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154 results in Trends in Southeast Asia

Page 1 of 8

The Democratic Action Party at Sixty
  • Struggles over Seniority, Structure, and Strategy
  • Francis E. Hutchinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    22 July 2025
  • Traditionally an opposition outfit, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has evolved to become a mainstream operation. A consequential player in Malaysian politics, it now has forty members of parliament and ninety state assembly representatives.

    Because of its cadre-based structure, the DAP usually has orderly party elections. Nonetheless, foundational issues have caused some disagreements to bubble to the sur-face - most recently at the 2025 National Party Congress.

    Now approaching its sixtieth year, the party is grappling with three key challenges.

    The first is the managing of generational change and the fostering of greater inclusiveness. Senior leaders are retiring, not always willingly; and while the party is multiracial in outlook, it has struggled to diversify its leadership.

    The second stems from it evolving from having a small group structure into a larger and more complex organization. No longer a uniquely nationally focused party, the DAP's leaders are increasingly nourishing support bases at the state level - shifting power within the party structure outwards and downwards.

    The third is the managing of diverse expectations. While much of its support base sees the DAP as the opposition, it is now in government. Navigating within the boundaries of what is politically feasible now calls for a different set of skills.

Retelling the Tale of Two Democracies
  • How Shifting Urban-Rural Dynamics Shaped Thailand's 2023 General Election
  • Napon Jatusripitak
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    14 January 2025
  • Thailand's 2023 general election reveals a political landscape undergoing significant transformation, where the traditional Bangkok-versus-countryside political dichotomy has given way to more nuanced urban-rural electoral dynamics unfolding within individual provinces and constituencies.

    As urbanization spreads across Thailand, political candidates adapt their campaign strategies to appeal to voters across the urban-rural divide in their constituencies, leveraging the resources and competitive advantages that come with their party affiliation.

    Parties with strong ideological stances and popular prime ministerial candidates who took clear positions on political reform performed better in urban constituencies than rural ones. Conversely, parties that specialized in candidate-centred, locally driven campaigns - including vote-canvassing networks - saw greater success in rural constituencies.

    A visible trend of ballot splitting emerged in rural constituencies, where voters frequently supported nationally appealing parties like the Move Forward Party (MFP) in the party-list vote but chose local candidates from other parties for constituency seats.

    A more urbanized electorate nationwide, combined with rural voters' strategic distinction between national and local preferences, enabled the MFP to win constituency seats outside major cities and secure strong party-list support across the urban-rural spectrum.

Revolutionary Regimes
  • Emerging Forms of Governance in Post-Coup Myanmar
  • Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Ashley South
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    13 March 2025
  • A variety of governance forms have emerged in Myanmar's post-coup landscape, bringing together established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) with dynamic new actors from a broad spectrum of elected lawmakers, youth, women and civil society in Myanmar's 'Spring Revolution' against the 2021 coup and military rule.

    Experiments with new forms of governance have had varying degrees of success, with wide swathes of territory across the country coming under the control of groups opposed to the State Administration Council (SAC). Governance in non-SAC areas ranges from union-level claims, through regional, township and village tract arrangements. We identify five main types of governance in non-SAC areas: (1) Direct EAO governance - generally an (often benign) one-party state, in the name of a specific ethnic group; (2) Emergent (post-coup) state or area-based governance with more inclusion of civilians and local minorities, in a specific area; (3) Transitional governance arrangements, moving from model 1 to model 2; (4) Local resistance administrations in non-EAO areas - often aligned with the National Unity Government; (5) Indigenous local governance - at organic village/community-level, but also radical initiatives such as the Salween Peace Park in northern Karen State.

    These developments have significant implications for democratic practices, national reconciliation and intercommunal relationships in Myanmar, serving as 'bottom-up building blocks' for a new federalism aspired to by many ethnic minority groups.

    However, they remain vulnerable to junta attacks and are potentially subject to conflict due to overlapping territorial claims and the unsettled nature of territorial control by competing armed groups.

Indonesia's Political Volunteer Organizations
  • Tools of Mobilization and of Patronage
  • Made Supriatma
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    06 March 2025
  • The concept of political volunteerism in Indonesia differs markedly from that in established democracies. In Indonesia, it is less about civic engagement or strengthening democracy and more about serving as a tool for candidates to mobilize voters and win elections.

    The relationship between candidates and their volunteers is reciprocal but often imbalanced, fostering opportunities for patronage within electoral politics.

    Volunteers emerge from an electoral system requiring candidates to meet high thresholds to participate. In Indonesia's multiparty system, where most parties fail to meet these thresholds, coalition-building becomes essential as support for the singular candidate.

    As a result, candidates often lack strong ties to a party or coalition. Volunteer groups, operating independently from party structures and directly under candidates' control, provide an alternative mechanism for voter mobilization.

    The importance of volunteer groups may decline if political parties become more institutionalized, and candidates consolidate support through single well-established parties with significant voter backing.

Youth Perceptions of Income Inequality in Six Southeast Asian Countries
  • Iim Halimatusa'diyah, Syaza Shukri
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    07 July 2025
  • While much research has explored how perceptions of income inequality influence political outcomes - such as political participation, behaviour, and support for democracy - less attention has been given to how a country's economic and political conditions shape these perceptions. This article argues that economic outlook and political stability play a crucial role in shaping how youths perceive income inequality.

    A youth and civic engagement survey conducted by the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute between August and October 2024 found that Indonesian, Filipino and Thai youths are the most pessimistic about the economic prospects and political conditions of their countries. This bleak outlook aligns closely with their negative perceptions of income inequality.

    In contrast, youths in Singapore and Vietnam exhibit higher levels of optimism, underpinned by the strong economic growth and political stability of their countries. These favourable conditions contribute to more positive perceptions of fairness in wealth distribution in their respective countries.

    Malaysia, however, presents a more nuanced picture. Despite relatively high levels of income inequality, Malaysian youths remain optimistic about the economic future of the country, revealing a disconnect between economic optimism and perceptions of income inequality.

    Overall, this article urges policymakers to address objective measures as well as subjective perceptions of inequality by fostering economic environments and political systems that bolster youth optimism and confidence in equitable development. Ensuring a balanced narrative regarding economic growth and fair wealth distribution is essential for sociopolitical stability in Southeast Asia in the future.

Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents
  • A'an Suryana
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    01 August 2025
  • Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.

    Candidates actively develop ties with the organization's leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.

    Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.

    This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU's political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia's history.

Current Perspectives on Geopolitics among Southeast Asian Youths
  • Sharon Seah, Eugene R. L. Tan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 January 2026
    Print publication:
    01 April 2025
  • Youths are becoming an increasingly significant political force in Southeast Asian countries. As a collective, young Southeast Asians aged 18-35 have the potential to exert greater sway over their respective national foreign policymaking landscapes. They will also occupy key positions in their respective countries and societies in the future, thus understanding young Southeast Asian opinion leaders' views on geopolitics can provide valuable insight into the future of foreign policymaking in the region.

    Using mixed purposive and open sampling methods, this series of Focus Group Discussions engaged thirty-three youths from the ASEAN-6 countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - between September and October 2024. Semi-structured interview questions and polling methods were used, and the results were aggregated and comparisons made for all age groups found in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey.

    The study's findings are fourfold. (1) Mainstream news sources remained the most referred source of information for youth elites. (2) Young Southeast Asian elites had a stronger preference for China over the US when compared to respondents across all age groups in the survey. (3) Japan and India emerged as the top preferred hedging partners for Southeast Asian youth. This stood in contrast to the results of the general survey where the EU emerged as the most preferred choice. (4) Youth elites in the region were deeply concerned about ASEAN becoming an arena for major power competition, the ineffectiveness of the organization, the disunity, and the growing disconnect with the average Southeast Asian citizen.

Myanmar's Uncharted Territories
  • Pitfalls and Prospects in Emergent Forms of Governance
  • Ardeth Thawnghmung, Gwen Robinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 January 2026
    Print publication:
    06 July 2025
  • An escalation of violence in Myanmar has led to a significant loss of territories by the Myanmar junta and reconfigured the country's political terrain. The territories can presently be characterized broadly into Junta-controlled areas with low resistance, junta-controlled areas with high resistance, active armed conflict areas, areas controlled by highly vulnerable non-state armed groups, areas controlled by non-state armed groups that are not as vulnerable, and border areas sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

    Negative concerns originated from the proliferation of armed actors and a growing conflict among non-state armed actors and inter- and intra-communal hostilities, while positive responses are drawn from emerging bottom-up local governing practices.

    The SAC has various options. It can intensify repression, it can divide and rule, or it can negotiate settlements on the terms set by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its coalition partners. Any of these could perpetuate the status quo or lead to negotiations that may either revert to civil war or result in further negotiations for 'federal democracy'.

    The nature of Myanmar's future territorial and governing landscapes will be determined by the relationships between union-level actors and regional actors, as well as those among regional actors.

    Given the many fault lines in Myanmar, domestic and international peace-building efforts will need to focus on fostering a broad coalition for federal democracy and mediating differences among anti-SAC forces, while encouraging local power holders to be more accountable to and sensitive about the needs of populations under their administrations.

Who's Doing What?
  • A Closer Look at Methane Climate Impact and Commitments in Southeast Asia's Energy Sector
  • Jiahui Qiu
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    06 June 2024
  • This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners. Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions. Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities. Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region's lack of decisive coal phaseout plans. As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure. More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements. These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.

The Rising Role of Chinese Firms in Southeast Asia's Automotive Supply Chain
  • John Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    01 November 2024
  • Chinese firms have become global leaders in the electrification, networking and intelligentization of vehicles. They are globally dominant in minerals extraction and processing and battery production for electric vehicles (EVs) and are becoming internationally competitive in the enabling microelectronics, components and systems. This report covers the role of Chinese firms in Southeast Asia across five segments of the EV supply chain, namely minerals extraction and processing; battery manufacturing, energy storage and charging; original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production of complete vehicles; microelectronics design and manufacturing; and research and development activities. The report focuses on Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. These are the five ASEAN economies where activities relevant to EV production are concentrated and where Chinese firms are involved in the supply chain. The report concludes with policy considerations for ASEAN governments. EVs and connected vehicles have become a new front in the technology contest and political tensions between China and the US, with other big players like the European Union now also moving towards measures to shield their automotive sector markets and companies. As 'technology-taker' economies at the forefront of climate change, the nations of Southeast Asia have much at stake in informed choices about this supply chain. They can benefit from participation in the evolving automotive sector without committing to one side, despite continued escalation in the global technology and trade war.

Party of Hardship
  • The Evolution of Malaysia's Parti Keadilan Rakyat
  • James Chai
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    14 May 2024
  • The People's Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party's twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person. PKR's evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998-2004 (formative), 2005-13 (golden era), 2014-18 (all-in for power), and 2019-22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots. PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.

    The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR's first 'real' governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR's core identity operating in full gear.

Delivering Development, Enforcing Shariah
  • PAS's Dilemma in Terengganu
  • Azmil Tayeb
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    15 May 2024
  • Whenever the Islamist party PAS comes to power in Terengganu, its political agenda has been to combine populist-type development programmes with the wish to turn Terengganu into a shariah-compliant state. Terengganu's state budget is however heavily dependent on the federal government, to the tune of 80-90 per cent. This hinders the state government's policymaking and implementation, especially when the federal government is controlled by its political opponents.

    This article argues that the politics of development play a more central role in determining the durability of the PAS state government in Terengganu than it does in neighbouring Kelantan. PAS cannot simply carry out its Islamic agenda without being complemented by tangible economic progress if it aspires to govern beyond a single term; PAS's loss in the 2004 election after being in power for one term is a prime example of this dynamic. One reason that the current PAS state government managed to get re-elected in 2022 was the unimpeded flow of oil royalty payments into state coffers since 2018, which allowed the state government to fulfil its campaign promises; PAS's inclusion in the Perikatan Nasional federal government in 2020 further improved the state government's financial standing.

    The key for the PAS state government to rule beyond the current term is its ability to negotiate the tense federal-state relationship, develop other sources of revenue, and find ways to claim credit for economic progress, in addition to burnishing its Islamic governing credentials by making Terengganu a shariah-compliant state.

Building upon Deep Trust
  • ASEAN-Japan Ties at a Crossroads
  • Joanne Lin
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    01 December 2024
  • ASEAN and Japan share a robust and multifaceted partnership that has evolved over five decades, and that is grounded in mutual respect, trust and shared values. The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 further solidifies their commitment to advancing cooperation in traditional areas while expanding into emerging domains such as digital transformation and sustainability. In the security domain, Japan has consistently prioritized ASEAN's centrality in the regional order, even as it aligns with the United States and participates in frameworks like the Quad. Initiatives such as the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) and the Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) framework demonstrate Japan's evolving approach, transitioning from traditional capacity-building to a broader focus on enhancing maritime security, conducting joint exercises, and providing non-offensive defence equipment to ASEAN countries. The partnership's new emphasis on 'co-creation' marks a transformative shift through public and private sector collaboration to address pressing socio-economic challenges. By fostering innovation and co-developing solutions in areas like green energy, digital trade, and healthcare, the co-creation model underscores ASEAN and Japan's shared commitment to inclusive and sustainable development. Looking ahead, the ASEAN-Japan partnership is well-positioned to navigate the complexities of an evolving geopolitical landscape. By harnessing Japan's expertise in advanced technology, infrastructure development, and healthcare systems to address ASEAN's evolving priorities, and by leveraging on Japan's role as a stabilizing force amid intensifying major power rivalries, this partnership will become pivotal to the fostering of long-term regional stability, resilience, and inclusive growth.

Malaysia's Motorcycle Sector
  • Past and Present Possibilities in an Era of Energy Transition
  • Sara Loo
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    12 November 2024
  • Malaysia has traditionally adopted an intensive automotive industrialization model and created its own vehicles under national brands. The national car project started with Proton in 1983, and the national motorcycle project with Modenas in 1995. While policies and scholarship have focused on national car projects, the two-wheeler sector has stood in their shadow. Modenas witnessed early growth and remains a popular brand after Yamaha and Honda; it has however failed to hit export targets, owing to limited technology transfer and the inability to scale. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the two-wheeler sector, focusing on phasing out combustion motorcycles in favour of electric two-wheelers (E2Ws). Still nascent, Malaysia's electric two-wheeler (E2W) sector appears to prioritize an extensive model of assembly and distribution rather than the protection of home-grown brands. Still in its infancy, E2W adoption rates remain low at under 1 per cent, albeit there has been high year-over-year growth since 2022. Interviews with E2W manufacturers, regulators, dealers, and consumers reveal challenges beyond common issues like price, range, charging time, maximum speed, absence of servicing infrastructure and a second-hand market. Notably, Malaysia lacks a suitable product for Malaysian roads and lifestyle due to insufficient institutional support for Research and Development (R&D) and talent matching. With aspirations to be an E2Ws regional manufacturing hub, the government and businesses should step up on public education to bridge the information gap, rethink the R&D support model for the electric vehicle industry, and develop clarity surrounding what a 'Made in Malaysia' motorcycle entails.

Managing State-Federal Relations
  • Growing Pressure on Malaysia's Madani Administration
  • Tricia Yeoh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 November 2024
  • Since the Sheraton Move in 2020 which led to the fall of the Malaysian government, many state governments in the federation have held their elections separately from the central government. This has resulted in a dynamic political situation in which coalitions have been formed in different ways at different times in different states. At present, there are seven states ruled by the Pakatan Harapan - Barisan Nasional (PHBN) grand coalition, while four states are under the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. States have increasingly demanded greater political and policy autonomy over the last few years, particularly in the area of fiscal revenue-sharing between the federal and state governments. Progress has been most forthcoming for issues related to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the federal government's newly set-up Malaysia Agreement 1963 Implementation Action Council has been meeting regularly. Contentious state-federal issues remain for states apart from Sabah and Sarawak, to which the federal government has not seriously responded. Limited space exists for formal state-federal negotiations that can result in firm decisions.

    Sabah will be holding its state election in 2025, followed by Sarawak and Malacca in 2026. Pressure will continue to build up as these timelines draw near, and the federal government will need to identify better federal-state negotiation platforms than are currently available.

Understanding Vietnam's Foreign Policy Choices Amid Sino-US Rivalry
  • Thi Ha Hoang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 June 2024
  • Vietnam's foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers. Vietnam's foreign policy adopts the paradigm of 'cooperation' and 'struggle' in its relations with major powers, and defines 'national security' as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security. Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an 'object of struggle' on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam's partner in the South China Sea but an 'object of struggle' when it comes to regime security.

    The Vietnamese public's favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.

    Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.

Autonomy in Sarawak and Sabah
  • Different Paths and Diverging Outcomes
  • Arnold Puyok
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    02 December 2024
  • When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah were granted special provisions under the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63) to safeguard their autonomy. However, centralization measures pursued by the federal government over time have eroded these rights, particularly pertaining to education, development spending and revenue sharing. Despite being on the same island and sharing a history distinct from Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah have evolved very differently in asserting their autonomy. Sarawak has managed to attain a greater degree of self-government, while Sabah has been more influenced by priorities pursued by Peninsular Malaysia. These varying outcomes are due to three differences between the two states: distinct historical developments in the run-up to independence; varying degrees of political control attained by the parties in power; and different priorities pursued by state leaders.

    This 'Trends in Southeast Asia' explores the different political trajectories of Sarawak and Sabah through a structured comparison of the two states across these three aspects. Sarawak's combination of sub-nationalism, dominant state-level coalition, and astute political leadership has enabled the state to push the boundaries much further than its neighbour. The downfall of the erstwhile-dominant Barisan Nasional coalition has increased the room for manoeuvre of Borneo-based groupings, heralding a new power relationship between West and East Malaysia. Sarawak is well-poised to push for further privileges and prerogatives. Should it want to push for more autonomy and resources, Sabah will need to emulate key aspects of its neighbour's strategy.

Learn from Your Comrades
  • Understanding Authoritarian Diffusion between Vietnam and China
  • Khac Giang Nguyen
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    09 September 2024
  • Since the normalization of relations in 1991, Vietnam and China, two of the five remaining communist regimes, have established a robust framework for mutual learning and cooperation. This collaboration has primarily centred around party governance and cadre training. Vietnam has actively studied and adopted elements of China's successful model, which combines economic reform with strict political control. This approach has allowed Vietnam to maintain communist rule in the face of increasing global pressure for democratic reforms. The process of learning from China involves two key dynamics: desirability versus capability, and effectiveness versus appropriateness. While Vietnam desires to achieve the same level of effectiveness as China in certain policy areas, it has been cautious in fully replicating the Chinese model, and shown consideration for its appropriateness to Vietnam's unique circumstances and for China's underlying motivations. Vietnam has adopted a mixed approach to learning from China, incorporating direct emulation, selective adaptation and drawing inspiration from China's experiences. One notable example of this is the ongoing anti-corruption efforts of both regimes, which share some similarities but also have distinct differences. The learning relationship between Vietnam and China is not without its challenges. Historical animosities, maritime disputes and anti-China sentiment all play a role in shaping this partnership. As a result, Vietnam has had to employ innovative tactics to adapt Chinese lessons to fit its own circumstances.

From Paper to Practice
  • Utilizing the ASEAN Guide on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance and Ethics
  • Kristina Fong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    09 June 2024
  • The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed - with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation. ASEAN's response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a 'practical guide' for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.

    For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.

Myanmar's Resistance and the Future of Border Trade
  • Challenges and Opportunities
  • Jared Bissinger
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    25 April 2024
  • Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar's resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade. Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions - giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.

    International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state. Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through 'checkpoints for border trade', which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.

    If Myanmar's resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.

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