On May 18, 1918, fourteen thousand high school students from St. Louis, Missouri, public schools, accompanied by fourteen drum corps and seven professional bands, paraded through the city’s Forest Park. Each school marched behind the US flag and its banners. Boys were dressed like soldiers and girls like nurses, in white uniforms bearing a tiny red cross. Battalions of young drummers, followed by legions of adult nurses, closed the parade. As the young people passed by, spectators applauded the inspiring sight. They could feel their hearts burn with new patriotism and new reverence. As the parade ended at Art Hill, eight thousand children in red caps and capes stood at attention on the slope, saluted the onlookers, and began to form a living cross. Below them, the remaining six thousand young people fell into place to form the word Red Cross. For the occasion – the Inaugural Junior Red Cross Parade – the youth had been rallied to demonstrate their patriotism and participation in the war effort. One journalist noted that “the present generation of children are learning that Service means sympathy as well as sacrifice, a desire and willingness to help others as well as a feeling that it is one’s duty and obligation to do so.”

A national conference on Americanization in April 1918 evidenced how social and political concerns mattered in wartime. Many regarded the global war as an unhoped-for opportunity to patch up the American nation and bring together the various ethnic groups living in the United States. Across the United States, ethnic enclaves existed and hyphenated Americans oscillated between pledging allegiance to the Stars and Stripes and being loyal to their homelands. Assimilationists seized the opportunity to foster American ideals in children. They consistently rallied politicians in their crusade against the hyphen and eventually defeated progressive integrationalists.

From August 1914 to April 1917, although the United States remained officially neutral, private individuals engaged American children in the war effort. At the local and state levels, initiatives mushroomed to capture children’s energy. Educationalists feared that explicit talk of war and propaganda in all forms would spoil children’s innocence. This is why they decided to engage children in civic leagues while others sought to mobilize children in the war effort. Although the leaders of these initiatives differed on how best to foster patriotism in the nation’s youth, the consensus was that American children needed to be engaged in civic and patriotic activities and be aware of their responsibilities as future adults.

As the war ended, politicians and educationalists saw the American Junior Red Cross as a means to promote American ideals abroad. Consequently, the American Junior Red Cross shifted its focus on a new form of Americanization, using children as part of a cultural diplomacy that positioned the United States as the global Good Samaritan. Children reached out around the globe, waged war against diseases, dedicated much of their spare time to rescue foreign "brothers" and "sisters," and sponsored children overseas.

Across the nation, children were urged to become “soldiers of the soil,” members of the United States School Garden Army, an initiative created in February 1918 by the US Bureau of Education to promote local gardening. Federal authorities urged local communities to feed themselves while the United States fed the Allies and other nations dependent on the US food supply. The more food civilians grew, the better the United States could feed the world. Children thus became part of a large pool of unpaid labor, serving the interests of both politicians and educationalists: as youth helped to increase food production, they learned skills and habits of self-reliance. Through the United States School Garden Army, children hooverized and learned to change their diet and eat with moderation. Gardening taught them the meaning of sacrifice.

Medical experts and epidemiologists knew the importance of hygiene on the home front. They convinced local, state, and federal authorities that the war on disease had to be fought. Consequently, the Modern Health Crusade, which originated in Detroit, became a nationwide movement in 1915. Federal authorities realized that a high infant mortality rate threatened the fabric of American society in the long run. Additionally, in order to build a strong and healthy army (and nation), bodies had to be physically fit. Children began to matter to the military and the nation writ large. As hygiene became a national concern, between 1914 and 1918, both medical and military authorities promoted hygienic standards to lift the nation.

In organizing a juvenile division of the American Red Cross – the so-called American Junior Red Cross – in September 1917, Woodrow Wilson attempted to mobilize the nation’s twenty-two million schoolchildren. Consequently, the American Junior Red Cross became the first federal youth-focused organization to be specifically dedicated to mobilizing American youth in wartime. In designing this first national youth-focused organization, Wilson impeded radical interventionists and quelled educationalists’ concerns. While directing children’s energy to altruistic humanitarian tasks, the organization opened schools to federal oversight of efforts to instill loyalty and deter dissent. Federal authorities attempted to control teachers and relied upon the educational structures to instill loyalty in the future generations of Americanyouth.

This chapter illustrates the importance of ongoing engagement with conceptual analysis when conducting research. It focuses on clientelism, a phenomenon in which politicians provide material benefits to citizens in direct exchange for political support. The chapter presents four typologies that refine the overarching concept of clientelism by revealing underlying dimensions, explicating subtypes, and reducing conceptual ambiguity. More specifically, the typologies clarify four key points: (1) campaign handouts can be used for both persuasion and mobilization; (2) campaign handouts can also shape the composition of the electorate; (3) a key distinction exists between electoral and relational clientelism; and (4) some scholarly usage of the term “vote buying” involves conceptual stretching. More broadly, the chapter suggests that continued engagement with conceptual analysis can yield important insights and analytical leverage. The typologies discussed not only improve conceptual clarity but also prove to be foundational for further formal and empirical research on the topic.

The chapter investigates the mobilizing effect of moral rhetoric, that is, effects on party supporters. I theorize that moral rhetoric is likely to mobilize the party base, or those who identify with the party. This works by moral rhetoric priming the moral intuitions of supportive voters. Heightened moral intuitions activate their emotions, which in turn increase willingness to participate in politics. In particular, I focus on the mediating role of positive emotions, especially pride about one’s partisan preference. I test my argument using experimental and panel survey data from Britain. First, I show that moral rhetoric can increase positive emotions, especially pride. Second, I find that voters who held more positive emotions about their party before an election were more likely to politically participate during the election. Interestingly, analyses show that pride plays a big role for expressive participation, like displaying an election poster. Third, I investigate the entire argument using mediation analysis. The chapter shows that while moral rhetoric can mobilize the party base, the effects are rather limited. Moral rhetoric promotes expressive, cheap forms of participation.

Chapter 5 transitions from theory to practice, offering in-depth empirical evidence of protest brokers in action within South Africa. Drawing on over 26 months of ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and surveys, this chapter shows that protest brokers are not only real but central to the organization of protest at the local level. It introduces the 37 brokers at the heart of this study, detailing who they are, why they act as intermediaries, and how they use their local knowledge, trust, and networks to mobilize communities on behalf of socially distant elites. The chapter also illustrates significant variation among brokers – reflecting the typology developed in Chapter 3 – and shows how these differences influence the brokers’ roles, scope of influence, and strategies. It also explores the dual relationships brokers maintain: with elites and with the specific communities they mobilize. Brokers emerge as highly skilled actors who manage reputations carefully, possess intimate knowledge of their communities, and selectively mobilize based on tightly defined social boundaries. By grounding the theoretical framework in rich qualitative and quantitative data, this chapter establishes protest brokers as indispensable actors in collective action processes.

This chapter analyzes the “Negro Plot” of New York in 1741, in which numerous black slaves and free people, as well as Catholic whites, were accused of conspiring with and corrupting others to commit a series of arsons in New York City over a bitterly cold winter and amid the threat of war. The chapter shows how corruption accusations surrounding the plot were “promiscuous,” in the sense that, as embedded in the colonial politics of the day, accusations made in terms of corruption escalated to increasingly implausible targets, even as they served to legitimate unlikely accusations. I show that this very promiscuity linked with the construction (and disintegration) of political narratives and official careers and was tethered to moralized visions of social order.

A view of corruption as disembedded from society and history is predominant today. In this view, corruption is basically the same thing everywhere and inherently a bad thing because it gets in the way of proper processes. In opposition to this view, we argue for understanding corruption as socially and historically embedded. While there are many viable ways to embed corruption, we advocate a comparative historical sociology of corruption in particular. This approach has in mind a view of corruption as “a moving object,” that is, as subject to variation across social space and transformation over time. It focuses on the processes through which a course of action is worked out in relation to historically specific structural conditions. By tracing these processes and embedding “corrupt” practices in the situations where they were developed and make sense, we gain a deeper understanding of these practices and are in a better position to evaluate them.

The Society of Critical Care Medicine (SCCM) launched the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) Liberation Campaign in 2014 as a project to improve patient- and family-centered care that packaged key concepts from 2013 and 2018 clinical practice guidelines into a six-element bundle delivered by an interprofessional team at the bedside. The goals of the bundle include: optimizing pain management, shortening the duration of mechanical ventilation, minimizing the use of sedating medications, and reducing the incidence and duration of delirium and ICU-acquired weakness, largely by keeping the patient as physically and cognitively engaged as possible through early mobilization and family engagement. In addition to these short-term goals, incorporation of the ABCDEF bundle is one major strategy to decrease the risk of PICS. The ABCDEF bundle includes: Assess, prevent, and manage pain, Both spontaneous awakening trials (SAT) and spontaneous breathing trials (SBT), Choice of analgesia and sedation, Delirium: assess, prevent, and manage, Early mobility and exercise, and Family engagement and empowerment. The bundle, whose elements are interdependent and synergistic, has demonstrated significant efficacy in improving several outcomes in critically ill patients, but compliance with the bundle is still suboptimal worldwide. Accordingly, many institutions utilize ‘checklists’ as cognitive aides to enhance bundle adherence with modest success.

The chapter provides historical background on the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts before the summer of 1944. It examines the profile of the troops. The majority of soldiers in the two army groups were Ukrainians, as the Red Army recruited heavily in the field as it marched across Ukraine while suffering high casualties. The chapter discusses soldiers’ experiences in the 1930s and the brutal German occupation. It argues that the recruits were treated brutally by the Soviet command, who viewed them with suspicion for having lived under German occupation. Recruits who survived initial engagements were eventually integrated into the military and served loyally. They did so out of patriotism broadly understood, a sense of national identity that aligned with the Kremlin’s narrative of Ukrainians as a subgroup of the great Russian nation, a wish for social and economic advancement through military service, a desire for revenge against the Germans and, importantly, lack of viable alternatives.

Through a case study of the T’aegǔkki rallies beginning in late 2016, Chapter 6 examines why and how senior citizens took to the streets in large numbers to protest the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and oppose the democratic and peaceful candlelight demonstrations. Analyzing the widespread emotions and narratives expressed by these older protesters, I argue that right-wing elites and intellectuals marshaled citizens by evoking historical experiences that aroused intense fear and outrage among older generations. In this chapter, I describe why the protests resonated so deeply with elderly citizens by focusing on their lived experiences during the Korean War and postwar industrialization and how the rise of new digital media inspired them to take to the streets on a large scale. Through grassroots organizing and by harnessing feelings of victimhood and fear among ordinary citizens, rightists cultivated a fertile ground for conservative mobilization.

July 1914 escalates because of a deterrence failure. Germany and Russia were playing a game of chicken. The kaiser stood firm; he believed that Russia was not prepared for war and would therefore back down. The tsar likewise stood firm; he vowed not to back down again after the Bosnian Crisis – and he thought that Germany would ultimately back down because it would not want to fight the combined power of Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. With neither side yielding, the crisis continued to escalate. A second dynamic contributed to escalation as well. At some point – probably on July 30 – the actors changed strategy. Instead of using coercion to deter their opponent, they started taking coercive measures to increase the likelihood that they would win a war, if one began. Each side mobilized, and mobilization led to war. Beneath all this lay rivalry and the repetition of crises between the major states. Finally, once war broke out between Germany and Russia, the alliance structure caused the war to spread rapidly. From this crisis, we learn many lessons, including that a balance of power and relatively equal military capabilities are associated with war onset; they do not prevent war.