This chapter identifies key features of Leibnizian theodicy in order to bring out its historical peculiarity and significance. To this end, it distinguishes between the surface form of Leibniz’s project, which exhibits typical traits of traditional explanatory theodicy, and its underlying motivational structure. The latter can be seen as arising from a confluence of three currents: the articulation of a perceived threat to the adequacy of creation, an extreme variety of theological and metaethical intellectualism, and a rationalist understanding of goodness. Elaborating this gap between surface form and motivational structure shows Leibniz to have a transitional status: while viewing God as an absolute explanatory and metaphysical principle, Leibniz begins to liberate criteria of goodness, rendering them principles of reason to which even the divine will is subject and by which his creation can be judged. Exploring the resulting tension helps us appreciate the novelty involved in his reconfiguring theodicy as a juridical enterprise, that of putting God on trial.

Following Allen Wood, Leibniz’s theodicy can be seen as both totalitarian – it claims that divine wisdom informs every single part of creation – and wholesale – it proves this only in general terms. This chapter explores the criteria Leibniz considers to be criteria of goodness and how he argues, in wholesale fashion, for their instantiation. Leibniz’s criteria can be divided into two categories: metaphysical, which concern properties and features of being as such, and anthropocentric, which bear on the morality and happiness of human beings. What unites them is an overarching conception of goodness as rational intelligibility: a maximally good world provides a maximal number of actual opportunities for rational creatures to appreciate its goodness and thereby perfect themselves. Closer attention to Leibniz’s handling of criteria, however, reveals a danger that anthropocentric ultimately dissolve into metaphysical criteria, the practical into the theoretical. As a result, Leibniz’s project is threatened with dialectical contradiction: the existential concerns that govern his theodicy’s underlying motivation cannot be articulated in the theoretical terms of its execution.

This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s thinking about theodicy and explains the fundamental shifts in his attitude towards the project. It begins by examining his pre-critical sketch for a theodicy that remains firmly within the Leibnizian mould while repairing its structural inconsistencies and gaps. At the heart of his reparative measures is a different conception of divine freedom, one that Kant will retain throughout his critical period. The chapter ends with a consideration of his late essay On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy of 1791, in which he rejects the entire tradition of rationalist theodicy, whilst still maintaining the importance of an ‘authentic’ alternative. The basis of his rejection of previous theodicies is moral: the very pursuit of such a theodicy involves sacrificing individual freedom and rejecting an autonomous stance. Accordingly, the central sections of the chapter explain Kant’s critical concept of autonomy and how the theory of normativity it entails is fundamentally incompatible with a rationalist conception of value.

Argues that the distinction between fideism (faith-centered theories of religious epistemology) and rationalism (reason-centered theories) needs nuancing, because there are numerous avenues that lead to hybrid views. Surprisingly, some arguments of medieval rationalists yield hybrids. The chapter refers to recent trends in the analysis of faith.

Conceptual engineering is, prima facie, the engineering of concepts. But what are concepts? And in what sense, if any, can they be engineered? In this chapter I introduce conceptual engineering and then distinguish three different understandings of concepts. The first, prevalent in parts of cognitive science, is the psychological account, which sees concepts as psychologically real cognitive structures in individuals’ minds. The second, with historical connections to the pragmatism of Carnap, is the semantic account, which sees concepts as semantic meanings determined by conventional principles of use. The third, rooted in Frege’s rationalism and in anti-individualism, is the representationalist account, which sees concepts as publicly accessible components of thought, determined ultimately not by use but by direct relations between individuals and the world. Disagreements over the nature, target and possible implementation of conceptual engineering are, I will claim, ultimately grounded in the more fundamental disagreement over the nature of concepts.

One of the central themes of this book is that, contrary to usual treatments, Arnauld has a consistent and subtle method and that once this method is appreciated the consistency of his philosophical thought emerges. Chapter 2 plays a central role in that overall argument by offering an account of Arnauld’s method and basic epistemological commitments. I argue that Arnauld distinguishes between three sources of knowledge - the central two being faith and reason - and each has a distinctive method for its use. I continue to outline Arnauld’s general rationalist commitments concerning reason. Finally, I argue for a central, and overlooked, difference between Arnauld’s and Descartes’s epistemological commitments revolving around their respective uses of clear and distinct ideas and accounts of judgment. This difference allows Arnauld to endorse many of the aspects of Descartes’s rationalism, while maintaining stricter limits on the scope of such knowledge.

Bankers rely on sophisticated risk models when they place their bets, informed by what they understand to be the rational beliefs they and others hold about the world. In a financial crisis, however, on a moment’s notice those beliefs can morph into panics, revealing unacknowledged uncertainties that had existed all along (section 1). What bankers, traders, government officials, and many of us do all too rarely is to acknowledge the pervasiveness of an uncertain future that we may intuit but cannot know. Without firm knowledge about the future, actors are guided by confidence-instilling conventions. Social conventions, such as risk-management models, were widely believed in and adopted to control uncertainty. These models generated endogenously a systemic crisis (section 2). The complementarity of the small world of risk with the large world of uncertainty is reflected in economic practices such as accounting and arbitrage (section 3). The Federal Reserve has relied heavily on story-telling (section 4). Going beyond the analysis of finance this chapter ends by discussing the denial of the risk-uncertainty conundrum by the reigning theory in the field of international political economy (section 5).

This chapter tacks the origin of Qiu Jun’s categories for diagnosing disorder and examining how it arose. His categories can be grouped into six ideological modules: ethicism, especially patriarchal ethics, which Confucians know as propriety and duty; Confucian Legalism, which embraces law, regulation, and punishment; moralism, which is enshrined in the category of personal virtue; rationalism, which entails both primordial principles, general trends, and fluctuating circumstances; ethnocentrism, which highlights the socio-political superiority of Chinese to non-Chinese; and finally institutionalism, which includes rites, political institutions, and social customs, a category which could be said to characterize his entire work. All these six modules were already in the statecraft toolkit by the fourteenth century for Qiu to construct a program to respond to disorder and as well to constitute discourses for that response. In this sense, Neo-Confucian learning is more than a moral philosophy focused on self-cultivation.

Unlike many core human rights treaties, the Statelessness Conventions are among the most poorly ratified in the world. Orthodox scholarship on human rights treaties primarily focuses on post-ratification implementation and their impact on state conduct. While it is important to examine post-ratification compliance, understanding why states agree to ratify human rights treaties is as crucial. Ratification nudges states towards better human rights practices and serves as a gateway for the implementation of international norms. This chapter addresses this gap in scholarship by examining the ratification status of the Statelessness Conventions and the ratification process of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, together with key actors and their influence, by the Philippines, Southeast Asia’s first State Party to the treaty, and its subsequent accession to the 1961 Reduction of Statelessness Convention. Both rationalist and non-rationalist explanations account for ratifications. While rational explanations push states to ratify treaties, socializing liberal and constructivist-oriented explanations, for example, also drive states to commit to treaties. Multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival orientations should therefore inform how and why ratification or accession campaigns should be undertaken, and perhaps, even how treaties themselves should be designed. This analysis serves as a basis for broader theoretical reflections on persuading states to ratify human rights treaties.

Dietterlin and other Renaissance artists supported an empirical approach to architectural image-making, one that emerged in treatises like Dietterlin’s Architectura. Such treatises became sites of conflict between rationalist and empirical mathematical traditions, with Dietterlin’s mixed arithmetic and geometrical design procedures marking a pivotal turn toward empiricism. The development of prints in architectural texts – from geometrical illustrations in masonic incunables to Dürer’s 1525 Lesson on Measurement and archaeological renderings by Sebastiano Serlio, Philibert De L’Orme, and Hans Blum – shows how Dietterlin and his contemporaries increasingly rejected received knowledge in favor of the empirical epistemology also practiced by period artists and natural philosophers. As architectural treatises shifted from rationalist to empirical approaches to architectural design, they aligned architecture with the empirical culture of Renaissance image-making exemplified in Dietterlin’s Architectura.

This chapter covers an account of fieldwork among Filipino Roman Catholic ritual practitioners alongside those of phenomenologically inclined anthropologists and performance studies scholars, particularly those who have deployed a ‘radically empirical’ approach. The author examines how these scholars have channelled the vicissitudes and anxieties of fieldwork towards productive ethnographic insights. The radical empiricist project is particularly feasible in contexts in which ethnographers encounter less ‘rational’ but intrinsically human experiences such as pain, suffering, healing, and illness in the reenactment of Christ’s Passion. This chapter offers a reflection on the methodological feasibility of embodied and ‘distendedly reflexive’ approaches towards a more expansive understanding of religious pain and suffering.

Chapter three analyses the period between 1650 and 1800. Many thinkers see The Enlightenment’ as intoxicated with ideas of reason, control and with building perfect knowledge, organizations and societies. I demonstrate that this view is exaggerated. The ravages of wars produced two opposed intellectual movements: on the one hand, natural law and rationalism whose adherents believed in certain knowledge and abstract schemes; on the other, thinking in terms of probabilities, which recognizes and accommodates uncertainty. Hume, Smith, Voltaire and Montesquieu saw the limits of human reason and foresight and made considerable room for uncertainty. Military thinkers cautioned that war is unpredictable and that systematic knowledge is a pipe dream. Uncertainty and unpredictability occupied the centre stage in European culture; in paintings, the picaresque novel and the popularity of gambling and betting. This era was much contested as three different world views established themselves: The idea that the world could be understood and predicted, the sense that it is entirely uncertain and a pragmatic world view that recognizes and accommodates uncertainty as a part of the world.

This chapter describes the motivations for an analytical, “internal” critique of the law-and-economics movement. In particular, it discusses earlier types of critiques and shows that, while they are probably successful on their own terms, they have done little to dislodge economic-style thinking as a dominant force in American private law. Instead, a critique on the law-and-economics movement’s own terms is needed. The chapter also identifies several recurring problems, or “antipatterns,” in legal-economic reasoning.

This chapter summarizes the problems of the law-and-economics movement and tries to outline new ways for economic thinking to make a more lasting contribution to law.

The primary goal of Chapter 3 is to introduce some of the important themes that have come up when philosophers think about the (human) mind, where it comes from and how it relates to the body and to the surrounding world. To this end, we visit a division of philosophy called the philosophy of mind, which will involve a review of a variety of “-isms” (such as rationalism, empiricism, mind–body dualism, monism, materialism, idealism, behaviorism, physicalism, associationism, and so on). We also meet a number of important philosophers who have developed various and often opposing views on the nature–nurture issue. We conclude with a discussion of what philosophers of mind call “the hard problem,” how to explain the notion of consciousness.

This chapter considers how Fantasy has been shaped by and shaped modern understandings that privilege facts, realism and scientific knowledge. It argues that while Fantasy has often been belittled by discourses that seek to define what is true, right and possible, fantasies have engaged in good faith with such discourses while serving as valuable means for negotiating their limitations. The chapter begins by discussing Enlightenment and its oversights, before pivoting to discuss how Fantasy was side-lined by discourses of genius that exalted authors and demeaned audiences, setting Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth and Francis Jeffrey against more sympathetic appraisals by Joseph Addison, Charles Lamb and George MacDonald. The back half of the chapter explores how Fantasy engages critically with dominant rationalist and realist understandings that emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, considering works including Arthur Machen’s The Great God Pan, the animated series Arcane, Adrian Tchaikovsky’s Elder Race, Susanna Clarke’s Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell, Guy Gavriel Kay’s Tigana, Seth Dickinson’s The Traitor Baru Cormorant, Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Octavia Butler’s Kindred, Colson Whitehead’s The Underground Railroad and Rivers Solomon’s The Deep.

This chapter sets out the origins of the traditional historiography of early modern philosophy based on the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism. After reconstructing the spread of the notions of empiricism and rationalism in Germany during the 1780s, we argue that the first outline of a history of metaphysics that displays the Kantian, epistemological, and classificatory biases can be found in Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s works from the early 1790s. Two early Kantian historians, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and Johann Gottlieb Buhle, turned Reinhold’s outline into fully fledged histories of early modern thought. Tennemann, who became a Kantian after reading Reinhold’s works, developed Reinhold’s historical sketches into a detailed, nuanced, and comprehensive account of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy that revolves around the empiricism/rationalism distinction and displays the biases of the traditional historiography. Thus, in Germany, the decline of experimental philosophy and the eclipse of the experimental/speculative distinction went hand in hand with the rise of Kantianism and the development of a historiography based on the empiricism/rationalism distinction.