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Commenting on Cargill’s article, this Commentary examines how gene therapy research is regulated in the United States and how oversight of the field has developed. It discusses recent applications of gene therapy technologies and their implications for oversight, and of the impact of ordered cuts to NIH-funded research on gene therapy developments more broadly. Ultimately, it underscores the need for adaptive oversight frameworks for research involving emerging biotechnologies that balance scientific innovation, safety, and ethical considerations, and for effective public engagement on the acceptable use of these technologies, notwithstanding the discontinuation of NIH’s advisory mechanism established for this purpose.
Like the previous item, this one (dating from late December 1963) consists of two directly related memoranda documenting operational component chiefs addressing higher echelons. In this case, two HUMINT components located in separate divisions are each asking their division superiors to mediate and resolve a dispute over who actually ‘owns’ the Harbin Public Security Bureau’s prized Agent 151 (Yang X, whose closed Agent Personal File provided the records translated in Part V above) and whose information needs the agent was henceforth to prioritise. History is never irrelevant in disputes like this one and how far back in the past one is able, or chooses, to go in one’s argumentation can often make all the difference when it comes to staking a convincing claim to something in the present.
This paper considers dangers and pitfalls associated with a range of oversight options and scenarios, including self-regulation, government regulation, donor monitoring and community participation. The paper outlines the blind spots and sources of potential bias associated with each of these oversight mechanisms. Examining the Ugandan case study we find that perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness tarnished the reputation of the sector, but at this stage the proposed peer review mechanism and stricter government regulation are unlikely to improve NGO sector outcomes. Government regulation is anticipated to be ineffectual due to poor design and insufficient resource allocation, but both of these factors may be attributable to the underlying political motivations. Similarly, not much is expected from the peer review mechanism because participation is voluntary, offers few benefits and the list of guidelines is too long and contains too many vague and intangible quality standards. The paper argues for more empirical research to inform the design of oversight mechanisms and to monitor the impact of self-regulation and government regulation on the NGO sector. This may also help to expose and limit opportunistic interventions by government, often thinly concealed under the conceptual cloak of accountability and oversight.
This chapter examines the philosophical and practical foundations for state regulation of the internet, focusing on the interplay between individual rights and societal interests. It argues that the digital realm introduces unique challenges that require state intervention to preserve the integrity of public discourse and democratic values. Drawing on legal theory, particularly the ideas of Lon L. Fuller, the chapter emphasises the importance of fostering trust, maintaining the rule of law, and balancing power between states, private actors, and users in internet governance. The chapter critiques the traditional view of rights as individualistic and argues for a more community-focused approach, emphasising that human rights should serve the common good. Trust is highlighted as a cornerstone of effective internet governance. The chapter underscores that moving online fundamentally alters the scope, impact, and mechanisms of regulation. Human rights law and governance frameworks must adapt to preserve trust, community, and the integrity of public discourse in the digital age.
At the core of corrective surveillance lies the excessive deficit procedure. This chapter employs theories of bargaining to explain the opening and continuation of this oversight and political economy theories of public spending to explain its consequences for national public finances. Whether a procedure is launched or concluded is shaped mostly by factors related to compliance, bargaining, and national pressures, such as past and expected fiscal performance, ideological positions of governments and commissioners, and public opinion in the surveilled country. As for the consequences of oversight, surveillance has significantly shaped national budgetary processes, counterbalancing the national pressures governments face when they set their fiscal policies. The impact of corrective surveillance offsets that of a two-year shortening of expected government duration, the addition of one party to a government coalition when debt is high, or a leftward shift in government ideology when the risk of replacement is low. Moreover, estimates from exact matching on treatment histories indicate that these effects peak after four to five years.
How can citizens in authoritarian regimes exercise oversight of the legal system? I examine police and court monitoring, bottom-up oversight activities popular in pre-war Russia (2012–2022). Monitoring pushes the state to honor commitments it has made in its own laws, taking advantage of the authoritarian state’s need for information and legitimacy. Yet monitoring activities are not just about improving the state’s performance. Using interviews, participant observation and document analysis of monitoring campaigns in pre-war Russia, I argue that monitoring can empower citizens in a profoundly disempowering environment, perhaps its most important legacy in a closing authoritarian space.
This article is the first to show that gender shapes the degree to which legislators use formal mechanisms to oversee government activities. Extensive scholarly work has analysed the use of oversight instruments, especially regarding who monitors whom. Whether, how, and why the conformity of men and women with institutional roles differs, has not yet received scholarly attention. We hypothesise that women become more active than men in overseeing the executive when in opposition while reducing their monitoring activities even more strongly than men when in government because of different social roles ascribed to men and women as well as differences in risk aversity between sexes. We analyse panel data for three oversight tools from the German Bundestag between 1949 and 2013 to test this proposition. Our findings imply that characteristics of political actors influence even a strongly institutionalised process as oversight and further clarify the gender bias in political representation.
Following the publication of a U.S. News and World Report article about ICN’s CEO, Panic, entitled “Sex and the CEO” detailing the pharmaceutical company’s expansive cover-up of workplace sexual harassment, a shareholder, White, filed suit against Panic for breaching his fiduciary duty by using corporate funds to resolve sexual harassment claims. The feminist rewrite finds that Panic and ICN’s board failed to exercise valid business judgment and did breach their fiduciary duty. The lack of diversity on ICN’s all-male boardroom is noted as a factor that led to the acceptance of Panic’s workplace sexual harassment and the allowance of corporate funds to actively conceal it. The examination refuses to sanitize the legal analysis to only rules and processes and instead chooses to analyze the case for its full revealing facts. The rewritten opinion views ICN’s board’s repeated decision to use corporate funds to settle sexual harassment cases as a proof of the fact that the board did in fact have actual knowledge of the persistent sexual harassment of its employees by Panic. Using precedent available at the time of White v. Panic, the feminist rewrite is able to come to the conclusion, which has become more common twenty years later in the post-#MeToo world.
The selections in this chapter discuss the management of the realm and the importance of specific royal practices. Ensuring the prosperity of the rural and urban populations, the productivity of the land, the proper maintenance of the army and sound financial management feature prominently among the king’s responsibilities. Many mirrors emphasise the necessity of constant royal oversight, particularly of the officials involved in the collection of taxes. Strict and consistent oversight, accompanied by swift dismissal when cases of abuse came to light, were the only measures that would protect the revenue-producing categories on whose labour the entire edifice of government depended. In cases of injustice, it was the ruler’s obligation to provide a means of redress, through the practice of listening to the petitions of his subjects and restoring to them any property that had been wrongfully seized. In many instances, the practices of good governance urged upon the wise and virtuous ruler reflect the principle of maṣlaḥa, the common good. The texts are drawn from al-Māwardī, Tashīl al-naẓar wa-taʿjīl al-ẓafar; Niẓām al-Mulk, Siyar al-mulūk; and al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-mulūk.
Mrs. Pritchard became the director of a family-owned reinsurance firm, Pritchard & Baird Intermediaries Corp (P & B), following the death of her husband. Mrs. Pritchard’s two sons were executives of the company, which eventually went bankrupt. The plaintiff, trustee of the P & B’s bankruptcy estate, filed this suit against the deceased Mrs. Pritchard’s estate claiming she was negligently liable as director for the over $10 million her sons improperly removed from the firm. The feminist rewrite agrees with the original opinion that Mrs. Pritchard was negligent in her role of corporate oversight, but it deviates by arguing Mrs. Pritchard was not negligent for failure to notice the financial issues because she should not have been expected to understand the intricacies of the business of which she served mostly as the figurehead and emotional glue. The rewritten opinion points out the implicit bias built within the New Jersey directors’ duty statute, which refers to “prudent men.” The commentary argues Mrs. Pritchard chose not to extend great care because she was not compensated or given much actual power within P & B. The commentary also critiques the rewritten opinion’s dismissiveness of Mrs. Pritchard’s corporate knowhow as not feminist enough.
This chapters introduces some basic concepts around the theoretical and historical aspects of carbon trading, exploring key governance aspects and the challenges of carbon markets.
This chapter considers the practical and legislative challenges of and requirements for achieving an effective crypto-legal structure for DLT in the carbon trading economy. It also explores the roles of different stakeholders in this transitioning process to achieve an efficient carbon economy.
When does legislation trigger regulation? The US Congress regularly passes laws that authorise government agencies to write legally binding regulations. Yet, when this occurs, agencies may take years to act – or, at times – may never act at all. We theorise that the breadth of the congressional statutory delegation drives the timing of agency policy production. In particular, when Congress expressly tells an agency to promulgate a rule, we expect agencies to do so quickly. Yet, when Congress provides greater policymaking discretion to agencies, we expect other factors – and especially, internal agency considerations – to drive regulatory timing. We use data from almost 350 statutes spanning four decades, which are then matched up with thousands of regulations, to assess the argument. Using innovative methods, we find support for our hypotheses. Overall, we produce a deeper understanding of the link between delegation and discretion: suggesting when it occurs, as well as, importantly, why.
In order for kingship to be legitimate, it had to be recognised. Only tyrants and usurpers would claim a royal title. Righteous rulers had their dignity thrust upon them. Yet a process of recognition also carried risks: the ability to award or confirm a royal title carried with it a responsibility to ensure that only those suitable of so elevated a dignity received it. Confirming tyrants cast into doubt one’s own legitimacy. Failing to come to the defence of a ruler one had recognised signalled that one lacked judgment, power or authority. Building on biblical, classical and patristic models, awarding royal titles meant that one was responsible for the conduct of the king. Yet that created a tension, given that kings were supposed to be beholden to nobody but God – one could not be a king unless one held power greater than that of a mere prince, but if one allowed others to intervene in the affairs of one's own realm, that power was called into question. Chapter 4 explores how high medieval observers engaged with these issues. It does so in relation to recognition both external (from popes, emperors or neighbours) and internal (from subjects and erstwhile peers).
The appointment of committee chairs to monitor the actions of ministers belonging to coalition partners has received considerably less attention than other mechanisms of policing the coalition agreement at executive or legislative level. We take a longitudinal perspective focusing on 11 Belgian cabinets (1980–2018) to study the determinants of such appointments and whether there is a substitution effect between shadow chairs, junior ministers and coalition agreements. Our findings indicate that the probability of appointing a shadow committee chair is higher when the ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition is larger. Other key findings are that ministers facing hostile junior ministers tend to be shadowed by committee chairs as well, while shadow chairs are also more frequent in minimum winning coalitions.
The essentially open-textured quality of political discourse that an equivocal (equi-vocal) norm suggests does not simply allow for many voices to be heard – it mandates it.Likewise, governance benefits from the pragmatism inherent in a norm that eschews absolutes and formulaic solutions in favor of bespoke designs, tailormade for environmental problems that vary in character by location and time.The forces of globalization make legislative oversight of administrative action difficult, if not impossible, by multiplying accountability challenges across multiple governance levels and processes.Using existing administrative competencies, a deliberative model of transnational democratic accountability can build on the functions that intergovernmental organizations already perform tolerably well without relying on new legislative inputs or continuous monitoring by elected officials.Two features of democratic deliberation – its tendency to reduce moral disputes and to promote consensus – can reduce the costs of organization maintenance in stakeholder communities that offer non-legislative alternatives for administrative oversight.The EU is a pioneer of transnational democratic oversight and administrative accountability, and its incremental and trial and error innovations, as inadequate as they still are, offer lessons for the problem of accountability in the absence of effective legislative authority.
This chapter first considers the existing academic evidence that private equity-backed companies outperform their peers and then looks at standard explanations for this outperformance.It is argued that existing explanations are inadequate.
This chapter discusses the EU’s payment and post-trading (i.e. securities clearing and settlement) systems. Over the past decade, the volume and value of transactions that are processed via these systems have grown tremendously. Stable and efficient payment and post-trading systems have become very important for the operation of financial markets and the economy in general. For a long time, these infrastructures were fragmented along national lines and were exposed to limited competition. But integration is continuing in the context of the single currency, the Single Euro Payments Area and technological innovations. The chapter starts by examining the different elements of (retail and wholesale) payment and post-trading systems. The second part of the chapter gives an overview of the economic features of the payment and securities market infrastructures. The third part of the chapter describes the current situation in the payment and post-trading industry and recent initiatives to promote further integration, and addresses weaknesses exposed by the financial crisis.
Laura Pitter describes the institutionalization of practices and procedures that have virtually stymied national security litigation in US courts. She surveys the evolution of habeas litigation, the deterioration of principles underlying attorney-client privilege, the overaggressive claims based on the states secrets doctrine, and the overclassification of material relevant to these cases. Ultimately, she questions the relationship between these policies and security itself.