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This chapter assesses the effects of intra-industry trade on lobbying in the EU. It includes the results of analysis of an original dataset of EU-based lobbying over several trade agreements. First, the chapter briefly discusses the nature of trade policy in the EU, and then surveys the literature on the politics of trade in Europe, with a focus on the state of our knowledge about the character of political coalitions and the involvement of industry associations and individual firms in the trade policymaking process. Second, the chapter discusses the role of intra-industry trade in the EU and presents an argument about the way that IIT has eroded the ability of European industry associations to lobby jointly over trade policy. Third, the chapter introduces the dataset used to assess the argument and discusses the quantitative analysis and results. The results support the theory developed in this book and demonstrate that IIT affects societal coalitions across diverse institutional contexts.
The impact of trade agreements is not gender neutral, as women and men play different roles and enjoy different opportunities in society, markets and the economy. In order to minimize the unintended discriminatory impact of these agreements on women, several countries have developed policy instruments with gender-related commitments. However, the nature and scope of these commitments vary considerably from one region to another. Moreover, while some countries have been at the forefront of including these provisions in their trade agreements, many others have lagged behind and have yet to take the first step in this direction. This chapter examines these dynamics. The first part of the chapter looks at the differences in gender-related provisions in different regions, using practical examples to illustrate differences and overlaps within these regions. The second part of the chapter zooms in on one of these regions, South America, as it has emerged as a frontrunner in drafting trade agreements with various types of gender commitments. This section offers reflections on the ways in which countries in South America have drafted gender provisions, the roles of women that these provisions have focused on, and the mainstreaming strategies that are unique to this region (such as the inclusion of stand-alone chapters and the creation of dedicated implementation mechanisms).
Special and differential treatment (SDT) has a long history in international trade negotiations. Born as a response to the development gap in the multilateral fora, S&DT has evolved as a set of substantive and procedural rules aimed at providing developing countries with broader policy space. Latin-American countries, which had fostered the creation and improvement of S&DT rules in the GATT-WTO, have faced different challenges in the negotiation of these provisions in their preferential trade agreements (PTAs). This chapter explores the scope of S&DT principles and operative clauses included in Latin-American trade agreements since the early 2000s. The main contributions of this chapter are, first, to present S&DT as a cross-cutting topic in PTAs; second, to bring to light the evolution of development-related policy space in trade agreements recently signed in the region; and third, to assess differences in the legal S&DT architecture across PTAs.
This chapter analyses Latin American trade policy trends from post-2008 to 2018 and offers in-depth case studies of Brazil and Mexico. At both aggregate and more detailed levels of analysis we document the significant rise in protectionism, and non-tariff measures (NTMs) in particular, in the decade following the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis. We focus on the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that govern Mexico’s trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Brazil’s trade in the context of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). We report two main findings regarding Latin American trade and commercial policy trends in the 21st century. First, PTAs – long considered as key trade and investment-creating conduits – are now emerging as venues within which NTMs (e.g., non-transparent interventions, import bans, licensing requirements, controls on safety standards) are simultaneously increasing. That is, members within the same scheme are deploying NTMs against each other. The good news is that membership in these PTAs has mitigated some intra-bloc protectionism, albeit against a backdrop of rising NTMs within these PTAs, nonetheless. Second, the rapid trade and investment integration of China into Latin America markets since 2002 has directly shaped trade policy patterns and responses in this region. In the end, neither Brazil nor Mexico has risen to the occasion in terms of generating a pro-growth trade strategy that delivers compelling distributional and productive returns. Some of these shortcomings are due to path dependence within each PTA, as policymakers in both countries have failed to update approaches that have clearly failed to deliver over time. Outside of these PTAs, the stale macroeconomic response of each country to dynamic and competitive challenges emanating from the global economy risks an extenuation of long-term patterns of political and economic underperformance.
Most recent preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include a full-fledged chapter devoted to the environment. These chapters typically incorporate specific commitments on various environmental issues, including endangered species, deforestation, and hazardous waste. Existing research has found that some of these commitments can be impactful, especially in developing countries. Yet, relatively few PTAs include detailed provisions on climate change. The first part of this chapter introduces a 2x2 typology of environmental provisions that are the most relevant for climate governance. This typology distinguishes positive and negative commitments as well as direct and diffused commitments. The second part builds on a data set of environmental provisions in 774 trade agreements to map the existing distribution of these four types of climate-relevant provisions. The third part zooms in on one important provision per type: restriction on fossil fuel subsidies, liberalisation of environmental good and services, climate exceptions related to investment protection, and exceptions allowing for carbon border adjustments. The fourth part makes specific suggestions to increase the degree of precision, obligation, and delegation for these four types of provisions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the legal and political context necessary to have PTAs that take climate change more seriously.
This article studies the incorporation of package treaties in domestic law and administrative practice, including the functions these treaties serve once in force. This sketch of the domestic operationalization offers a window into the institutional design choices that shape how lawmakers craft the regulatory ecosystem in which flanking policies are carried out. The typology for understanding how governments situate package treaties in their domestic regulatory spaces is introduced, arguing that the ‘package’ of legally binding trade liberalization commitments and mutually agreed flanking policies is shaped by both legislative and regulatory choices that are often underestimated and overlooked. DUS trade agreements are used as a case study, finding that the US government's treatment of each of its trade agreements tends to follow a common pattern: only a small part of the agreement is transposed into domestic law; complex and robust institutions are built around the agreement to embed it deeply into the trade policy work of the executive branch; and, the entrenchment of US trade agreements has a significant enabling effect across a wide range of cross-border regulatory engagements that US agencies think of as ‘monitoring’ or ‘enforcing’, among other labels. Finally, the policy choices against the goals laid out by proponents of package treaties are assessed.
In the past decades, a backlash against globalization has been brewing, especially in advanced economies. Despite this backlash being only partly determined by trade, we observe an increasing demand for transparency on procedures, methodologies, and results. Impact assessments (IAs) aim at identifying expected effects of trade agreements and at highlighting policymakers' concerns, thus representing an important tool to foster public acceptance. To help us identify spillovers of trade liberalization, we construct a country and sector-specific database of impact assessments. This database provides an overview of the evolution of the coverage and methodological approaches taken by the EU and US for their IAs. We rely on official EU and US sources over the period 1990–2023. We first observe differences in terms of methodology and institutional framework within and between the two regions. Secondly, the coverage of non-trade outcomes has evolved over time both for the EU and the US, with the inclusion of more labour, environmental, and human rights indicators as well as cross-cutting issues. We observe that the depth of the evaluation is correlated with the partner country's social protection and environmental performance. Lastly, we find that the inclusion of a sector in the analysis is driven by economic reasons in the EU but by political reasons in the US.
Recent years have seen an increased focus on the implementation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). While the number of PTAs has risen remarkably since early 2000, data on the utilization of preferential tariffs under these agreements point out that some businesses have not gained access to all the benefits that PTAs can provide. When utilization rates are low, the impact of the agreement will likely differ from what was anticipated by ex-ante economic research. This paper conducts a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the expected impact of the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and compares a scenario that includes realistic preference utilization data with a standard scenario where all tariff liberalization is assumed to be fully utilized by businesses. The results show considerable differences between the two scenarios and illustrate the need to make the inclusion of credible utilization data standard practice in the modelling of international trade.
The Australian debate over Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) sharpened in 2023 because Australian mining billionaire Clive Palmer, having previously registered his mining company in Singapore, has claimed to be a Singaporean investor. He is using ISDS provisions in the 2012 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement and the amended 2017 Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement to sue the Australian government for a total of A$410 billion in three separate claims. This article uses Cox’s critical theory framework developed by Schneiderman to explain the historical development and power dynamics of ISDS, the contest between its business supporters and social movement critics, and the impact of this contest on governments. It then analyses the Palmer claims and explores the global debate about ISDS, including its increased use by fossil fuel companies against government regulation of carbon emissions, which has led to increased resistance from social movements and governments. ISDS is also being reviewed by the United Nations and World Bank institutions which provide arbitrators for its tribunals and by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The conclusion assesses the debate over whether ISDS can be reformed and its future viability.
The mushrooming of trade agreements and their interlinkages with environmental governance calls for new research on the trade and environment interface. The more than 700 existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) include ever more diverse and far-reaching environmental provisions. While missed opportunities remain and harmful provisions persist, numerous environmental provisions in PTAs entail promising potential. They promote the implementation of environmental treaties and cover numerous environmental issues. New concepts, data, and methods, including detailed content analysis across multiple institutions, are needed to explain these interlinkages and understand whether and how PTAs with environmental provisions can contribute to tackling global environmental challenges. Making use of the most extensive coding of environmental provisions in PTAs to date and combining quantitative data with qualitative analyses, this Element provides a comprehensive yet fine-grained picture of the drivers and effects of environmental provisions in PTAs. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The chapter explores the question of how different domestic and international law approaches to regulating the international transfer of personal data deal with cybersecurity threats. It examines the 2016 EU General Data Protection Regulation, the 2021 UK National Security and Investment Act, and the 2018 United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement, as representing distinct approaches for regulating international data transfers, namely data protection legislation, investment screening legislation, and digital trade agreements. The analysis demonstrates that a lack of uniformity in terms of what constitutes an adequate level and design of data protection mechanisms has left the issue of how to distinguish between acceptable and non-acceptable data-transfer restrictions largely unresolved.
In the recent years, there has been an upsurge in the number of countries that are mainstreaming gender equality concerns in their trade and investment agreements. These recent developments challenge the long-standing assumption that trade, investment, and gender equality are not related. They also show that gender mainstreaming in trade and investment agreements is here to stay. However, very few countries – mostly developed countries – have led this mainstreaming approach and have made efforts to incentivize other countries to negotiate gender-responsive trade and investment agreements. The majority of developing countries are yet to take their first steps in negotiating such policy instruments with a gender lens, and their hesitation can be grounded in various reasons including fears of protectionism, lack of data, paucity of understanding and expertise, and, more broadly, constraints relating to their negotiation capacity. Moreover, the inclusion of gender-related concerns in the negotiation of such agreements has deepened and widened the negotiation capacity gap between developed and developing countries. In this article, the authors attempt to assess this widening negotiation capacity gap with the help of empirical research, and how this capacity gap can lead to disproportionate and negative repercussions for developing countries more than developed countries.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows can lead to more opportunities for women in the job market but may also exacerbate gender disparities. While gender mainstreaming in trade agreements has been extensively discussed over the past few years, demonstrating the need for reform, the discussion on gender mainstreaming in investment treaties is incipient, although extremely interesting. The inclusion of gender provisions in investment treaties is one of the pillars for a successful strategy to overcome gender inequality. It needs to be addressed along with gender policies by multinational enterprises (MNEs) leading the foreign investment process. This chapter aims to address the role of women as levers of change and the opportunity for MNEs to be the drivers of this change. To this end, it reviews the recent evolution of gender provisions in investment agreements and demonstrates how FDI can foment much-needed change by providing examples of actions and policies by MNEs in the Americas towards promoting more opportunities for women.
With the narrowing space between international trade and domestic policy, the topic of women’s empowerment1 is increasingly becoming part of mainstream discussions in global governance circles. Indeed, renewed attention is now being paid to how international trade policies may impact gender equality.2 Recently, multiple studies have demonstrated that trade policy is not gender-neutral.3 Trade policies create both ‘losers’ and ‘winners’, as they benefit some and leave others behind.4 The distributional outcomes of trade can vary between women and men, since they play different roles in society, markets, and the economy, and they enjoy different opportunities.5 Hence, if trade policies are designed without taking into account their impact on gender powers and opportunities, these policies can magnify the existing gender gaps.6
A gender-responsive trade policy can lift obstacles faced by women in trade through, for instance, financial and non-financial incentives, or by providing access to trade-related infrastructure, especially in rural areas. Trade policies can create new opportunities for women entrepreneurs and female farmers, and for women to enter the workforce, in export sectors. In light of these opportunities, the chapter seeks to explore how capabilities for women can be expanded and enforced in global trade. Among other things, the research will delve into the ability of trade agreements to contribute to gender equality. Specifically, the chapter analyses these issues from the institutional aspect of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its role in designing gender-inclusive trade policies and monitoring such policies through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).
Trade policies create both 'winners' and 'losers', as some actors stand to benefit and others are left behind. More often than not, it has been women who have borne the negative impacts of international trade policy and it is thus imperative that future trade policy is negotiated and implemented with an eye toward women's interests. This collection represents an innovative systematic evaluation of the debate relating to international trade law, policy, and gender equality. It analyses the role of WTO as a trade policy setter, current debates and possibilities for gender-inclusive trade agreements and emerging topics such as e-commerce and gender-responsive standards. With a range of interdisciplinary contributions and national and regional case studies, this collection offers a comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the intersections between trade law and gender, and is vital to ensuring that both men and women 'win' from trade policy in the future. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
China, the EU and the United States are the world’s largest traders, and many of the tensions in the trading system arise in the relations among them. Our premise is that reforming WTO is a necessary condition for the organization to be a more salient forum for the three large economies to address trade tensions, and that agreement among these three trade powers in turn is necessary to resolve the problems of the WTO. After a brief discussion of the global challenges that ought to be on the WTO agenda and of the systemic context, we discuss both how China understands WTO reform and how the other two leading powers see the China problem in the WTO. We consider how the three see transparency, plurilateral negotiations, economic development differences, fisheries and industrial subsidies, WTO working practices, and dispute settlement. We conclude by considering the implications of our analysis for fostering cooperation between the three major trade powers in the WTO.
China, the EU and the United States are the world’s largest traders, and many of the tensions in the trading system arise in the relations among them. Our premise is that reforming WTO is a necessary condition for the organization to be a more salient forum for the three large economies to address trade tensions, and that agreement among these three trade powers in turn is necessary to resolve the problems of the WTO. After a brief discussion of the global challenges that ought to be on the WTO agenda and of the systemic context, we discuss both how China understands WTO reform and how the other two leading powers see the China problem in the WTO. We consider how the three see transparency, plurilateral negotiations, economic development differences, fisheries and industrial subsidies, WTO working practices, and dispute settlement. We conclude by considering the implications of our analysis for fostering cooperation between the three major trade powers in the WTO.
The negotiation of the free trade agreement (FTA) between Australia and the United Kingdom promised to integrate trade and climate policies. As a leader of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference in Glasgow, the UK seemed well-placed to exert pressure on Australia, a country that was yet to embrace a target of net zero emissions by 2050. This article asks whether the FTA achieves this aim. It explains the link between trade liberalisation and climate change, referring to the scale and composition of economic activity and drawing upon examples from energy, agriculture, building and transportation sectors, as well as strategic factors. It provides an original analytical framework to assess the FTA's contributions to climate change goals, pointing to: (1) provisions to strengthen climate commitments, including net zero targets; (2) provisions to facilitate trade and investment in climate-related areas; and (3) provisions relating to enforcement and cooperation. It compares selected initiatives of other FTAs, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the European Union–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the UK–New Zealand FTA and the Singapore–Australia Green Economy Agreement. It reviews the FTA's negotiating process and its aftermath, including complaints about public participation. The article's conclusion that the FTA makes minimal contribution to climate change mitigation has implications for the broader quest for mutually supportive trade and climate policies, and, now that a net zero target has been legislated by the newly elected Australian Parliament, for the FTA's future implementation.
In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.