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Street-Level Political Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John T. Scholz
Affiliation:
State University of New York Stony Brook
Jim Twombly
Affiliation:
State University of New York Buffalo
Barbara Headrick
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University

Abstract

Local partisan activities of legislators and their electoral coalitions systematically influence field office activities of federal bureaucracies in their electoral districts. This alternative to centralized democratic controls over bureaucracy occurs because discretionary policy decisions made at the field office level are influenced by local resources generated through partisan activities. Our study of county-level Occupational Safety and Health Administration enforcement in New York (1976–85) finds that county, state, and federal elected officials influence local enforcement activities, with liberal, Democratic legislators associated with more active enforcement. The county political parties are most influential for activities with the most local discretion, while members of Congress are more influential for local activities more readily controlled by the national office.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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