Chapter 4 examines how politicians’ ability to influence bureaucrats’ careers creates opportunities for corruption in public procurement. Drawing on surveys and interviews with bureaucrats across local governments in Ghana, it finds that nearly half of bureaucrats believe procurement contracts are awarded uncompetitively, often in exchange for party financing. These perceptions highlight the vulnerability of procurement processes to partisan manipulation. A key mechanism through which politicians secure bureaucratic compliance is career control, particularly the threat of geographic transfers. Bureaucrats who resist corrupt demands risk reassignment to less desirable locations, a sanction that can disrupt both professional advancement and personal lives. Evidence from a survey experiment underscores this fear: bureaucrats anticipate that opposing corruption would trigger punitive transfers. By focusing on career management as a channel of influence, the chapter contributes to broader debates on bureaucratic autonomy and political interference. It also demonstrates that corruption is not merely the result of bureaucrats’ individual incentives but of institutionalized practices that bind bureaucrats’ careers to politicians’ partisan strategies.