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This chapter presents qualitative case studies of the dramatically different political dynamics of TPP and TTIP negotiations. Why was lobbying so much more contentious over TPP while lobbying over TTIP was muted and almost entirely in favor of the agreement? The chapter traces the development of industry and labor union positions on each agreement, showing how the effects of endowments-based, inter-industry trade on the basis of comparative advantage (much more prevalent with TPP partners) serves to unify industries and unions around their particular position, facilitating strong collective action. With TTIP, the chapter shows how internationally engaged firms were highly motivated to lobby in favor of increased market access and the removal of regulatory barriers, while domestic-oriented firms either sat out of the political process entirely or formed cross-sectoral ad hoc coalitions. These cases elucidate how and why actors came to these decisions.
Chapter 3 develops a theory of the domestic politics of intra-industry trade. It argues that changes in the nature of trade away from endowments-based trade to two-way trade within industries change the structure of preferences over trade policy and the way that actors mobilize politically in order to influence trade policy. This, in turn, affects trade policy outcomes and the ease with which trade agreements are concluded. First, I argue that the distributional effects of intra-industry trade drive a wedge through industry preferences over trade policy. As intra-industry trade increases, globalized firms support openness, and smaller, domestic-oriented firms within the same industry support protection. Second, these heterogeneous firm preferences change the ability of industries to overcome collective action problems and organize politically to influence trade policy. I argue that industry associations are hamstrung in their ability to lobby while individual firms have a greater incentive to lobby alone for their preferred policies. Third, exporters will overwhelm domestic-oriented firms in their ability to lobby, and as a result, tariffs will be lower in industries with higher intra-industry trade, though this may not be the case with non-tariff barriers to trade.
The book concludes by synthesizing the major findings and discussing the compelling questions it raises about future trade policy negotiations. This chapter focuses on the troubling implications of a lobbying landscape dominated by individual firms. It discusses the ways that intra-industry trade may increase societal inequality, as well as links between firm lobbying and the societal backlash to hyperglobalization. The chapter also provides policy recommendations and fruitful areas of future research based on the findings of this study.
This chapter assesses the effects of intra-industry trade on lobbying in the EU. It includes the results of analysis of an original dataset of EU-based lobbying over several trade agreements. First, the chapter briefly discusses the nature of trade policy in the EU, and then surveys the literature on the politics of trade in Europe, with a focus on the state of our knowledge about the character of political coalitions and the involvement of industry associations and individual firms in the trade policymaking process. Second, the chapter discusses the role of intra-industry trade in the EU and presents an argument about the way that IIT has eroded the ability of European industry associations to lobby jointly over trade policy. Third, the chapter introduces the dataset used to assess the argument and discusses the quantitative analysis and results. The results support the theory developed in this book and demonstrate that IIT affects societal coalitions across diverse institutional contexts.
Economists have modelled the economic rationale for intra-industry trade, yet political scientists largely have neglected it until recently. Every Firm for Itself explores how dramatic shifts in the way countries trade have radically changed trade politics in the US and EU. It explores how electorally minded policymakers respond to heavy lobbying by powerful corporations and provide trade policies that further advantage these large firms. It explains puzzling empirical phenomena such as the rise of individual firm lobbying, the decline of broad trade coalitions, the decline of labor union activity in trade politics, and the rising public backlash to globalization due to trade politics becoming increasingly dominated by large firms. With an approach that connects economics and politics, this book shows how contemporary trading patterns among rich countries undermine longstanding coalitions and industry associations that once successfully represented large and small firms alike.
Trade policy in Chile has always enjoyed a high degree of consensus among the various social actors. The low level of debate in the media and civil society has always been highlighted, especially with regard to the strategy of signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs), except for some sectoral debates. However, this low level of politicization has been reversed since the social outbursts of 2019, when this questioning was installed. The CPTPP has generated a broad debate among different actors. To determine the extent to which perceptions of PTAs have actually changed, the chapter develops a mixed qualitative methodology based on stakeholder surveys, expert interviews, and media analysis. We try to find out why Chile appears to have turned its back on PTAs, given the potential economic benefits they have brought to the country. The first section reviews the literature on perceptions, particularly in relation to trade agreements. The second section describes the evolution of Chile’s trade policy in order to understand the key moments when turning points in general perceptions have occurred. The third section presents and discusses the results of the surveys, media analysis, and interviews.
Over the past 20 years, the European Union (EU) has shifted the emphasis of its trade policy from multilateral agreements towards bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and, more recently, to unilateral policy instruments. In this article we analyze the EU’s growing ambitions in promoting environmental sustainability in the context of these shifts. We advance an analytical and a conceptual argument, focusing on a product group that is highly relevant to the EU’s green transition: aviation fuels. We argue that the increasing hardness and ambition of the EU’s environmental policy instruments on the sustainability of aviation fuels contributes to a trend of ‘unilateralization’ in EU trade policy. Our analysis further illustrates how the complementary qualities of hardness and ambition in the multi-, bi-, and unilateral EU instruments lead to their flexible combination in the EU trade policy mix. Based on these findings, we propose to describe and critically analyze the EU’s current approach as ‘flexilateralism’. The EU has changed from prioritizing multilateralism to a more pragmatic, flexilateral approach, rather than for fully fledged bilateralism or unilateralism. This is what the EU’s more assertive ‘strategic autonomy’ may be about: a flexilateral approach to better address issues such as environmental sustainability with the most useful combination of instruments available.
On 1 March 2018, President Trump declared a 25% tariff on certain steel imports by invoking Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The tariff pitted two of America’s most storied and interconnected industries, steel and auto producers, against one another and made allies out of longtime bitter political opponents on Capitol Hill. Later that same year, President Trump doubled down on the steel tariff when he initiated a Section 232 investigation on auto and auto parts imports. The auto industry blasted the proposal, while steel offered its strong support. This paper examines the congressional response to President Trump’s proposed auto tariff. Specifically, we explain why 159 MCs signed a letter opposing the tariff. After controlling for other factors, such as district interests and campaign contributions, we find that ideology matters more than party affiliation on whether legislators signed the auto letter. We also find the second dimension of the DW-NOMINATE score to matter, suggesting the strong presence of intra-party cleavages. Our findings highlight the complex nature of trade policy as a domain of bipartisan agreement amidst broader political polarization and at a time when traditional party platforms on the issue are rapidly changing.
Two scholarly communities work on global trade and investment governance yet communicate little with each other. On the one hand, classic trade and investment scholarship focuses on states' foreign economic policies, trade and investment treaty programs, and participation in the World Trade Organisation. On the other hand, scholars of private and commercial law study how businesses draft and enforce the international contracts of a private law nature that ultimately constitute international trade and investment transactions. This research note seeks to raise awareness for this bifurcation of research on global trade and investment, develops a conceptual framework to better understand the role of private law in shaping trade and investment flows, and proposes a research agenda anchored in economics, political economy, and political science to advance our understanding of the role of private law in global trade and investment transactions and governance.
The story told in this chapter is that of two major waves in liberalization and globalization, occurring in the second halves of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Iberian economies participated in both waves, but in a way different from the core European economies. During the first globalization boom, despite the smaller domestic market, Portugal was more protectionist than Spain, what probably discouraged export competitiveness in international markets, and promoted a bigger dynamism in pushing more labour and pulling more capital lending from abroad. During the second globalization, Portugal was slightly more trade-friendly and international labour integrated than its Iberian neighbour, as expected for an economy with a small domestic market, and a robust global migration network. Finally, after fast industrialization and welfare convergence process to the more prosperous Europe, both Iberian countries have recently enjoyed, within the scope of European Institutions, more balanced growth and active participation in the international economy, at least until the financial crisis of 2008.
The South Korean economy began to grow rapidly in the 1960s, enabling it to converge with the advanced countries in per capita product. It did so as the leadership change enhanced state capacity. The government intervened pervasively in the economy, making sure that firms receiving the favors used them properly. The size of the government itself was small, but the macroeconomic policy was inflationary. The resultant inflation affected the way financial policy, the most important policy at the time, worked. The export promotion policy degenerated as the government employed non-price measures while the price incentives fell in spite of the 1964 exchange rate reform because of inflation, whereas the reform helped to check import growth. Nonetheless, exports grew rapidly, providing important dynamism for the economy. South Korea coped with the emerging balance of payments problem by normalizing its diplomatic relationship with Japan and sending troops to Vietnam.
The EU’s common commercial policy is used as an instrument to realize its values in EU trading partners, reflected in the inclusion of sustainable trade and development chapters in EU preferential trade agreements (PTAs). This chapter asks if including non-trade provisions (NTPs) in EU PTAs has a systematic positive effect on non-trade outcomes in partner countries. It analyzes the relationship between bilateral trade flows, the coverage of NTPs in EU PTAs and the performance of EU partner countries on several non-trade outcome variables using synthetic control methods. It finds no robust evidence of a causal effect of including NTPs in EU PTAs on indicators of non-trade outcomes.
Bringing together leading experts in trade law and policy, this volume investigates the coherence between the European Union's trade policy and its non-trade objectives. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, it highlights previously unaddressed dimensions of EU policy objectives and outcomes. With a range of illustrative case studies, the contributions offer in-depth analysis while making key issues and policy conclusions accessible to readers without specialist training. Pushing the frontiers of research on trade, investment, and non-trade issues, the volume advances debates concerning the reform of the international trade regime and the EU's adoption of a new trade policy. Bolstered by a diverse range of contributors and perspectives, this expansive collection recognises the achievements of the current EU trade policy, assesses its limits, and puts forth actionable recommendations for how it may be improved.
Women across countries and regions face many obstacles that hamper their capacity to fully benefit from international trade and, more generally, from their participation in the economy. Those shortcomings are also found in the least-developed countries (LDCs), but they are magnified by persistent and acute development challenges that include high levels of poverty, deficient infrastructure, limited productive capacities, and a mostly low-skilled labour force. Trade has been singled out as an effective tool for a fruitful integration of the LDCs into the global economy, and preferential trade regimes have been set up to facilitate the process. However, have LDCs benefited from such regimes and, above all, has trade provided meaningful opportunities for women’s economic empowerment? This chapter will try to provide an answer to these questions. First, it will look at underlying factors that play a role in determining women’s likelihood to participate in trade and benefit from it, including women’s level of education, time availability, agency, and participation in the labour market. Second, it will explore the role women play and the gendered obstacles they face in the female-intensive sectors of agriculture, artisanal and small-scale mining, Export Processing Zones (EPZs), and tourism. The chapter will then suggest measures that would help women benefit more from their participation in these sectors and highlight the overall economic and societal benefits that this would imply. The measures identified as being potentially beneficial to women will be checked against measures that have been put in place by the LDCs through rescue packages. This will allow a preliminary assessment of the matching between what women would need, especially in a post-pandemic environment, and what so far has been provided to them.
The extent to which Chinese goods exports faced unilateral trade policy changes taken by other WTO members is documented here and decomposed between those policy changes that specifically target China and those that do not. Chinese goods exposure to measures taken by the European Union, the United States, China’s regional partners, and those taken worldwide are also contrasted, in terms of scale, discriminatory or liberalising treatment, as well as timing. The degree to which China’s WTO membership protected its goods exports from worse competitive conditions since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis is assessed and found wanting.
The extent to which Chinese goods exports faced unilateral trade policy changes taken by other WTO members is documented here and decomposed between those policy changes that specifically target China and those that do not. Chinese goods exposure to measures taken by the European Union, the United States, China’s regional partners, and those taken worldwide are also contrasted, in terms of scale, discriminatory or liberalising treatment, as well as timing. The degree to which China’s WTO membership protected its goods exports from worse competitive conditions since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis is assessed and found wanting.
While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.
This article reviews Adam Smith’s clearly articulated views about the desirability of free trade and his equally strong view on the necessity of sound institutions and ‘the tolerable administration of justice’ as key ingredients of successful economic management. It starts with Smith’s views on free trade and shows how pertinent they are to today’s high-level trade policy challenges. It then considers a more detailed day-to-day instrument of policy—the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). Following Brexit, the TRA was created as an arms-length body for investigating cases for granting temporary import restrictions to specific products according to a reasonably well-defined objective process. The article demonstrates how, over the first 2 years of its life, the TRA has been reduced from a useful administrative instrument to a fig leaf for a political process for granting protection to petitioners. Unfortunately, this tendency to displace analytical approaches to policy by purely political ones can now be observed in many activities of UK governance.
In this introductory chapter to Part III, we examine the context of EU international investment regulation. We will analyse the objectives of EU trade and investment strategy, and shifts between multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism, effectively endorsing pragmatic-lateralism. First, EU values, objectives and principles are briefly introduced, to the extent to which they shape and define the EU’s international action. This is followed by the examination of EU strategy for its integration with the wider world through trade and investment agreements, and the consideration of circumstances which led to the EU’s international investment policy reform. The aim of this chapter is to provide the political background of EU international investment regulatory framework, which is analysed in Chapters 8 and 9.
The Office International des Épizooties (OIE) is a Paris-based, inter-governmental organisation with 164 member countries. Since its establishment in 1924, the OIE has made a major indirect contribution to animal welfare, at a global level, via the organisation's role in epizootic disease control. The OIE animal health code includes a chapter on minimum animal welfare standards for trade and a standard-setting role has also been played in respect of animal transportation. In 1994, the publication Animal Welfare and Veterinary Services was included in the OIE Scientific and Technical Review Series, and provides a valuable State Veterinary Service perspective on animal welfare capability and specific animal welfare issues. In drawing up its strategic plan for the period 2001 to 2005, animal welfare and food safety were identified as two areas for future OIE involvement and these were formally accepted as strategic initiatives at the 2001 OIE General Assembly meeting. An international expert group was established to provide specific recommendations on the nature and scope of the OIE's animal welfare role. The expert group's recommendations were reviewed and adopted, as Resolution XIV, at the May 2002 OIE General Assembly meeting. A permanent international working group was established and met for the first time in October 2002. This paper provides a background to animal welfare as an international trade policy issue and provides an update on progress to date in developing an OIE animal welfare mission statement, supporting guiding principles and policies, and an agreed modus operandi. Priority areas for OIE involvement are identified, and emphasis is placed on the importance of making use of all available expertise and resources, including those from academia, the research community, industry, animal welfare organisations and other relevant stakeholders.