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The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Wendy L. Hansen
Wendy L. Hansen*
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Stony Brook
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Abstract

I analyze the governmental regulation of internationally traded goods produced by U.S. industries. General theories of regulation—most notably “capture” theories and the theory of “congressional dominance”—are used to analyze the decision-making behavior of the U.S. International Trade Commission, which plays a major role in approving and providing tariffs, quotas, and various types of nontariff trade barriers sought by these industries. Unlike previous studies, this one simultaneously accounts for both the supply and demand sides of trade regulation. This work seeks to predict, on a basis of domestic politics, the factors that affect the demand for, and supply of, trade protection for U.S. industries. The methodology consists of applying a nested logit framework to capture the decision behavior of the International Trade Commission and industries simultaneously. The analysis shows that industries do appear to self-select themselves in applying for protection from the International Trade Commission. In light of these findings, it appears that trade protection is subject to domestic political forces similar to those affecting other regulatory policy areas.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 21 - 46
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Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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