How do the president's calculations in achieving policygoals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios?Despite the growing literature on presidentialcabinet appointments, this question has barely beenaddressed. I argue that cabinet appointments arestrongly affected not only by presidentialincentives to effectively deliver their key policycommitments but also by their interest in havingtheir administration maintain strong politicalleverage. Through an analysis of portfolioallocations in South Korea after democratization, Idemonstrate that the posts wherein ministers caninfluence the government's overall reputationtypically go to nonpartisan professionalsideologically aligned with presidents, while theposts wherein ministers can exert legislators'influence generally go to senior copartisans. Myfindings highlight a critical difference inpresidential portfolio allocation from parliamentarydemocracies, where key posts tend to be reserved forsenior parliamentarians from the ruling party.