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The “Rabassa Morta” in Catalan Viticulture: The Rise and Decline of a Long-Term Sharecropping Contract, 1670s–1920s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

Juan Carmona
Affiliation:
Profesor Visitante and James Simpson Profesor Titular, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain
James Simpson
Affiliation:
Profesor Visitante and James Simpson Profesor Titular, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain

Abstract

For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust between the principal and agent.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1999

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