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Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.
The platform economy enables socio-technical infrastructures that facilitate new forms of internet intermediation between buyers and external sellers. Several prominent and successful examples of such digital infrastructures depict themselves as a part of the so called “sharing economy”. We posit here that the key to understand the social structures of sharing economy platforms is to analyze them as digital marketplaces created and operated by market organizers. In this article we address these issues by approaching the problem of market order creation and the elements of market order as a question of the organization of markets by drawing on two exemplary cases, Lyft and Airbnb. We first consider efforts of market organizers to create new market orders on their digital marketplaces by mobilizing participants and resources. Second, we analyze what elements of organization these market organizers install to continuously operate their digital marketplaces. In all we show that although they use the rhetoric of sharing, internet platforms in the sharing economy generate enormous profits by establishing order on digital marketplaces using the five elements of organization.
Markets and organizations are often contrasted with each other and are sometimes even treated as opposites. But they share at least one characteristic: They are both organized. Many markets have been created by organization, and virtually all markets are organized to a greater or lesser extent; for markets to function according to the normative ideals of economists, a high degree of organization is necessary. In this chapter, the organization of markets is contrasted to other ways by which markets are formed – mutual adaptation among sellers and buyers and institutions. Organization adds substantially to the uncertainty that has been seen as a typical trait of markets. The chapter describes how different combinations of organizational elements are used in different markets. In addition to sellers and buyers, there are two types of market organizers: ‘profiteers’, who organize in order to benefit their own business; and ‘others’, who claim that they organize for the benefit of other people or of everyone. Market organization is the basis for a form of democracy on the global level – a form other than that tied to a formal organization, such as a state.
The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).
This article investigates dynamics of mobilization over environmental and human rights norms in the context of undemocratic governments. We test the suggestion in norm diffusion theories that the success of domestic struggles in this context depends on the level of internalization of norms brought about by international pressure. We find that the internalization (or lack thereof) of global norms by the Government of Sudan does not explain its recognition of environmental justice claims in this case. Furthermore, the various litigation efforts pursued by affected people outside Sudan did not influence their campaign. However, a combination of the political climate in the country and a unique political interplay between the government and a distinct group of the affected people may have led to the singular success of their campaign. We use a combination of discourse analysis, legal analysis, norm mapping, and semi-structured interviews to reach conclusions.
How politically powerful is business in American politics? Does the political power of business distort the quality of democratic representation? This chapter reviews the literature on these vital questions, discussing selected studies in political science, sociology, history, and other fields. It finds that assessments of business influence in American politics have varied considerably over time, but it also observes there has been a broad turn in recent scholarship toward the notion that business is “more equal” than other groups in the American political system. A small but growing number of studies—especially studies focusing on politics in our time—has begun to provide credible evidence of business influence. We have also seen the introduction of some exciting new ideas about the ways that business influence, economic inequality, and political representation may be theoretically connected. But definitive conclusions remain elusive. We do not really know whether business is disproportionately powerful and how business influence affects the performance of American democracy. The chapter concludes with some suggestions about the kind of studies that are needed going forward.
Today’s parties are hollow parties, neither organizationally robust beyond their roles raising money nor meaningfully felt as a real, tangible presence in the lives of voters or in the work of engaged activists. The parties have become tarred with elements of polarization that the public most dislikes—from the screaming antagonism to the grubby money chase. More than any positive affinity or party spirit, fear and loathing of the other side fuels parties and structures politics for most voters. Party identification drives American politics—but party loyalty, in the older sense of the term, has atrophied. Even the activists who do so much to shape modern politics typically labor outside of the parties, drawn to ideologically tinged “para-party” groups such as MoveOn.org on the left or the Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity on the right. The parties offer clear choices but get no credit. Our new Party Period features a nationalized clash of ideology and interests but parties that are weakly legitimized and hollowed out.
In this chapter, I explore the link between government food taxes and urban unrest. I analyze an event dataset on social and political disorder in cities across the developing world matched to cross-national data on consumer food taxes between 1965 and 2009. I estimate panel regressions of the effect of food taxes on unrest. I find no simple relationship between food policy and political instability in cities. However, when the effects of food taxes are allowed to vary by political regime type, I find that higher taxes are significantly associated with greater levels of unrest under anocracy. I also estimate instrumental variables regressions that exploit exogenous variation in the composition of a country's agricultural sector to identify the causal effect of food taxes on unrest. The results of these models align with those of the panel regressions. I find that higher food taxes are significantly correlated with greater unrest, but only under anocracies, which combine a lack of democratic accountability with a relatively permissive political opportunity structure.
Introduction: Previous systematic reviews suggest early mobilization in the intensive care unit (ICU) population is feasible, safe, and may improve outcomes. Only one review investigated mobilization specifically in trauma ICU patients and failed to identify any relevant articles. The objective of the present systematic review was to conduct an up-to-date search of the literature to assess the effect of early mobilization in adult trauma ICU patients on mortality, length of stay (LOS) and duration of mechanical ventilation. Methods: We performed a systematic search of four electronic databases (Ovid MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL, Cochrane Library) and the grey literature. To be included, studies must have compared early mobilization to delayed or no mobilization among trauma patients admitted to the ICU. Meta-analysis was performed to determine the effect of early mobilization on mortality, hospital LOS, ICU LOS, and duration of mechanical ventilation. Results: The search yielded 2,975 records from the 4 databases and 7 records from grey literature and bibliographic searches; of these, 9 articles met all eligibility criteria and were included in the analysis. There were 7 studies performed in the United States, 1 study from China and 1 study from Norway. Study populations included neurotrauma (3 studies), blunt abdominal trauma (2 studies), mixed injury types (2 studies) and burns (1 study). Cohorts ranged in size from 15 to 1,132 patients (median, 63) and varied in inclusion criteria. Most studies used some form of stepwise progressive mobility protocol. Two studies used simple ambulation as the mobilization measure, and 1 study employed upright sitting as their only intervention. Time to commencement of the intervention was variable across studies, and only 2 studies specified the timing of mobilization initiation. We did not detect a difference in mortality with early mobilization, although the pooled risk ratio (RR) was reduced (RR 0.90, 95% CI 0.74 to 1.09). Hospital LOS and ICU LOS were decreased with early mobilization, though this difference did not reach significance. Duration of mechanical ventilation was significantly shorter in the early mobilization group (mean difference −1.18. 95% CI −2.17 to −0.19). Conclusion: Our review identified few studies that examined mobilization of critically ill trauma patients in the ICU. On meta-analysis, early mobilization was found to reduce duration of mechanical ventilation, but the effects on mortality and LOS were not significant.
Introduction: Long-term immobility has detrimental effects for critically ill patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) including ICU-acquired weakness. Early mobilization of patients admitted to ICU has been demonstrated to be a safe, feasible and effective strategy to improve patient outcomes. The optimal mobilization of trauma ICU patients has not been extensively studied. Our objective was to determine the impact of an early mobilization protocol on outcomes among trauma patients admitted to the ICU. Methods: We analyzed all adult trauma patients ( > 18 years old) admitted to ICU over a 2-year period prior to and following implementation of an early mobilization protocol, allowing for a 1-year transition period. Data were collected from the Nova Scotia Trauma Registry. We compared patient characteristics and outcomes (mortality, length of stay [LOS], ventilator days) between the pre- and post-implementation groups. Associations between early mobilization and clinical outcomes were estimated using binary and linear regression models. Results: Overall, there were 526 patients included in the analysis (292 pre-implementation, 234 post-implementation). The study population ranged in age from 18 to 92 years (mean age 49.0 ± 20.4 years) and 74.3% of all patients were male. The pre- and post-implementation groups were similar in age, sex, and injury severity. In-hospital mortality was reduced in the post-implementation group (25.3% vs. 17.5%; p = 0.031). In addition, there was a reduction in ICU mortality in the post-implementation group (21.6% vs. 12.8%; p = 0.009). We did not observe any difference in overall hospital LOS, ICU LOS, or ventilator days between the two groups. Compared to the pre-implementation period, trauma patients admitted to the ICU following protocol implementation were less likely to die in-hospital (OR = 0.52, 95% CI 0.30-0.91; p = 0.021) or in the ICU (OR = 0.40, 95% CI 0.21- 0.76, p = 0.005). Results were similar following a sensitivity analysis limited to patients with blunt or penetrating injuries. There was no difference between the pre- and post-implementation groups with respect to in-hospital LOS, ICU LOS, or the number of ventilator days. Conclusion: We found that trauma patients admitted to ICU during the post-implementation period had decreased odds of in-hospital mortality and ICU mortality. Ours is the first study to demonstrate a significant reduction in trauma mortality following implementation of an ICU mobility protocol.
Key [1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: A.A. Knopf] observed voters tend to support local candidates at higher rates, a phenomenon he termed “friends-and-neighbors” voting. In a recent study, Panagopoulos et al. [2017. Political Behavior 39(4): 865–82] deployed a nonpartisan randomized field experiment to show that voters in the September 2014 primary election for state senate in Massachusetts were mobilized on the basis of shared geography. County ties and, to a lesser extent, hometown ties between voters and candidates have the capacity to drive voters to the polls. We partnered with a national party organization to conduct a similar, partisan experiment in the November 2014 general election for the Pennsylvania state senate. We find localism cues can stimulate voting in elections, including in neighboring communities that lie beyond the towns and counties in which the target candidate resided, at least among voters favorably disposed to a candidate and even when voters reside in the home county of the opponent.
Excessive mobilization of body reserves during the transition from pregnancy to lactation imposes a risk for metabolic diseases on dairy cows. We aimed to establish an experimental model for high v. normal mobilization and herein characterized performance, metabolic and endocrine changes from 7 weeks antepartum (a.p.) to 12 weeks postpartum (p.p.). Fifteen weeks a.p., 38 pregnant multiparous Holstein cows were allocated to two groups that were fed differently to reach either high or normal body condition scores (HBCS: 7.2 NEL MJ/kg dry matter (DM); NBCS: 6.8 NEL MJ/kg DM) at dry-off. Allocation was also based on differences in body condition score (BCS) in the previous and the ongoing lactation that was further promoted by feeding to reach the targeted BCS and back fat thickness (BFT) at dry-off (HBCS: >3.75 and >1.4 cm; NBCS: <3.5 and <1.2 cm). Thereafter, both groups were fed identical diets. Blood samples were drawn weekly from 7 weeks a.p. to 12 weeks p.p. to assess the serum concentrations of metabolites and hormones. The HBCS cows had greater BCS, BFT and BW than the NBCS cows throughout the study and lost more than twice as much BFT during the first 7 weeks p.p. compared with NCBS. Milk yield and composition were not different between groups, except that lactose concentrations were greater in NBSC than in HBCS. Feed intake was also greater in NBCS, and NBCS also reached a positive energy balance earlier than HBCS. The greater reduction in body mass in HBCS was accompanied by greater concentrations of non-esterified fatty acids, and β-hydroxybutyrate in serum after calving than in NBCS, indicating increased lipomobilization and ketogenesis. The mean concentrations of insulin across all time-points were greater in HBCS than in NBCS. In both groups, insulin and IGF-1 concentrations were lower p.p than in a.p. Greater free thyroxine (fT4) concentrations and a lower free 3-3′-5-triiodothyronine (fT3)/fT4 ratio were observed in HBCS than in NBCS a.p., whereas p.p. fT3/fT4 ratio followed a reverse pattern. The variables indicative for oxidative status had characteristic time courses; group differences were limited to greater plasma ferric reducing ability values in NBSC. The results demonstrate that the combination of pre-selection according to BCS and differential feeding before dry-off to promote the difference was successful in obtaining cows that differ in the intensity of mobilizing body reserves. The HBCS cows were metabolically challenged due to intense mobilization of body fat, associated with reduced early lactation dry matter intake and compromised antioxidative capacity.
What are the consequences of committing violent attacks for terrorist organizations? Terrorist attacks might broaden the base of supporters by increasing the perceived group efficacy. However, terrorist attacks might also lead its supporters to believe that the organization is excessively violent or involvement may become too dangerous. This article employs a unique dataset with 300,842 observations of 13,321 Twitter accounts linked to the Islamic State (IS), collected during a 127-day period, to empirically investigate the impact of terrorist attacks on the number of the organization’s supporters. By exploiting the exogenous timing of terrorist attacks as a natural experiment, we find that the number of followers of IS-related Twitter accounts significantly reduces in the aftermath of the attacks. Additionally, we provide some suggestive evidence to disentangle two mechanisms: disengagement – a change in supporters’ beliefs – and deterrence – demobilization due to fear. Because we do not find support for the latter, we conclude that the disengagement effect might explain our main result.
China's blood-borne HIV catastrophe in the 1990s prompted the government to adopt a blood-collection system that combines voluntary donations with the state's monopoly on blood services. Juxtaposing fieldwork and survey data, this study examines how the intricate interplay between government manoeuvres and citizen reactions has led to blood shortages that are serious yet manageable. This article reveals that even though voluntary blood donations are adversely affected by a public distrust of state-run collection agencies, owing to political concerns healthcare officials shirk from engaging with citizens to overcome the distrust. It also finds that the blood shortages are nevertheless largely manageable because the authorities have the capacity to recruit captive donors through work units, with the caveat that such captive practices are used sparingly. Overall, this study argues that the lack of state–society synergy in voluntary donations, while exacerbated by government involvement, is also partially remedied by the government's mobilization of captive donors.
Social movements are not completely spontaneous. On the contrary, they depend on past events and experiences and are rooted in specific contexts. By focusing on three case studies – the student mobilizations of 2011 and 2013, the anti-government mobilizations of 2012, and the protests against the Rosia Montana Gold Corporation project of 2013 – this article aims to investigate the role of collective memory in post-2011 movements in Romania. The legacy of the past is reflected not only in a return to the symbols and frames of the anti-Communist mobilizations of 1989 and 1990, but also in the difficulties of the protesters to delimit themselves from nationalist actors, to develop global claims, and to target austerity and neoliberalism. Therefore, even in difficult economic conditions, Romanian movements found it hard to align their efforts with those of the Indignados/Occupy movements. More generally, the case of Romania proves that activism remains rooted in the local and national context, reflecting the memories, experiences, and fears of the mobilized actors, in spite of the spread of a repertoire of action from Western and southern Europe.
This paper takes up the question of who asks racial-ethnic minority voters to vote, relative to white voters? We examine more closely the targeted mobilization strategies in the 2016 Presidential election cycle and highlight the roles of race, demographic context, and mobilization source on patterns of reported mobilization. Utilizing the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey we model the impact of demographic profiles on the probability of mobilization by white mobilizers and compare that to mobilization by minorities. Our analysis suggests that even when controlling for battleground context and likely voter characteristics, minority voters are neglected, but this is contingent on the racial demographics of those doing the mobilizing. These findings shed light on the discrepancy of turnout across racial and ethnic groups in the United States
Following Japan's invasion of China in 1937, Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual elites constructed a volatile image of the munitions worker as trickster. Within this discursive realm, the worker became an object of hope, fear, and rage for the guardians of an idealized home front struggling to bolster war production while still adhering to wartime goals of national austerity. In the cultural fantasies and nightmares of the Japanese home front, the munitions worker fluctuated between the valorized “industrial warrior” laboring for the nation and a violent delinquent ready to wreak havoc on society.
Autocrats rely on co-optation to limit opposition mobilization and remain in power. Yet not all opposition parties that pose a threat to their regime are successfully co-opted. This article provides a formal model to show that reliance on activists influences whether an opposition leader receives and accepts co-optation offers from an autocrat. Activists strengthen a party’s mobilization efforts, yet become disaffected when their leader acquiesces to the regime. This dynamic undermines the co-optation of parties with a strong activist base, particularly those with unitary leadership. Activists have less influence over elite negotiations in parties with divided leadership, which can promote collusion with the regime. The results ultimately suggest that party activism can erode authoritarian control, but may encourage wasteful conflicts with the government.
In the digital age, the Internet is an important factor in the emergence and success of political parties and social movements. Despite growing evidence that extremists of all stripes use the virtual world for their purposes, research on this topic still lacks a wide array of empirical data, case studies, and theoretical background. In particular, Facebook, as the most important social networking site, is a new tool for political parties and movements to mobilize followers. The article explores how the extreme-right party Jobbik uses this tool more successfully than other Hungarian parties or Western European extreme-right parties. Comparing the growth in followers highlights this success, and a look at how it generates likes helps to explain it. The article argues that Jobbik uses Facebook in a sophisticated way and suggests that this “likable” attitude helps to attract young and first-time voters.
The redesign of Skopje's main square and the wider central area in the last six years has been a top priority of the Macedonian government. The project, called Skopje 2014, provoked intense domestic debate and controversy as well as international reaction and concern. Although officials say that project's aim is to unify ethnic Macedonians, it has produced several lines of political, intra-ethnic/interethnic as well as intra-cultural/intercultural divisions in the fragile Macedonian society. The aim of the paper is to offer reflections about its mobilizing potential among ethnic Macedonians in a set of social, economic, and political contexts. In that sense, four areas of mobilization are suggested: (1) around new identity markers; (2) around the name dispute and against threats (real or imagined) to the ethnic and national identity; (3) against the internal Other, that is, the ethnic Albanian community, as well as critics of these identity politics; and (4) in reaction to the global financial crisis and problems within the EU.