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Chapter 4 considers how duties of international cooperation safeguard sovereign equality by reconciling the territorial sovereignty of coastal states with landlocked states’ rights to access the oceans through negotiation or binding arbitration.
Chapter 5 demonstrates that states have accepted obligations of mandatory cooperation with respect to a variety of other transboundary harms, including piracy, terrorism, and at least some cyberattacks.
Chapter 13 concludes by recapping the book’s key themes, considering potential obstacles to mandatory cooperation, and identifying other matters of international concern, such as pandemics, that are good candidates for mandatory cooperation under the equitable conception of sovereign equality.
Chapter 10 examines whether states bear duties of international cooperation with respect to forced migration, including the mass displacement caused by Myanmar’s campaign of ethnic cleansing against its Rohingya Muslim minority. It makes the case that the international community has accepted the protection of forced migrants as a common concern of humanity under the community’s joint stewardship.
Chapter 1 draws on the history of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine to distinguish two conceptions of sovereign equality under international law. It argues that that international law in the twentieth century embraced a constitutional and equitable conception of sovereign equality, generating state obligations to cooperate with one another to resolve disputes over matters of common concern in accordance with equitable principles.
Chapter 3 shows how the international law of the sea moved away from state unilateralism in favor of the equitable model of sovereignty by requiring states to resolve disputes over international fisheries and maritime boundaries through cooperation in accordance with equitable principles.
Chapter 9 explains how duties of international cooperation apply to the international community’s collective responsibility to safeguard international peace, security, and human rights. With the establishment of the United Nations, the Grotian paradigm of states deciding when to use force for themselves shifted to a collective stewardship model whereby states must cooperate with one another to avoid armed conflict, punish atrocity crimes, and combat global poverty, including through collective consultation, negotiation, and peaceful dispute resolution.
Chapter 2 explains how international law governing rivers has evolved to establish a requirement that upstream and downstream sovereigns must consult and negotiate in good faith to determine mutually satisfactory solutions for the shared use of rivers.
Chapter 7 examines climate change as a transnational and existential threat to humanity generally, and to certain smaller and vulnerable states most dramatically. Since it poses an existential threat to low-lying coastal states and raises the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, Chapter 7 makes the case that climate change should be understood to trigger duties of international cooperation.
Chapter 8 considers international territorial administration through multilateral governance structures, devoting special attention to Antarctica as a global res communis for peaceful exploration and scientific study.
Chapter 12 offers a provocative and jurisprudentially ambitious argument: that sovereign equality requires states to submit to international adjudication or arbitration even in ordinary legal disputes that do not involve overlapping sovereign rights or powers.
Chapter 11 uses antitrust law as a case study to explore the phenomenon of extraterritorial regulation. It argues that the principle of sovereign equality requires states to resolve disputes involving fields of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction through mandatory cooperation.
Humanity in the twenty-first century faces serious global challenges and crises, including pandemics, nuclear proliferation, violent extremism, refugee migration, and climate change. None of these calamities can be averted without robust international cooperation. Yet, national leaders often assume that because their states are sovereign under international law, they are free to opt in or out of international cooperation as they see fit. This book challenges conventional wisdom by showing that international law requires states to cooperate with one another to address matters of international concern-even in the absence of treaty-based obligations. Within the past several decades, requirements to cooperate have become firmly embedded in the international legal regimes governing oceans, transboundary rivers, disputed territories, pollution, international security, and human rights, among other topics. Whenever states address matters of common concern, international law requires that they work together as good neighbors for their mutual benefit. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter assesses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional project as an international regime. Although ASEAN’s regime is underpinned by unique features, certain characteristics of other regional integrations are still evident. Accordingly, ASEAN’s regime is devoid of complete synchrony of state parties’ normative interests and the surrender to implementing institutions of the regional project. Although ASEAN has been lauded as a successful regional integration project, its normative beliefs have been constructed around its identity as a regional project. Indeed, ASEAN member states might have taken inspiration from the EU, but they continue to be highly cautious about institutional arrangements that centralise decision-making and dilute state sovereignty. Hence, the gains of prosperity recorded so far are largely driven by individual countries’ efforts rather than a collective outcome of normative interests and obeisance to the implementing institutions.
This chapter examines the legal and policy regime that governs the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) and the underlying constraints. The AfCFTA, regarded as the largest trade arrangement after the World Trade Organization (WTO) in terms of the number of participating countries, seeks to utilise economic integration to promote pan-African development as a pathway to prosperity. With a commitment to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in intra-African trade, the AfCFTA is governed by general and specific objectives as well as principles aimed at making the agreement a transformative instrument of African prosperity. While the AfCFTA is a consequence of normative beliefs and common identity of the state parties, there are fears that NTBs and prevalent weak institutions could frustrate the expected outcome. This further buttresses our contention that normative interests should be mutually constitutive with the institutions established to manage the underlying implementation for prosperity to be realised. Although development and, ultimately, prosperity are well constructed under the AfCFTA agenda, there must be complementarity between the AfCFTA regime and the implementing institutions. This chapter proffers the way forward to navigate these dynamics.
This chapter investigates the legal instruments that govern MERCOSUR and the degree to which they have facilitated prosperity in the region. Even though it is an international regime, MERCOSUR remains a project for a future single market. In comparison with other regional integrations in this book, MERCOSUR members’ implementation of commitments has not unleashed regional prosperity. This is generally attributable to incongruity between the normative interests and beliefs in the state parties’ responses to MERCOSUR’s regime. Therefore, institutional functions and the level of implementation are not proportionate to the level of prosperity so far experienced. Indeed, MERCOSUR has not totally dismantled restrictions on intra- MERCOSUR trade, which couples with the delay in adoption of a number of secondary rules. To realise the prosperity gains of regional integration, state parties must synchronise the normative interests and beliefs in the implementing institutions.
Research shows that information cues influence public opinion on international cooperation, yet it is unclear whether all cues are equally effective in the context of a global crisis. This paper sheds light on this issue by analysing how frames in public discourse influence support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19. Building on research on in‐group favouritism, decision‐making under uncertainty, and public support for multilateralism, the paper argues that frames emphasizing vaccine nationalism are more potent than those emphasizing international cooperation and that nationalist political identities moderate these framing effects. An original survey experiment in the United Kingdom confirms this argument and shows that public support for multilateralism is substantial but vulnerable. A vaccine nationalism frame reduces support for multilateralism, while an international cooperation frame has no effect. Moreover, ‘Brexit identities’ moderate this framing effect, with ‘Leavers’ being more susceptible to the detrimental effect of the vaccine nationalism frame than ‘Remainers’.
The global diffusion of state power has led to a decline in global governance; that is, in the attempt to build authoritative rules and institutions that represent the common goals of the international community. The rise of China and other powers has increased the heterogeneity of the international system, and the erstwhile hegemon has turned against the international order. The major powers today have vastly different domestic characteristics and pursue strongly divergent interests. This has gridlocked and marginalized multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization and seen a worrying disregard for international law. In response, the institutional ecosystem of global governance is adapting by lowering its scope, weakening its commitments, and splintering into partly competing institutional orders. Adaptation and decline are not mutually exclusive: Today, we can witness the adaptation of global governance to its own decline. Theoretically, this points to the enduring relevance of hegemonic stability theory for global governance. The result is a reduced normative ambition for global governance, signaling a retreat from the grand internationalist vision of organized cooperation among all the members of the international community.
In the introduction to this roundtable, we argue that global governance currently faces hard times because it is affected by a set of significant developments revolving around the changing distribution of state power, the rise of nationalist populism, and the frequent occurrence of transnational crises, while seeking to facilitate collective action on complex cooperation problems. Against this backdrop, the essay identifies two major institutional dynamics of global governance in hard times: first, the drift of formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) that is caused by them being gridlocked in a period of significant changes in their social, (geo)political, economic, and technological environment. Second, the proliferation of various types of low-cost institutions. To help us think systematically about how these two interrelated institutional dynamics affect global governance, the essay develops the innovation thesis and the decline thesis. The “innovation thesis” suggests that by transitioning from a rather exclusive and hierarchical system revolving around FIGOs into a more inclusive and heterarchical system revolving around institutional diversity, global governance is currently being adapted to its new environment. The “decline thesis,” by contrast, argues that the two institutional dynamics undermine rules-based multilateralism and may lead to a shift back toward traditional (great) power politics that does not respect institutional constraints.