The prevalence of conspiracy theories is a concern in western countries, yet the phenomenon is rarely addressed in experimental economics. In two preregistered online studies (NStudy 1 = 97, NStudy 2 = 203) we examine the relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking, self-reported conspiracy mentality, self-reported manipulativeness, and behaviour in an economic game that measures strategic sophistication. Part of our design was based on Balafoutas et al. (2021), who found a positive relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking and strategic sophistication. Our results did not corroborate their findings in an online setting. Our measures of conspiracy mentality were modestly correlated with strategic sophistication in Study 2, but not in Study 1. Although we expected manipulativeness to be positively associated with both conspiracy mentality and strategic sophistication—thereby linking conspiracy mentality and strategic sophistication indirectly—it was only associated with conspiracy mentality.

How should countries in a fixed exchange rate system balance their current account? This question was at the center of the historical debate between Keynes and White in 1944 and is being debated increasingly these days for the Eurozone. Should consolidation by deficit countries be complemented by higher spending in surplus countries in order to avoid a downward bias in the level of consumption? We investigate the associated disequilibrium behavior experimentally, letting our experimental subjects act as heads of state who repeatedly seek to coordinate their policies. If only deficits are punished, as proposed by White, we observe that consumption is persistently reduced and adjustment is slower than in a treatment in which a surplus is also punished, as suggested by Keynes. We find support for the fact that underconsumption occurs for behavioral but not for rational reasons.