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This chapter explores anti-utopian satire in bestselling British author Terry Pratchett’s Discworld series. Like the anti-chivalric satire of Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Voltaire, the Discworld books celebrate pragmatism and local knowledge rather than political ideals. The Discworld is alive with vivid utopian impulses, however, the chapter argues that they frequently lack concrete detail. Pratchett is more concerned with constructing a colourful world of humour, heroism, and villainy. The Ankh-Morpork books reflect on the processes of historical change, accelerating a medieval city-state into liberal industrial modernity via an array of fantastically estranged forms. The city itself, however, fails to actualise into a utopian vision of the future. Rather, Pratchett’s fantasy series articulates a deep suspicion of the kind of political radicalism often associated with utopian thinking. Through a close reading of two books in the series, Night Watch (2002) and Making Money (2007), the chapter considers how Pratchett’s fantasy world laments structural violence whilst lampooning utopian remedies to such violence, such as democratic elections, trade unions, industrial action, or new kinds of post-capitalist value.
Edited by
Filipe Calvão, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,Matthieu Bolay, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland,Elizabeth Ferry, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
In exploring the politics of corporate versus small-scale mining of rubies and the ongoing struggles over a potentially enormous rare earth element (REE) deposit, this chapter hinges upon a critical analysis of transparency, opacity, and the politics of sovereignty in a country that is increasingly framed as a synecdoche for climate change in this century. Recent decades have seen the growth of two emergent forms in the international aid industry: (1) transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs) that endeavor to bring aid organizations in line with standard expectations around their operations; and (2) modest, small-scale do-it-yourself (DIY) aid projects that emerge from and depend on trusting relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries. This chapter considers the ambiguous coexistence of these forms, drawing from ethnographic research with a small-scale healthcare project in Madagascar to illustrate how DIY aid can be effective (for better or worse) despite operating outside the purview of TAIs.
The Declaration of Independence, usually regarded principally or even exclusively as a manifesto about certain “inalienable rights,” is better understood, especially historically, as a complex argument about popular sovereignty. Who exactly were “the people” who were entitled, as in the America of 1776, to secede from the British Empire and then claim their own rights of “self-determination”? The Declaration begins with the assertion that Americans were “one people.” But that was demonstrably false, even in 1776, and has become even more so since then. After all, James Madison, in Federalist 10, emphasizes the plurality of interests, including, religion and property, that generate “faction” and the possibility of tyranny of governing elites. Does the Declaration, even if complemented by the Constitution, supply enough of an “American creed” to supply the basis for genuine unity and political amity or does it instead plant the seeds for further division and even secession in the name of self-determination and government by consent of the governed?
This chapter examines the narrative of cybersecurity in China’s mass media, with a focus on the domestication of cybersecurity and its subsequent challenge to democracy. While much ink has been spilled over cybersecurity in (Western) democracies, less is known about the narrative and discourse of cybersecurity in an authoritarian context and its implications for global Internet governance and security. This chapter fills this gap by exploring news narratives on cybersecurity in China’s domestic mass media after the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2017. Drawing on computer-assisted semantic network analysis of 9,094 news articles and commentaries, this chapter uncovers how the Chinese regime is adopting a discourse of cybersecurity to legitimize and consolidate its control over the Internet and to counter the challenges of global Internet connection. This domestication discourse is further utilized to place blame on the West for cyber threats. This chapter concludes with thoughts on the domestication of cybersecurity by authoritarian regimes like China and the challenge of defending cybersecurity.
This chapter lays out the book’s argument in two parts. First, it first develops the concept of self-determination as understood by state and non-state actors in the Global South to apply to the legitimate exercise of power in the international system. Rather than requiring strict sovereignty and exclusion of outside actors, self-determination is about the nature of cooperation and international involvement. It requires that people, through their governments, be able to domestically affirm international rules and to meaningfully participate in their enforcement. The second part of this chapter explains how establishing regional organizations as an authority over issue areas can be a strategy for realizing self-determination and why, in the case of human rights, it necessitated compromising on the norm of non-interference. This strategy is effective at deterring pressure from Western governments because it combines and appeals to widely held beliefs about the legitimacy of self-rule with beliefs about the importance of exercising power through international organizations.
Why have regional organizations become authorities over human rights and international intervention, and what explains the differences in regional authority across different regions? Why did leaders in some parts of the Global South go from rejecting any interference to arguing for the central role of regional organizations in international interference? This chapter introduces the central questions addressed by this book and provides an overview of its core argument, focusing on the creation of new regional authority at one important moment: the emergence of regional organizations as authorities over human rights. This was the first time when leaders in the Global South changed from arguing for complete non-interference to arguing that legitimate interference should be carried out by or with the involvement of regional organizations. They did so as a strategy of subtle resistance to new challenges to self-determination, in the form of economic enforcement of human rights by Western governments. In regions targeted by this enforcement, leaders responded by establishing their regional organizations as authorities over human rights, accepting regional interference for the first time.
This chapter explores implications of the argument made in this book for other areas of international relations scholarship and for contemporary international politics, with regional authority and self-determination continuing to occupy an important place in the international politics of the Global South. It considers how incorporating the importance of self-determination, and the idea of regional organizations as a means of realizing it, can provide more complete understandings of contemporary political phenomena. I discuss how the argument in this book sheds light on the Global South’s dissatisfaction with liberal norms and institutions, the openness of democratic states in the Global South to cooperation with illiberal powers, and present-day dynamics of regionalism, including the creation of “new” regions and the growth of “authoritarian” regional organizations.
Just a few years after Latin American leaders began to establish regional authority over human rights, African leaders started to face similar economic pressure in their relations with European governments, most significantly in the context of the Lomé Convention, an aid and preferential trade agreement with the European Economic Community. In response, African leaders created their own regional human rights system from scratch, setting up a human rights charter and a commission to enforce the charter within the Organization of African Unity. This chapter traces the drafting history of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, showing that the initiative to create a regional human rights system was led by prominent human rights advocates who wanted an African-owned and -led system. Many African leaders were concerned with the level of authority given to the proposed human rights commission and the fact that it compromised on non-interference. They ultimately accepted it, in spite of these concerns, because of the shadow cast by new Western enforcement.
Where the 1970s and 1980s was a period of dramatic change in the use of regional organizations and attitudes towards the norm of non-interference in Latin America and Africa, the Middle East followed a very different trajectory. The changes in global norms and advocacy surrounding human rights in the 1970s coincided with the Middle East’s increased importance in Western foreign policy and the explosion of oil wealth in the region. Because of this, Western governments did not attempt to enforce human rights in this region, and as a result, leaders in the region made no changes towards establishing regional authority over human rights. Instead, the emergence of the human rights movement in the 1970s had the effect of short-circuiting earlier advances towards creating human rights institutions. It was only in the early 2000s, following the start of the Global War on Terror, that the Arab League finally began to develop new human rights institutions, and these institutions have been weaker and subject to greater state control. In contrast to Latin America and Africa, regional human rights institutions in the Middle East represent a straightforward attempt to deflect international pressure.
What should we make of the dramatic appearance of the Leveller leader John Lilburne in Hatfield Level in 1651, at the height of a decade of anti-improvement riots? This unusual contact between central radicalism and rural unrest destabilises binaries between a zealous minority driving civil war conflict and indifferent provincial subjects. Fen projects instead expose the pluralism of political ideas in seventeenth-century England. These crown-led ventures polarised notions of justice and became entangled in the events and debates propelling the English civil wars. In Epworth Manor, commoners across the social spectrum asserted an inalienable ‘just right’ to wetland commons in the face of royal and republican coercion. The strength of customary politics extended far beyond the parish, becoming a powerful means to articulate opposition to improvement in conflicts that moved between wetlands and Westminster. Central governors ultimately struggled to exercise a monopoly over legitimacy or violence in Epworth, where collective action across almost a century repelled efforts to turn their commons into theatres of state power and national productivity.
Latin America was the first and most intense target of the imposition of economic enforcement of human rights. The strategy of establishing regional organizations as authorities over human rights emerged in response to these new enforcement policies. This meant greatly expanding the authority of the Organization of American States and, for the first time, allowing it to interfere in member states’ internal affairs to enforce human rights. This strategy emerged first as an authoritarian survival strategy put forward by the Chilean government in response to unprecedented challenges to its domestic behaviors. However, democratic leaders in the region transformed it into a strategy involving real enforcement once economic pressure spread to the entire region. As this chapter demonstrates, the idea that regional organizations have special authority over human rights had not been taken for granted prior to this, as human rights were not understood as an issue that could be altered to fit local contexts. Instead, Latin American leaders–including democracies and leaders supporting human rights enforcement–argued forcefully for this new authority.
Denouncing the persistence of nationalist reflexes in order to explain the crisis of European integration is much too simple, as is the critique of a mercantile Europe deprived of solid social and moral foundations. Yet, these interpretations, oversimplified as they are, do point to some aspects of our liberal civilisation, which are under pressure in the current trajectory of developments shaping Europe. Seen as symptoms of a widespread malaise, these perspectives should be taken seriously.
In a lecture given in 1991, while working on the never finished third volume of his series on theories of justice, Brian Barry gave a rare glimpse into the ideas with which he was wrestling – twenty years ahead of present-day political theorists. What is the role of the state, how are we to conceptualize it, in a world if globalization, and against the background of a legitimate appeal for international distributive justice?
The European Union (EU) integration project is under attack from a reassertion of national sovereignty following Brexit and the Covid-19 crisis. Our analysis examines the impact that traditional forms of sovereignty and national interests will have on the conduct of EU foreign and security policy post-Brexit. We focus on the Brexit challenge to the EU mode of regulation and diplomacy in internal/external policies in Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. The article also considers key scenarios for future UK-EU security cooperation to inform analysis of likely policy outcomes for the UK and the EU. The article concludes that the EU will have a greater impact through its laws and regulations on the post-Brexit UK than vice versa and that Brexit is not an immediate threat to the EU's regulatory mode of security governance. The new realities of internal/external security governance in Europe post-Brexit will mean weakened EU–UK security arrangements, which will impact the scope and quality of European security cooperation beyond traditional defence. This is both undesirable and potentially dangerous for European security cooperation and for Europe's position in the wider world.
The lack of power exercised by the European Union (EU) in the international security arena explains its relative invisibility in the US. When Americans do recognise the EU, their interpretations of American history shape their responses to it. Whether puzzled by the loss of sovereignty or by the continuing strength of national identity, the American understanding of European integration cannot be divorced from Americans’ own understanding of the American process of nation-building and the exercise of federal power.
The article sets out to answer two closely related questions of why western states do outsource and why they display a variance. Hypotheses will be drawn from historical and sociological institutionalism and probed in two cases: Germany and the US. Historical institutionalism argues that the current contractor support is in keeping with the historical trend. Sociological institutionalism instead argues that states organise their militaries according to a globally shared template. However, the extent to which it is implemented is strongly influenced by the ideational foundations the states are built upon. Comparing these explanations, this study argues that patterns of military privatisation result from globally shared standards and the ideational foundations of the state rather than from historical trajectory and material benefits.
Foundations are often criticized as organizations of elite power facing little accountability within their own countries. Simultaneously, foundations are transnational actors that send money to, and exert influence on, foreign countries. We argue that critiques of foundation power should expand to include considerations of national sovereignty. Recently, countries across the globe have introduced efforts to restrict foreign aid, wary of the foreign influences that accompany it. However, it is unknown whether these restrictions impact foundation activity. With data on all grants from US-based foundations to NGOs based in foreign countries between 2000 and 2012, we use a difference-in-difference statistical design to assess whether restrictive laws decrease foundation activity. Our results suggest that restrictive laws rarely have a significant negative effect on the number of grants, dollars, funders, and human rights funding to a country. These results call for attention to considerations of foundation accountability in a transnational context.
The idea that regional organizations rightly occupy a central place in human rights, global governance, and international intervention has come to be taken-for-granted in international politics. Yet, the idea of regions as authorities is not a natural feature of the international system. Instead, it was strategically constructed by the leaders in the Global South as a way of maintaining their voice in global decision-making and managing (though not preventing) outside interference. Katherine M. Beall explores changes in the norms and practice of international interference in late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when Latin American and African leaders began to empower their regional organizations to enforce human rights. This change represented a form of quiet resistance to the imposition of human rights enforcement and a transformation in the ongoing struggle for self-determination. This book will appeal to scholars of international relations, international history, and human rights.
The introduction provides historical and theoretical framings for this book. It situates the American military presence in postwar China within two interconnected contexts of China’s civil war confrontations and America’s global occupation. It engages with existing historiographies by locating China in the American empire and locating America in Communist propaganda. Through the micro-lens of the everyday, it also analyzes the actual and critical links between grassroots frictions and Sino-US relations.
Chapter 1 examines the the US military operations in China within the volatile context of the civil war and the emerging Cold War. As the US forces accepted the Japanese surrender, clashed with Communist forces in sporadic skirmishes, and adjudicated trials of Japanese criminals in China independent of the Nationalist Government, they staged an American victory, might, and justice to both enemies and allies. The tactic of “show of force” was used in a “peaceful” mission to ensure submission and deference. However, its diverse, ambiguous, and at times contradictory objectives created significant military and political challenges. Ultimately, occupying China became a mission impossible.