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Recognising that the world into which students emerge upon graduation is characterised by constant change, we embrace a critical pedagogy that can be implemented in the classroom through the use of freehand drawing. Freehand drawing is a technique that can stimulate a critical stance, as visual representations allow us to comprehend the world differently, while permitting us see how others understand the world. First year students, in their first lecture, were asked to draw their interpretations of Irish politics and to explain in writing what they had drawn. The students were then placed in groups and asked to note what they saw in each other's drawings, allowing for the identification of general patterns and themes. In this context, freehand drawing facilitates our ability to: ‘see’ how we understand a topic and that there are multiple ways of understanding; test theories, orthodoxies and accepted truths; scrutinise tacit assumptions; and ponder other possibilities. In employing freehand drawing in this manner, our aim is to create a learning environment where students develop their capacity for critical self-reflection.
A theoretical intervention into the challenge of thinking through the complexities of life, in Iran or elsewhere. Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault offer us a model of thinking as a practice. Each attempted one project in which they were thinking systematically about ongoing events, and offering that thinking as a contribution to public understanding. Arendt traveled to Jerusalem to observe the Adolf Eichmann trial, and her contemporaneous writing was published in The New Yorker magazine. Foucault traveled to Iran to observe the early stages of the revolution, and his contemporaneous writing was published (mostly) in the Corriere della Sera newspaper. These two projects have commonly been regarded as their author’s most controversial and have often been ignored or used to denigrate the writer’s entire theoretical oeuvre. Yet they offer compelling models of thinking as a practice that critically links the self and the world. Rescuing theory from the confines of academic specialization restores it, and us, to the possibility of thinking as a practice of freedom, and freedom as the daily possibility of beginning anew.
For many adults, the idea that infants and toddlers are ‘knowers, thinkers and theorisers’ is a strange one. Such concepts are often associated with older children whose abilities to build and express understandings are more evident and align more readily with traditional ideas about learning and teaching. Furthermore, cognitive states and processes such as ‘knowing’, ‘thinking’ and ‘understanding’ are not visible in the same way that physical, social and emotional behaviours. This means that they have to be inferred and interpreted, especially when pre-verbal infants and toddlers cannot tell you what is going on in their heads. Together these challenges may result in a deficit view that, instead of seeing infants and toddlers as active and capable learners, positions very young as waiting to learn. Also, an emphasis on meeting physical and emotional needs may come at the cost of overlooking infants and toddlers cognitive capabilities and potentials.
The Conclusion sums up the main results of the study and their philosophical relevance. It focuses on the notion of complete passive activities; Aristotle’s integration of causal, qualitative, and relational features of perception; his dynamic account of perception, which defies the standard dichotomy between materialism and spiritualism; the central dilemma for Aristotle’s endeavour to explain perception, as well as the prospects of the homeostatic solution; and finally the promise of the present study to also provide the groundwork for a better understanding of Aristotle’s account of intellectual cognition.
The core of the Polycrisis, along with the thinking skills and personal development needed to thrive in the Anthropocene are discussed in clear terms, laying the foundation for the next chapter.
One of the striking features of Heidegger's philosophical engagement concerns his privileging of poetry and poetic thinking. In this understanding of language as fundamentally poetic, Heidegger puts forward a different way to do philosophy. In this Element, the author places Heidegger's poetic thinking in conversation with Sophocles and Hölderlin as a way to situate his critique of global technology and instrumental thinking in the postwar years. This Element also offers a critique of Heidegger's efforts to arrogate poetic thinking to his own aim of a destinal form of German national self-assertion through poetry. Overall, the aim here is to show how crucial poetic thinking is to the way Heidegger understands philosophy as a radical engagement with language.
Every philosophy is a celebration of the fact that being can be thought, that the world around us yields to concepts that join together into arguments which can lead us to new thoughts and new ways of thinking. Heidegger's great talent was to never lose his philosophical wonder at philosophy, to never stop thinking about thinking. Heidegger's early work favors a somewhat pragmatic view of thinking as organized by and around our projects, emphasizing tacit skills over articulate conscious thinking. It also explores stepping back from all projects in dread and wonder. His later thinking is reciprocal rather than autonomous, something we do with and for being instead of something we do to or on beings, which can help overcome contemporary nihilism. After the death of God, we may no longer be able to pray to a divinity, but we can still be the thinkers of being.
Decisions are doors that provide people of all ages with opportunities to express who they are and to learn about who they want to become. Sometimes the young people in your life may choose the wrong door and, while that can make for a good learning experience, you probably want to help them make good decisions and avoid the bad ones. You did, after all, decide to open up this book. While we cannot program kids with the answers they need to live healthy and fulfilling lives, we can support kids in learning and using a common-sense approach to understanding and organizing their feelings and thoughts as they make their own decisions.
Many people have had the experience of thinking with pleasure, or of the pleasure of thinking, but can we substantiate the idea that thinking can be pleasurable? This first chapter explores non-psychological productions to search for evidence of the pleasure of thinking in the visual arts, in philosophy – mainly in the writings of Baruch Spinoza and Hannah Arendt - and in the self-writing of a few authors, among them Sigmund Freud and the novelist Chaim Potok. This enables to identify five modalities of the pleasure of thinking. The chapter then poses the theoretical frame for the book, a sociocultural and developmental psychology, and highlights its ontological and epistemological axioms. Two concepts are defined: on the one hand, the concepts of thinking, including reasoning, sense-making, and daydreaming; on the other hand, the concept of pleasure. The methodology used for the book is then exposed – an abductive integration of theoretical work with the secondary analysis of existing work and of data collected in our past work. The outline of the volume is finally presented.
This chapter offers a critique of the idea that writing has unique or inherent benefits. It argues that the promise or potential of writing lies in what we do with writing, rather than what writing does to us. The chapter focuses on the ways in which we think with writing as well as how we label and organize our environment, and navigate the world, in both a literal and a metaphorical sense. It also shows how writing has evolved as a way of initiating and sustaining our social relationships. Writing can be used to mislead us, or to persuade us to do things we might later regret, and this is used to counter overenthusiastic claims about the promise of writing.
Comprehension can be the starting point for further cognitive activities such as thinking and problem-solving. Productive thinking requires a specific interaction between descriptive and depictive representations combining representational power and inferential power. The interaction takes place through processes of mental model construction and model inspection. Descriptive representations are combined and coordinated with the corresponding depictive representations, whereby each representation constrains the construction and usage of the other representation. Model inspection requires systematic and exhaustive interrogation of depictive representations in order to read off relevant information. Depictive representations have to grasp task-relevant structures and facilitate performance of the required procedures. Required operations should not be difficult to perform and the sequences of operations should be relatively short. Inappropriate perceptual structures of visualizations can obscure relevant structural attributes, preventing the application of correct procedures and stimulating the application of incorrect procedures.
Multimedia messages use combinations of texts, pictures, maps, and graphs as tools for communication. This book provides a synthesis of theory and research about how people comprehend multimedia. It adopts the perspectives of cognitive psychology, semiotics, anthropology, linguistics, education, and art. Its central idea is that information displays can be categorized into two different but complementary forms of representations, which service different purposes in human cognition and communication. Specific interaction between these representations enhances comprehension, thinking, and problem solving, as illustrated by numerous examples. Multimedia Comprehension is written for a broad audience with no special prior knowledge. It is of interest to everyone trying to understand how people comprehend multimedia, from scholars and students in psychology, communication, and education, to web- and interface-designers and instructors.
Thinking as a way of coping with the situations in which we find ourselves. Internal dialogue and gestures. Situations calling for thought. Thinking and rational deliberation. Actions and plans for actions as having entirely different ontological status. In the seventeenth century the mechanical worldview separated bodies from minds, and thinking thereby became a disembodied process. The body was instead equated with “the passions.” As a result, movements such as the ballet came to be regarded only as aesthetic objects. Eighteenth-century theories of the origin of language buttressed this claim. The ridiculousness of ballets d’action. Ballet dancers now became sex workers, and the theater became a location where rational, disembodied, human beings keep their emotions.
Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic – precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.
This chapter deals with inquiry, a central tenet of geographical learning as set out in the Australian Curriculum. It examines the reasons for using inquiry in the classroom, in terms of both pedagogical theory and practical classroom teaching. It then suggests a number of ways in which inquiry can be put into practice.
The logic of the Concept has three parts. The first (“The subjective concept”) examines (apparently following the divisions of traditional logic) the concept as-it-is, the types of judgement and the reasoning (“syllogism”) constructed from judgements; but the notions of judgement and syllogistic reasoning are as deeply transformed as that of the concept itself. Far from any formal approach, how thought informs reality should be examined. The second part (“The object”) examines how this conceptual shaping of the real happens. It occurs at three levels, seemingly corresponding to the great divisions of classical science: mechanism, chemism, teleology. The third part concerns “the idea”, a notion that is completely transformed, being defined as “the absolute unity of the [subjective] concept and objectivity” (Encyclopedia §213). Hegel describes how subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality, interfere, to the extent that it becomes impossible to separate them, except at the cost of a great abstraction, that of the “understanding”. Hegel calls this interpenetration of thought and being the “absolute idea”, thus redefining the terms in which philosophy had hitherto been thought.
The chapter considers Plato's claim, in Parmenides 135, that thinking about things requires Forms. It locates Plato's argument for this claim in 132 and, especially, in the second part of the dialogue (142ff.). It shows that the second part of the dialogue is just as much about thinking as it is about being.
In this article, I propose a typology of thinking pattern that helps us understand the variants of the so-called ‘both/and thinking’ shared by many organizational paradox scholars in the West and China. The variants are distinguished by the ‘primary thinking-secondary thinking’ structure between the combined elementary thinking. One of the variants, i.e., Neither-And thinking, is associated with James March's discussion of logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness. An examination of March's writings reveals an additional ‘principle-practice’ structure underlining March's unique solution to paradox. Incorporating the ‘principle-practice’ structure into the proposed typology in turn helps us better understand the other variants of ‘both/and thinking’ such as ambidexterity, contingency, and Zhong-Yong. The typology shows March's Neither-And solution is unique because it embraces a primary neither/nor thinking while all the other variants do not. To demonstrate the value of March's unique solution, I apply Neither-And thinking characterized by the ‘principle-practice’ relationship to paradoxes outside organization studies, e.g., in Deconstruction, Buddhism, and quantum physics. The wide application of Neither-And thinking implies that James March's unique solution to organizational paradox may have provided a key to understanding paradox in general.
Most empirical studies about chess have taken the happenstance of the cognitive or experimental paradigm within psychology. In this chapter, the past main research findings from this approach will be reviewed together with their contribution to psychological science. The chapter is structured into three main subsections, perception, memory, and thinking. Each of these sections describe more specific themes such as information processing models, eye movements, theories of memory in chess, and thinking methods such as pattern recognition and search. The main conclusions from this extensive body of research are summarized through the prism of the individual differences approach.
Chapter 1 introduced the basic ‘tools’ of performance and reward management, including key aspects of purpose and practice. In this chapter we introduce two overarching concepts of alignment that recur throughout this book: ‘strategic alignment’ and ‘psychological engagement’. The design, implementation and maintenance of effective performance and reward management systems requires simultaneous, systematic and constant attention to both of these dimensions of alignment.
‘Strategic alignment’ refers to the plans, processes and actions involved in establishing and maintaining an alignment between an organisation’s overarching purpose or intent and how it manages employee performance and reward, as well as all other aspects of people management.