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Chapter 2 explains how the Economist Mental Model (EMM) is measured by capturing two key dimensions: familiarity with core economic concepts (e.g., inflation, supply–demand, market dynamics) and the application of economic reasoning tools (e.g., cost–benefit analysis, opportunity costs, marginal analysis). This measurement approach uses an index of “economic knowledge,” drawn from original surveys in the US, Italy, and the UK. By assessing both factual economic knowledge and the ability to apply it to hypothetical scenarios, the index distinguishes EMM users (high economic knowledge) from those with Alternative Mental Models (AMMs) (low economic knowledge). Descriptive findings reveal that older, educated, wealthier men tend to score higher, with no strong partisan gap. Notably, EMM adopters do not value economic objectives more than those with AMMs, highlighting that differences in policy choices likely stem from how trade-offs are interpreted rather than divergent fundamental values. Demonstrating strong consistency across contexts, these measures set the stage for subsequent empirical analyses.
This chapter advances a simple argument. From the moment designated coastal legislation and administration started to impact on the physical geography from the 1690s, the coast became a politically distinct space. Whereas geography had influenced social and economic realities in coastal regions for centuries, it was only with the designated attempts at ordering littoral space and controlling coastal mobility that this also became true in a political sense. The coast, in legal and practical terms, became an area of state activity and, thereby, a space apart. By looking at how legislators and administrators attempted to order coastal space with designated sets of laws and new bodies of coastal officers from the late seventeenth century onwards, the chapter aims to illustrate this larger argument by a number of smaller points.
Once the coast appeared on the political map of the United Kingdom in the context of political concerns specific to the reign of Mary and William (chapter 1), there was no returning to a state of ignorance. And yet for a long time, ignorance as to what the coast was and where it began or ended was not eliminated from legislation. With increasing amounts of legislation targeting coastal areas, there was not necessarily an awareness of how best to control coastal space. Such regulation was, secondly, often profoundly at odds with priorities in the executive. This was only natural, given that enforcement was a different matter from legislation. It is argued here, however, that these differences not only derived from different positions in the governing apparatus but originated in diverging understandings of space.
For each item, ‘untitled’ means that there is no title in the manuscript. Modern titles are given in modern English, in quotation marks, preceded by ‘Called’. Titles found in the manuscript are given in Middle English with modern capitalization, in italics, preceded by ‘Title’ and followed by parenthetical identification of location and any rubrication. Headings found in the manuscript are given in Middle English, in italics, preceded by ‘Heading’.
In this list, ‘no other manuscripts’ means that none are identified in the DIMEV or NIMEV, the IMEP, or In Principio; in the absence of such a note, it may be assumed the item appears in at least one other manuscript. For other witnesses to items in Middle English verse, see www.dimev.net.2 For other witnesses to items in Middle English prose, see William Marx, The Index of Middle English Prose. Handlist XIV: Manuscripts in the National Library of Wales (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 19–27, and https://imep.lib.cam.ac.uk/ for updates. For other witnesses to items in Latin, see In Principio – Online at https://www.brepols.net/series/INPR-O.
Scribal hands have been named (A, D, H, etc.) in accordance with Margaret Connolly's analysis in Chapter 3 in this volume.
Quire 110, fols. 1–10, parchment
1. fol. 1r–v, English prose. Begins: The man tat fallet syke te fyrst day of eny monet te tirde day folowynge he schall be hole. Ends: Thys is a trew wytnesse found of wise men. Untitled. Heading: Secundum anticos Grecorum. Prognostication. Hand A.
These descriptions had prompted quite a lively chat between Fessler and Franziska. He asked to hear about the social life in the small North German town and posed one question after another. What he found most interesting were the scenes from the Lutheran parsonage: the many children, the games of whist, and the pastors’ conferences. All of this garnered his unmistakable interest, and that of the countess, as was clear from their expressions; and only Count Adam, usually the most vocal admirer of such descriptions and exchanges, had fallen strikingly silent. He was obviously pondering other matters and questions, as he gave absentminded replies and toyed with a curtain tassel that hung down by his chair. He did not demur when the guests left earlier than usual or indulge in teasing or objections when Fessler requested the honor of accompanying Franziska to her lodgings. In fact he hardly smiled, and when the two guests left, he withdrew to his room which was directly above his sister's salon.
She was used to seeing her brother's nervous vivacity change into its opposite without any particular reason, and so she felt no surprise until the next morning, when he excused himself from breakfast without further explanation. At the same time she could hear him pacing back and forth in his room, like a man tormented by some deep inner disquiet. What could it be? What had happened to put him in this humor? She was still turning this over in her mind when the old count walked into her salon, more elegantly clad than usual, and in every way carrying himself like someone about to appear at an audience or to deliver a speech of great import.
This chapter collects evidence from drama, poetry, cult inscriptions, and papyri that identifies peithō with the action of enchantment (thelgein). Descriptions of the goddess Peithō in cult and early Greek poetry, beginning with Hesiod, associate her with the magical qualities of related divinities, such as Aphrodite and Hermes. The chapter outlines three mechanisms of Peithō’s bewitching action that are represented across a variety of source material: the beguilement of the eyes in Ibycus, Pindar, and Aeschylus; the driving force of erotic agōgai in Pindar and the Greek Magical Papyri; and the ambiguous poison of pharmaka (drugs) in Gorgias’ Encomium and Sophocles’ Trachiniae. Through association with the operations of thelgein, peithō is situated as a surreptitious and enchanting force that comes from outside but can also enter the psyche of a person with or without their willing it.
The conclusion unifies the book’s central theme: Mental models shape how people evaluate trade-offs, process information, and choose policies. Those with the Economist Mental Model systematically weigh costs and benefits, integrate new evidence, and ultimately favor measures that maximize aggregate welfare – even if such policies require short-term sacrifices. In contrast, those with Alternative Mental Models rely on different heuristics, often supporting short-term, populist policies that can undermine long-term prosperity. Across policy areas ranging from Brexit to AI, individuals who think like economists prove more receptive to economic information and less swayed by zero-sum narratives. Yet, these findings highlight a demographic skew in economic knowledge, skewing older, educated, wealthier, and male. The conclusion stresses the urgency of democratizing economic reasoning, showing that targeted interventions can broaden its reach. Ultimately, empowering diverse populations to think more like economists holds promise for forging consensus around policies that balance immediate concerns with long-term gains.