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Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Michael Johnston*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

How are patronage rewards allocated within a political machine? This article studies the distribution of 675 CETA Title I jobs within a New Haven machine. Data suggest that the jobs were used as patronage, but that patronage allocations did not follow conventionally assumed patterns of organization maintenance. Ethnic particularism overshadowed, and in fact redefined, considerations of vote-maximization and recruitment of workers. Questionnaire data suggest that those hired were not highly active politically, either before or after hiring, a finding contrary to normal suppositions about patronage recipients. The seemingly anomalous (and perhaps even counterproductive) patronage allocations become understandable, however, viewed in light of some problems and contradictions inherent in patron-client politics. These involve the inflexibility of job-based incentive systems, qualifications on assumptions of reciprocity, and the “aging” of the organization.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1979

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