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Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Keith Krehbiel
Keith Krehbiel*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

A diverse set of congressional studies portrays members of standing committees as more or less homogeneous “high demanders” or “preference outliers” relative to members of the larger legislature. Using interest group ratings of members of the Ninety-sixth to Ninety-ninth Congresses, I conduct conventional statistical hypothesis tests to discern whether standing committees are more extreme and more homogeneous than the legislature as a whole. With only a few exceptions, the tests do not allow confident rejection of null hypotheses of identical committee and chamber preferences. The absence of convincing evidence of preference outliers is broadly consistent with emerging incomplete information game-theoretic legislative research and difficult to reconcile with many previous formal theories of legislative politics.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 149 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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