¹ Gunnell, John G., “Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry,” this Review, LXIII (12, 1969), p. 1238 Google Scholar, emphasis added.

² Lukasiewicz and Carnap have used “metalogic” to refer to that metalanguage concerned with logic as its object language—more specifically with a subdomain of syntactical (not substantive) analysis which treats of logical sentences to the exclusion of specifically mathematical ones. Certainly “metalogic” would never refer to the analysis of sentences in the material mode, i.e., substantive sentences. Arthur Pap simply uses the term, “metalogic” to designate discourse about logic (as a formal language). Cf. Carnap, R., The Logical Syntax of Language (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), p. 9 Google Scholar; and Pap, A., Semantics and Necessary Truth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 432 Google Scholar.

³ Cf. Smart, J. J. C., Between Science and Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 3–6 Google Scholar; Morgenbesser, S., “Introduction,” Philosophy of Science Today (Edited by Morgenbesser, S.; New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. xiii Google Scholar.

⁴ Toulmin, S., The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 7 Google Scholar. That Toulmin's interesting arguments involve (in any sense of the term) a rejection of Hempel's models of explanation is, at least in part, belied by the fact that I have made extensive use of Toulmin's insights in my forthcoming Introduction to Metapolitics: A Brief Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Inquiry (Free Press) without abandoning the substance of Hempel's construal of scientific explanation. In effect, one can find Toulmin's arguments substantially correct and yet not abandon Hempel's models of scientific explanation.

⁵ Cf. Hempel, C. G., “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 3–51, particularly p. 51 Google Scholar.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 333–412, “Scientific Explanation,” in Morgenbesser, op. cit., pp. 79–88.

⁷ Gunnell, op. cit., p. 1241–42.

⁸ Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 168f.

⁹ Cf. Brodbeck, M., “General Introduction,” in Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (edited by Brodbeck, M.. New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 1–11 Google Scholar; Nagel, E., The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rudner, R., Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Cf. Hempel, C.G., Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

¹¹ For a discussion of “entrenchment,” cf. Goodman, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), chapter ivGoogle Scholar; for Hempel's acceptance of funded and contingent conditions for truth ascription in the case of substantive truths, vide his “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” op. cit.

¹² Hempel, C. G., “Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws,” in Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar (edited by Baumrin, B.; New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 125–132 Google Scholar.

¹³ Gunnell, op. cit., p. 1242.

¹⁴ Cf. Toulmin, S., The Philosophy of Science (London: Arrow, 1962), pp. 86 and 79 Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Alexander, H. Gavin, “General Statements as Rules of Inference,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (edited by Feigl, H., Scriven, M. and Maxwell, G.; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1958), II, pp. 309-29Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Scriven, M., Philosophical Review, XXIV (1955), 124–128 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ For a discussion of Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms" in science, cf. Sheffler, I., Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 74–89 Google Scholar and Gregor, op. cit., chapter 10.

¹⁸ This, on the face of it, seems to involve what has been called the process-product confusion—there is the process of explaining, which is an activity, and then there are products called explanations—in much the same way that we say we both swim and have a swim.

¹⁹ GuDnell, op. cit., p. 1242.