the public of constitutional transgressions and thereby transform the public’s support for the rule of law into a guardrail against executive overreach. We suggest judicial independence enhances the ability of courts to signal that an executive has gone too far. By contrast, courts with low levels of judicial independence are impotent: their decisions are not credible enough to affect citizens’ attitudes. We also expect the rulings of independent courts to be most effective among citizens who have a high level of support for the rule of law and to persist even in the face of stark partisan polarization.
We open the book by discussing the rise of constitutional courts and judicial review, emphasizing their stated responsibility as guardians of the constitutional system. We discuss existing theories of judicial power and independence, highlighting the concept of judicial efficacy: the ability of courts to create political penalties for elites who fail to abide by the constitutional limits on their authority. We discuss different types of penalties courts might levy and explain why attitudinal costs – particularly a loss of public support – represent the cornerstone of judicial efficacy. We then provide a summary of our argument, contrasting our theory of judicial efficacy with existing accounts of judicial power and impact. The chapter concludes with a roadmap for the rest of the book and a summary of our key findings.
Does partisanship undermine the ability of courts to affect citizens’ attitudes? We introduce a dueling theoretical account to our own which suggests that citizens prioritize partisanship over constitutional rules when evaluating executive actions. We test these rival perspectives in Germany and the United States with a survey experiment that leverages the countries’ federal structures. We find that citizens of both countries are remarkably steadfast in their willingness to punish executives – including copartisans – for breaching constitutional limits and flouting court orders. Contrary to fears that partisanship is an overwhelmingly pernicious threat to the rule of law, we show that independent courts are resilient in their ability to cut through the binds of partisanship, to monitor executives, and coordinate public actions to reign in incumbent excess.
Chapter 6 on Separation of Powers offers a comprehensive exploration of how the balance of power between the judiciary and other branches of government plays out in climate litigation. The authors critically analyse key cases where these doctrines have been invoked, shedding light on how these doctrines shape the courts’ approach to climate cases. They underscore the significant variation in how this issue is dealt with across jurisdictions, acknowledging the diversity of constitutional and legal frameworks globally. Despite this diversity, the authors distil an emerging best practice where courts are increasingly recognising their crucial role in safeguarding fundamental rights and constitutional values in the context of climate change. This recognition is not a one-directional or universal trend but a nuanced evolution detectable across various jurisdictions and legal systems.
Over the past century, countries around the globe have empowered constitutional courts to safeguard the rule of law. But when can courts effectively perform this vital task? Drawing upon a series of survey experiments fielded in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, this book demonstrates that judicial independence is critical for judicial efficacy. Independent courts can empower citizens to punish executives who flout the bounds of constitutional rule; weak courts are unable to generate public costs for transgressing the law. Although judicial efficacy is neither universal nor automatic, courts – so long as they are viewed by the public as independent – can provide an effective check on executives and promote the rule of law.
This article contributes to debates about the theoretical underpinning for legitimate expectations. Building on existing arguments that what underpins the doctrine is public trust in government, it draws on scholarship on trust from disciplines outside law to reimagine the “trust conception” of legitimate expectations. It argues that the current trust conception lacks conceptual clarity, including several areas of ambiguity which have generated problems for it. The article claims that with the conception so reimagined, trust can offer the necessary theoretical underpinning for legitimate expectations and thus provide much-needed certainty to this confused area of administrative law.
The paper outlines Czech constitutional law and the development of emergency law. Initially, the legislature did not expect emergencies to occur, perhaps due to the idealistic optimism associated with the general atmosphere of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the “End of History” thesis. As a result, emergencies were not regulated by Czech law in the 1990s. This changed after the great floods at the end of the 1990s, when “history returned,” and the need for some special rules for emergencies became clear. The first decades of this century showed that Czech emergency law worked well for short-term natural disasters. The game-changer came in 2020, with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for a long-term state of emergency. It soon became clear that the rules that worked for floods and other disasters did not work for long-term global pandemics. In other words, the legal system was not prepared for a situation in which emergencies were the rule rather than the exception. Legislators were unable to prepare a long-term legislative response to fill this gap. The memory of COVID-19 is fading fast, and there are no plans to reform the relevant legislation. Accordingly, any new pandemic or similar event will lead to the same problems that the Czech legal system had to deal with from 2020 to 2022.
In the recent case of Ezuame Mannan v Attorney General and Speaker of Parliament,1the Ghanaian Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision struck down the Narcotics Control Commission Act, 2020 (Act 1019), on grounds that the parliamentary processes leading to its enactment were unconstitutional. In arriving at this decision, the court strived to define the limits of Parliament’s legislative powers. While some clarity was achieved, difficult contradictions emerged. Prominent among these was the extent to which the constitutional power of judicial review over legislative actions should interfere with the autonomy of Parliament. In this article, I propose that a proper understanding and application of the purposive approach to interpretation offers an effective tool for reconciling these seemingly conflicting constitutional values.
This paper argues that (1) political community requires an agreed method of deciding disputes about the norms that will govern; (2) a decision method that includes a legislative process, strong judicial review, and a legislative override is a method with components that work at cross purposes; and (3) that such a method cannot be agreed upon responsibly. Points (1) and (2) describe Canada’s method of decision-making in which the legislative override is called the notwithstanding clause. An argument at cross purposes is incoherent and cannot responsibly be accepted, nor can someone responsibly obey a command that involves contradictory directives. By analogy of reasoning, steps that work at cross purposes in a decision-making system can weaken or erode agreement to it. In other words, the political legitimacy of that method is weakened and contributes to its illegitimacy. Optimally for democratic decision-making, eliminating strong judicial review removes this weakness.
This chapter addresses a former practice where international civil servants of certain UN organisations, who were not satisfied with the decisions rendered by the administrative tribunal dealing with their employment matters, were able to have these decisions re-examined by the Court. These proceedings drew much attention to the access and procedural inclusion of individuals before the World Court. It argues that the Court was indeed the incorrect forum for wronged UN staff members seeking redress due to its own Statute barring access to individuals and therefore entailing a permanent inequality of the parties. However, it argues that while the Court was handling such disputes, there were ways to adjust its procedural mechanisms to further bridge the inequality between the parties.
Mauro Cappelletti’s waves of domestic and transnational constitutionalism have reached Asia where courts exercise constitutional review and engage with international law in the process. Institutional and sociological legal scholars celebrate this as the inexorable global constitutionalization of international law through the liberal structures of judicial review and dialogue. A previous article cast doubt on the inevitability of global constitutionalization in view of material inconsistencies in interactions with international law by Asian courts, even those with rule of law and liberal democratic traditions. The present article on the Philippine Supreme Court sheds light on an underlying cause: arbitrary and contradictory selection and application of secondary rules for identifying international law by its source. The consequent degradation of international law and delegitimization of judicial engagement with it are the makings of the third wave of judicial review that Doreen Lustig and Joseph Weiler warned will reverse the gains of transnational constitutionalism.
This chapter examines rights relating to personal freedom, including the right to liberty and the rights of persons deprived of liberty. It discusses the legal basis, interpretation, scope, and international protection of these rights. The chapter explores the standards for lawful detention, the procedural safeguards required to protect personal freedom, and the mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing these standards. It also highlights the role of international bodies in addressing violations of personal freedom and the challenges in ensuring compliance with human rights norms in various contexts, including criminal justice, immigration, and mental health.
This part explores the principles and mechanisms for the reparation of human rights violations and the enforcement of decisions rendered by international human rights bodies. It discusses the obligation of states to provide full reparation for harm suffered as a result of human rights violations, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. The sections examine the legal standards for determining and quantifying reparation, the procedural aspects of reparation processes, and the role of international and national bodies in monitoring and enforcing reparation awards. Additionally, this part focuses on the enforcement mechanisms and challenges in implementing international human rights decisions. It discusses various models of enforcement, including judicial review, hybrid monitoring, and political and diplomatic control. The part highlights the importance of effective enforcement in ensuring the realization of human rights and the accountability of states for human rights violations. By providing insights into the reparation and enforcement processes, this part emphasizes the critical role of comprehensive and effective mechanisms in achieving justice and reconciliation for victims of human rights violations.
This title focuses on the mechanisms and challenges in enforcing decisions rendered by international human rights bodies. It discusses the various models of enforcement, including judicial review, hybrid monitoring, and political and diplomatic control. The section examines the procedures for monitoring compliance with international decisions, the role of international and regional bodies in supervising the implementation of judgments, and the strategies for addressing noncompliance. It also explores the impact of enforcement mechanisms on the effectiveness of international human rights protection, the importance of political will and international cooperation, and the need for innovative approaches to enhance compliance. By providing insights into the enforcement process, this title highlights the critical role of effective enforcement in ensuring the realization of human rights and the accountability of states for human rights violations.
Constitutions set out fundamental principles of political morality that bind institutional action and assign strong political rights to individuals. At surface level, the principle of proportionality is a methodological device. It operates as a doctrinal heading under which courts scrutinize state interference with individual liberty and assess the scope of their own authority. According to the orthodox understanding of proportionality, this scrutiny takes the form of balancing rights against public interest, which raises questions about the legitimacy of judicial review. This chapter argues that, contrary to the orthodox view, proportionality is primarily about the normative foundations of constitutional rights and the duty of courts to pursue, through principled legal reasoning, the moral truth about individual rights. On this rival account of proportionality, rights are equality-based moral norms constraining state action and no actual balancing takes place by courts. If we are to take seriously both the idea of fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality, we must abandon the misleading metaphor of balancing and the problems of incommensurability and judicial scepticism to which it leads.
This chapter focuses not on the possible content of a Bill of Rights, such as whether it should contain social and economic rights or only civil and political rights, but on the form any such Bill needs to take to be legitimate in a manner congruent with the moral norms of equal concern and respect underlying both rights and democracy. It explores four conceptions of Bills of Rights and the different ways they relate to democratic theory and practice. I start with the view of a Bill of Rights as distinct from normal legislation and that is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to defend. I distinguish between substantive and procedural accounts, in which the first focuses on upholding the rights necessary to ensure the outputs of democratic decisions reflect democratic norms whereas the second seeks to uphold the rights required for a due democratic process. I then turn to legislated rights and the role of Parliamentary Bills of Rights. Finally, I examine the role of democratic constitutional politics as a means for justifying and legitimising such rights instruments, be they upheld by legislatures or courts.