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Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Michael Suk-Young Chwe*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Abstract

I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to “enforce” its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. “Special” voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of Lani Guinier's arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation, benefitting everyone.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 93 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 85 - 97
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Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

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