¹ Liska, George, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 214 ffGoogle Scholar.

² See Liska in ibid, for an attempt at this kind of clarification.

³ The extent to which assumptions about the nature of the international system actually influence decision makers has never been proved—the supposition that they act in a certain way because they perceive that they are operating within one kind of system and would therefore act differently in another kind of system is still merely an analytical and a priori judgment. In fact, decision makers may never make systemic judgments at all but merely react (as the next sentence in the text suggests) to perceptions about the immediate impact of a range of considerations which constantly vary as problems vary.

⁴ This point is discussed at greater length below.

⁵ For a somewhat different attempt to list the basic features of the contemporary system, see Brecher, Michael, The New States of Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁶ Dinerstein, Herbert S., “The Transformation of Alliance Systems,” American Political Science Review, 09 1965 (Vol. 59, No. 3), p. 590fCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ See Deutsch, Karl and Kaplan, Morton A., “The Limits of International Coalitions,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 170–189Google Scholar.

⁸ See Örvik, Nils, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–1941 (Oslo: Johan Gundt Tarum-Forlag, 1953)Google Scholar.

⁹ Burton, J. W., International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 115Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 167. For another argument about the distinctive character of nonalignment see Crabb, Cecil, The Elephants and the Grass (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹¹ The point ought to be emphasized to avoid misunderstanding: Nonalignment is an entirely different kind of proposition in a balance-of-power system. In fact, it is unlikely that it would be viable in any system where the Great Powers competed for each other's allegiance directly rather than concentrating on winning the support of a “third world.”

¹² Thus Nasser has said “Tito is a great man. He showed me how to get help from both sides—without joining either.” (Quoted in Lyon, Peter, Neutralism [Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963], p. 86.)Google Scholar

¹³ Bell, Coral, “Non-alignment and the Power Balance,” in Bobrow, Davis B. (ed.), Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 69Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Quoted in ibid.

¹⁵ The situation is different if war has broken out. See Fox, Annette Baker, The Power of Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959)Google Scholar, for a discussion of Small Powers directly threatened by the Great Powers during World War II.

¹⁶ Krishna, Raj, ‘India and the Bomb,” India Quarterly, 04–06 1965 (Vol. 21, No. 2), p. 122Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Quoted in Smith, Roger M., Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 53Google Scholar. And for Sweden's tacit assumption that Western support will be forthcoming even without an alliance, see Robbins, James J., Recent Military Thought in Sweden on Western Defense (RM-1407) (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, y1955), pp. 80, 84Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Not, of course, to all people. A recent article in India has noted that in some circumstances “you would have found Nepal practicing non-alignment against us.” (Masani, M. R., “The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb,” India Quarterly, 01–03 1965 [Vol. 21, No. 1], p. 15.)Google Scholar

¹⁹ The desire to extract some benefits from a relatively bipolar situation is not new: The Balkan states before 1914 and Poland after 1933 are indicative.

²⁰ Quoted in Rivkin, Arnold, The African Presence in World Affairs (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1963), p. 196Google Scholar.

²¹ Lefever, Ernest, “Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism,” in Martin, Lawrence (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 95Google Scholar.

²² Hoffmann, Stanley, “Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy,” Daedalus, Fall 1962 (Vol. 91, No. 4), pp. 692–693Google Scholar.

²⁸ Marshall, C. B., “On Understanding the Unaligned,” in Martin, , Neutralism and Nonalignment, pp. 13–33Google Scholar. The psychological attractions of nonalignment suggest that it would have been an attractive policy to the new states irrespective of the distribution of power. Note, for example, some of the similarities in behavior between the United States in its formative years and the current generation of new states. However, it is worth reemphasizing that nonalignment—whatever its instinctive appeal—could not be a successful policy without a particular kind of power configuration.

²⁴ Krishna, , India Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 122Google Scholar.

²⁵ See the essay by Robert Good, “State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States,” in Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment. This would have been an unlikely, if not inconceivable, rationale in the past when the ethos and imperatives of modernization did not prevail—and when the new states were, in general, more viable creations.

²⁶ See Johnstone, William C., Burma's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963)Google Scholar, for numerous examples with respect to Burma.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 113–115.

²⁸ A Ghanaian memorandum for a meeting of the nonaligned states in 1958 reflects both the sense of moral superiority and the desire to use the East-West conflict expediently:

It would be unwise, therefore, to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of European policies. Our detached position invites us to pursue quite a different course. … Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?

(Quoted in Hovet, Thomas Jr, Africa in the United Nations [Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1963], p. 27.)Google Scholar

²⁹ See Liska, p. 210f.

³⁰ See Lefever in Martin, , Neutralism and Nonalignment, p. 96Google Scholar.

³¹ See Johnstone, p. 76, where he notes Burma's “growing dependence upon the vagaries, sudden changes, and swift developments in the struggle of the giants.” See also Hassner, Pierre, “La montée des jeunes fitats et les relations entre les deux blocs,” in Duroselle, J. B. and Meyriat, J. (ed.), La communauté internationale face aux jeunes États (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962), p. 399Google Scholar.

³² See Bell, in Bobrow, , Components of Defense Policy, pp. 70–71Google Scholar.

³³ Ibid., p. 73f.

³⁴ Halpern, Manfred, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 410fGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ Thus one analyst argues that the Sino-Soviet split “obliges each side … to intensify its efforts to demonstrate its superiority over rivals.” (Crozier, Brian, “The Struggle For the Third World,” International Affairs [London], 07 1964 [Vol. 40, No. 3], p. 451.)Google Scholar

³⁶ See Liska, pp. 206–207.

³⁷ See Modelski, George, SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962), p. 8Google Scholar, where he describes SEATO as “a great power association for the support of certain small nations….” The Small Power, at any rate, may try to extend and strengthen the commitment of a multilateral alliance to compensate for its lesser degree of credibility.

³⁸ Thus a study of all the crises faced by SEATO shows that “in all cases the decisive event at issue had been the actual or potential joint or individual intervention of the Western great powers on behalf of a small state of South-East Asia.” (Ibid., p. 15.)

For Philippine efforts to extend and improve the nature of the United States commitment in SEATO see Smith, Roger M., “The Philippines and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization” (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1959), pp. 12, 18Google Scholar. And for the efforts of Thailand to strengthen SEATO and for fears that the United States commitment to it was weakening (particularly after the events in Laos in 1960 and after) see Nuechterlein, Donald E., Thailand and the Struggle For Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1965), Chapters IV and VGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ It might also be noted that SEATO conferred some benefits on states which remained out of it. Thus “Communist China knew that too great a pressure on Burma involved the risk of forcing her into SEATO.” (Modelski, p. 9.) Although India stayed out of SEATO, which in any case could not offer support in the north where India was threatened, it might have benefited from Chinese concessions there in response to the southern threat represented by SEATO. See Rosemary Brissenden, “India, Neutralism, and SEATO,” in ibid., pp. 217ff.

⁴⁰ See Liska, p. 76. I have qualified the point somewhat.

⁴¹ Thus Thornton Read has noted that:

The weaker member of an alliance is less able to commit its stronger ally to a course of action that the latter is reluctant to undertake. For example, in 1914 Austria was able to commit Germany to war, while in 1956 the United States not only dissociated itself from the British-French Suez adventure but even subjected its allies to pressure.

(Military Policy in a Changing Political Contest [Policy Memorandum No. 31] [Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1964], p. 41 n.)Google Scholar

⁴² Dinerstein, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 593Google Scholar.

⁴³ See the books by Hovet and Rivkin, previously cited, for a discussion of these blocs.

⁴⁴ Calvocoressi, Peter, World Order and New States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 66Google Scholar, notes that regional arrangements would have to be defensive since agreement could not be reached on an offensive project.

⁴⁵ Macdonald, Robert W., The League of Arab States (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 292–293Google Scholar.