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Ulpian’s successors followed his lead in imagining a world without legal politics. To articulate their vision, they constructed a law of government: a body of law devoted to the administration of cities, and to criminal punishment. It focused on questions of public order and administration, and sought to eliminate the scope of, if not the need for, collective participation. It was concerned to limit the jurisdiction of governors, who might become enmeshed in local political systems. Within this system, jurists reserved the capacity for affective judgment for emperors alone. This is the vision of law that would be taken up over the long course of Late Antiquity: only the emperor would be permitted affect and discretion; all others were construed as responsible to the law itself. Together, jurists and the emperors created a vision of law that was radically opposed to the society upon which it was enacted.
Legal jurisprudence is widely debated but rarely measured. We present the first comprehensive measure of jurisprudence in U.S. Supreme Court opinions from 1870 to 2024. Building on qualitative studies of legal reasoning, we classify court opinions into two contrasting types: “formal” reasoning and anti-formal or “grand” reasoning. The foundation of this measurement dataset is a smaller, hand-annotated dataset created by a team of domain experts. Using this annotated dataset, we fine-tune and evaluate a foundational large language model, which is then employed to predict legal reasoning across all opinions in the full dataset. We demonstrate the potential of this new measure for applications in empirical research, enabling analyses of shifts in jurisprudence over time, the reasoning styles of individual justices, and the relationship between legal reasoning and other judicial features, such as ideology. To support further research, we release the annotated dataset, the fine-tuned model, and the final measures, offering a resource for both studying legal reasoning and judicial behavior and evaluating language models in the legal domain.
Roman law is justly famous, but what was its relationship to governing an empire? In this book, Ari Z. Bryen argues that law, as the learned practice that we know today, emerged from the challenge of governing a diverse and fractious set of imperial subjects. Through analysis of these subjects' political and legal ideologies, Bryen reveals how law became the central topic of political contest in the Roman Empire. Law offered a means of testing legitimacy and evaluating government, as well as a language for asking fundamental political questions. But these political claims did not go unchallenged. Elites resisted them, and jurists, in collaboration with emperors, reimagined law as a system that excluded the voices of the governed. The result was to separate, for the first time, 'law' from 'society' more broadly, and to define law as a primarily literate and learned practice, rather than the stuff of everyday life.
The fourth chapter provides an examination of substantive canons that judges use to interpret government pension legislation under the Contract Clause. It concentrates on three clashing canons routinely employed in pension law: the remedial (purpose) canon, the “no contract” canon (otherwise known as the unmistakability doctrine), and the constitutional avoidance canon. Courts are at a crossroads in selecting among these dueling canons to determine public pension contractual obligations. This canon warfare is often outcome-determinative, insofar as it normally answers the question of whether there is a contract. Capturing conflicting interpretative strategies allows for an in-depth exploration of the policies in pension reform litigation and develops a better appreciation of the responsibilities of courts, legislatures, and society. The investigation also fosters an informed dialogue over the choice of canons and the circumstances of their operation in the ongoing legal battles about restructuring pension obligations.
The second chapter analyzes the government pension question and the role of adjusting benefits as an important part of the answer. It charts constitutional constraints to public pension reform under state and U.S. Contract Clauses from unprotected gratuities to protected contracts, highlighting the concept of contract as an essential ingredient to constitutional protection. It cautions, however, that the contract element is in flux given the deluge of decisions challenging benefit reductions and emphasizes key challenges to examining contractual obstacles to public pension reform.
The fifth chapter continues the excavation and evaluation of evidence in the making of a government pension contract by describing the circumstances under which reforms have proven effective against constitutional contention. It probes the power of reservation clauses, the credence of contemporary commentary like employee handbooks, the impact of persuasive authority, and the influence of the Supreme Court of the United States. It identifies which forms of proof have been the most effective and why, along with what matters have been missed. In assessing the evidence for and against the creation of a contract, this chapter prioritizes sources, comments on their respective import, and otherwise argues for courts to undertake an expansive inquiry to determine whether government pension benefits receive contract protection.
The book ends with a brief discussion of key conclusions. My four substantive chapters demonstrate different accounts of making-good-again. Read together, they show how the conduct of restitution emerges as a material question of responsibility which is asked through texts and objects in different genres, including law. Responsibility as a material practice is shown to be dynamic, contingent and contextual, shaped by personae and places.
The book begins by situating my key phrase ‘making-good-again’ through contrasting the history of the terms Wiedergutmachung and restitution. I give a brief history of understandings of responsibility and introduce my argument regarding material practice. Part two gives a brief overview of the methods used in the book, situating my approach in relation to jurisprudence and current approaches in law, humanities and their intersections.
Just as court reporters are the “ears” of the courtroom, court artists are the “eyes” of the courtroom. The adage “a picture is worth a thousand words” shows the importance of the integrity of that image. Because the artist’s sketch can convey information pertaining to the health of a defendant/plaintiff/witness, misrepresentation by the artist must be avoided so as to foster honest journalism. From a bioethics perspective, courtroom art should align to the live, physical (visible) presentation, even if one or more elements of the physical presentation has been fabricated. Similarly, invisible illnesses and symptoms should not be added to courtroom sketches. The court artist has a duty of objectivity and clinical honesty in their artwork. This fosters justice and journalistic integrity.
This article examines the way in which the canons of Nicaea continue to form part of the living canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church. It addresses how these ancient canons should be interpreted to ensure their relevance, and application, in the contemporary Church. The article concludes by emphasising that the canonical tradition is, in fact, part of the theological reflection of the Orthodox Church.
Since the end of the Second World War, restitution in Germany – Wiedergutmachung – has been mainly understood as part of state or private law. This book offers a different approach, arguing that authors and artists have also taken up a responsibility for restitution. Deploying the literal translation 'making-good-again', this book focuses on the 'making' of law, literature and visual art to argue that restitution is a practice which is found in different genres, sites and temporalities. The practices of restitution identified are dynamic, iterative and incomplete: they are practices of failure. Nevertheless, in this book, the question of how to conduct restitution emerges as a material question of responsibility asked through the making of texts and objects in different genres, including law. The resulting text is a unique expansion and re-conceptualisation of the practices of jurisprudence, restitution and responsibility in the context of the aftermath in Germany. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
It is often said that natural law and interpretive perspectives of adjudication are incompatible with the notion of judicial law-making—in contrast to positivist and legal realist perspectives, which are hostile to the declaratory theory. One must either accept the declaratory theory or accept that judges make law, but one cannot accept both views. This article draws upon the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, Karl Llewellyn, Lon Fuller, and Ronald Dworkin to push against the idea that these conceptions of the common law judicial method are fundamentally discordant. It is argued that, properly understood, the declaratory theory can be reconciled with the notion of judicial law-making.
This chapter describes how the Caribbean Court of Justice is embedded within colonial legacies that have affected regional political norms and legal culture. It shows the CCJ’s decisions are characterized by moderate deference, infrequently ruling in favor of states and typically eschewing restrictive interpretation. More deference, however, is observed through the Court’s remedial orders. The chapter links the CCJ’s tendency to not defer to its intermediate political constraints. Specifically, the CCJ’s strategic space is shaped by high formal independence that is partially offset by homogeneous state preferences. These factors combine to affect the Court’s legitimacy and signal when state resistance might be feasible and credible. In particular, the CCJ defers more when states are clearly aligned. The Court’s nondeference is facilitated by the Court’s practices of persuasive argumentation and public legitimation. The chapter also suggests the CCJ’s support network lacks the robustness necessary to account for its moderate deference.
This chapter provides an overview of the evolution and current dynamics in international administrative law, emphasizing the unprecedented growth in international administrative tribunals (IATs) over the past three decades. The introduction outlines the structural, quantitative, and qualitative changes reshaping this field, including the expansion in the use of non-staff personnel and the increase in the importance of human rights within international administrative law. The chapter highlights IATs’ convergence on common issues across diverse institutions, and explains the study’s approach and methodology, focussing on jurisprudential commonalities and the emergence of shared procedural standards across tribunals.
This chapter provides an overview of the evolution and current dynamics in international administrative law, emphasizing the unprecedented growth in international administrative tribunals (IATs) over the past three decades. The introduction outlines the structural, quantitative, and qualitative changes reshaping this field, including the expansion in the use of non-staff personnel and the increase in the importance of human rights within international administrative law. The chapter highlights IATs’ convergence on common issues across diverse institutions, and explains the study’s approach and methodology, focussing on jurisprudential commonalities and the emergence of shared procedural standards across tribunals.
This chapter describes how the creation and functioning of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are shaped by the colonial past and its impacts on political norms and legal culture. It shows the ACtHPR’s decisions are characterized by minimal deference, as it commonly rules against states, abstains from restrictive interpretation, and issues intrusive remedial orders. The chapter connects the ACtHPR’s nondeference to its subtle political constraints. Specifically, the Court has a broad strategic space due to its relatively high formal independence and politically fragmented membership. These factors combine to enhance the Court’s legitimacy and suggest that collective state resistance is impracticable. Yet following exit from aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court defers more. The Court’s nondeference is facilitated by the Court’s practices of persuasive argumentation and public legitimation. The chapter also suggests the African Court’s support network cannot fully account for the observed minimal deference.
This chapter describes how the East African Court of Justice is rooted in colonial legacies, which affect regional political norms and legal culture. It shows the EACJ’s decisions are characterized by substantial deference, frequently ruling in favor of states and relying extensively on restrictive interpretation. Less deference, however, is observed through the Court’s remedial orders. The chapter draws linkages between the EACJ’s deference and its pervasive political constraints. Namely, the EACJ’s strategic space is narrowed by weak formal independence and moderate political fragmentation. These two factors combine to undermine the Court’s legitimacy and imply that state resistance is feasible and credible. A significant episode of prior resistance also suggests states could execute future resistance. To the extent the Court does not defer, the chapter reveals how persuasive argumentation and public legitimation facilitate nondeference. Last, the chapter illustrates how the Court’s support networks insufficiently account for its substantial deference.
Represented by the same lawyer of other Protestant groups, the missionaries began using legal avenues to challenge the Italian government in court, arguing that Italy’s constitution had superseded older statutes, including Fascist-era laws being used against them. While this strategy would eventually prove successful, the mission found itself in an increasingly precarious situation. Despite its efforts and the establishment of various branches across the Italian peninsula, it managed to attract only a few hundred members. Funds began to dwindle, forcing the mission to sell some of its most prized properties. The US State Department grew increasingly critical of the mission’s aggressive tactics, viewing them as unnecessarily provocative and ultimately counterproductive. Meanwhile, the mission’s leaders continued to clash with Italian authorities, who at times fined or briefly arrested them, while using visa renewals as leverage to exert pressure on the missionaries. In the United States, the initial enthusiasm of many coreligionists for the Church’s mission in Italy gradually faded, giving way to disillusionment or a shift of focus toward other missionary activities, particularly in the Third World.
Chapter 6 aims to construct a future-looking theoretical framework for handling cultural objects for which questions of past illegality and/or illegitimacy arise but where a potential claimant – whether an individual, a community, or a source nation – is unable to pursue formal legal proceedings against the current possessor, and the relevant law enforcement agencies cannot equally pursue criminal, administrative, or public law proceedings. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to identify normative principles for dealing with the issue of “restitution” (broadly defined) that operates outside the realm of hard-law norms and institutions. It starts by examining the key aspects of the institutional/procedural and normative principles of the restitution committees established in certain European countries and tasked with the development and implementation of “just and fair solutions” to address Holocaust-era wrongful dispossessions. It then considers whether “just and fair solutions” can be devised for other contexts and, if so, how legalistic ethical reasoning could be adapted for these settings. The focus then shifts to the case study of France and its complex approach to the restitution of colonial-era objects to African source countries. The chapter then examines the various remedial mechanisms that are in operation, or that can be developed, to apply such normative principles to broader contexts of addressing past wrongs, including long-term loans, digital restitution, and the establishment of cross-border trusts to enable the joint custody and stewardship of collections. The chapter, and the book, conclude by addressing the role of such a normative blueprint, aligned with the concept of new cultural internationalism, in moving toward the convergence of law, policy, and markets for cultural property.
This chapter concludes the book with normative messages on contexts where states can trust public cooperation without coercion, addressing jurisprudential and normative aspects of governments gaining public cooperation.