[1] Note, e.g. E. Käsemann's remarks about the ‘liberal-idealist tradition’ in ‘The Spirit and the Letter’, Perspectives on Paul (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 139Google Scholar; and see the articles of Cohen, B., ‘Letter and Spirit in Jewish and Roman Law’ and ‘Letter and Spirit in the New Testament’, in Jewish and Roman Law. A Comparative Study, 1 (New York, 1966), pp. 31–57, 58–64.Google Scholar

[2] Cf. Käsemann, E., An die Römer (Tübingen, 1974), p. 182 and the literature there mentioned.Google Scholar

[3] Cf. Grant's, R. M. study of Origen's use of the allegorical method, The Letter and the Spirit (London, 1957).Google Scholar

[4] Cf. Schneider's, B. discussion of the ‘formalistic’ interpretation of the antithesis in The Meaning of St. Paul's Antithesis “The Letter and the Spirit”’, in C.B.Q. 15 (1953), pp. 163–207.Google Scholar

[5] Schneider, op. cit, distinguishes between the ‘formalistic’ and the ‘realistic’ interpretations of the antithesis: the ‘formalistic’ sees the ‘letter’ as the literal sense of scripture, and the ‘spirit’ as the spiritual, typical sense; the ‘realistic’ interpretation sees the ‘letter’ as the Mosaic law itself (not one sense of it), the ‘spirit’ as the Spirit, Holy, ‘the internal vivifying norm and principle of the Christian life’ (p. 164).Google Scholar His article is helpful in tracing representatives of both interpretations and in explaining the deficiencies of the former; but his division into two interpretations does not adequately cover the exegetical debate of today. Hence, though my own interpretation of the antithesis would doubtless be classified by Schneider as ‘realistic’, I prefer to develop that interpretation in contrast to a more broadly defined ‘hermeneutical’ one.

[6] Cf. Prat, E., The Theology of Saint Paul, II (London, 1927), pp. 435–41Google Scholar; also the remarks of Allo, E. B., Seconde Epître aux Corinthiens (Paris, 1956), pp. 103–11.Google Scholar

[7] Cf. Prat, op. cit., p. 440: the veil is present for ‘unbelieving Jews, who read the letter of the Law without grasping its spirit’ (Prat's italics).

[8] Cf. also Kamlah, E., ‘Buchstabe und Geist. Die Bedeutung dieser Antithese für die alttestament-liche Exegese des Apostels Paulus’, Ev.Th. 1459: (1954), pp. 276–82Google Scholar: γράμμα is said to express Paul's reproach against the Jews, ‘dass sie also das Alte Testament im Sinne dieser Weltzeit auslegen und deswegen nicht voll verstehen’ (p. 282; my italics). This is contrasted with the full understanding of scripture, which is possible only when it is interpreted in the light of the cross of Christ.

[9] Cranfield, C. E. B., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 1 (Edinburgh, 1975), pp. 339 f.Google Scholar Note, too, that O. Michel, in his commentary on Rom. 7. 6 (Der Brief an die Römer, Göttingen, ¹⁴1978, p. 222) interprets the letter-spirit antithesis as referring to the Jewish rabbinic and the early Christian understandings of scripture respectively.

[10] Cf. n. 1 above. Page references in the discussion which follows are taken from this article.

[11] The following discussion of Bultmann is based on his Theology of the New Testament, 1 (London, 1952).Google Scholar

[12] Cf. also Schrage, W., Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese. Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik (Gütcrsloh, 1961), p. 76.Google Scholar And note Hübner, H., Das Gesetz beiPaulus. Ein Beitrag zum Werdcn der paulinischen Theologie (Göttingen, 1978), pp. 128 f.Google Scholar

[13] See especially ‘Romans 7 and the Anthropology of Paul’, in Existence and Faith. Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (New York, 1960), pp. 147–57.Google Scholar

[14] Kümmel, W. G., Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus (Leipzig, 1929Google Scholar; reprinted in Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament. Münchcn, 1974, pp. 1–160).Google Scholar

[15] The verbs of ‘doing’ in this passage (κατεργάζεσθαι, vv. 15, 17 f., 20; ποεīν, vv. 15 f., 19 ff.; πράσσειν, vv. 15, 19) are taken by Bultmann to refer not to empirical deeds (i.e. ‘do’), but to the result of doing (i.e. ‘bring about’, ‘reap’); cf. Theol. I, p. 248. In his Theology, however, he does allow for the possibility that the former sense may be intended.

[16] The usual understanding, of course, is that ‘What I will’ (7. 15, 19) refers to the fulfilling of the commandments, ‘what I do not will’ (7. 16, 19 f.) to the transgressing of them.

[17] Cf. Bultmann, , ‘Anthropology’, p. 154Google Scholar; Theol. I, pp. 247 f., 265Google Scholar; and note his comments on another verse important to our subject: ‘When 2 Cor. 3. 6 says: ‘for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life’, there is no reflection in this context over the question whether the individual under the reign of Law brings death upon himself by transgressing the Law or by his zeal for it’ (Theol. I, p. 247).

[18] ‘Anthropology’, p. 156.Google Scholar

[19] Note, however, Barrett's, C. K. interpretation (A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1957, pp. 57–9)Google Scholar: when Paul says that the Jew transgresses the law, he means that, in boasting of his circumcision, the Jew forgets his creaturely status and thus sins against the real purpose of the law. But Paul shows clearly enough in 2. 1–3, 8, 21–24 that he is thinking of manifest transgressions which even the circumcised commit.

[20] Cf. Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, , A Greek-English Lexicon, etc. (Chicago, 1957), p. 179.Google Scholar

[21] Cf. Dodd, C. H., ‘New Testament Translation Problems’, in The Bible Translator 28 (1977), pp. 110 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

[22] ‘Letter’, p. 146.Google Scholar

[23] Cf. Linton, O., ‘Paulus och juridiken’, Svensk Teologisk Kvanalskrift 21 (1945), pp. 179 f.Google Scholar

[24] Cf. Wilckens, U., ‘Was heisst bei Paulus: “AusWerkendesGesetzes wird kein Mensch gerecht”?’ in Rechtfertigung als Freiheit. Paulusstudien (Neukirchen, 1974), p. 83.Google Scholar

[25] Cf. Bultmann, , Theol. 1, p. 239.Google Scholar

[26] Cf. Bultmann, , ‘Anthropology’, p. 154Google Scholar; Theol. 1, pp. 247 f.Google Scholar; Bornkamm, G., Early Christian Experience (New York, 1969), p. 90Google Scholar; Käsemann, , Röm., p. 186.Google Scholar

[27] Bultmann's interpretation of these verses, too, proves unsatisfactory: partly because the verses which precede prepare us for a discussion involving the actual transgression of concrete commands, not the nomist who fulfils the commands; but primarily because Bultmann's interpretation does violence to the terminology used by Paul; Cf. Althaus, P., Paulus and Luther über den Menschen (Gütcrsloh, ⁴ 1963), pp. 47–9Google Scholar; also Kümmel, , Bild, p. 191 n. 69 (supplemented on p. 220), and the literature he mentions.Google Scholar

[28] This of course does not mean that Torah has nothing to say to the Christian: Paul still cites it as ή γρøή, and draws lessons from it. It simply means that the obligation to fulfil the laws of Torah which marked the old covenant does not apply to those under the new.

[29] So, e.g. Moule, C. F. D., ‘Obligation in the Ethic of Paul’, in Christian History and Interpretation. Studies Presented to John Knox. Ed. Farmer, W. R., Moule, C. F. D., and Niebuhr, R. R. (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 389–406.Google Scholar But see the comments of Bruce, F. F., ‘Paul and the Law of Moses’, B.J.R.L. 57 (1974–1975), p. 266.Google Scholar

[30] So, e.g. Cranfield, C. E. B., ‘St. Paul and the Law’, in S.J.T. 17 (1964), pp. 54–65.Google Scholar

[31] Cf. the comments of Longenecker, R. N., Paul, Apostle of Liberty (Grand Rapids, 1976 ( = 1964)), pp. 125–7, on the nature of the law as ‘contractual obligation’ under the old covenant.Google Scholar

[32] Grammatically, the genitives γρáμματος: and πνεύματος could be dependent on either δια κόνους or διαθήκης. But the fact that Rom. 7. 6 speaks of the ‘letter’ and the ‘spirit’ as two different ways of serving suggests that here it is Paul's ministry (i.e. διακόνους) rather than the covenant which takes the genitives. This is confirmed in the verses which follow, where the ‘letter’ which kills (v. 6) becomes the ‘ministry (διακονία) of death carved in letters on stone’ (v. 7; cf. v. 9), and the ‘spirit’ of v. 6 becomes the ‘ministry’ of the spirit in v. 8. Cf. Plummer, A., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle ofSt Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh, 1915), p. 88.Google Scholar

[33] This remains true in spite of the references to the reading of the old covenant and the ‘veil’ which is said to be present when Jews read it, vv. 14 f. The point of the passage is not that Jews fail to perceive the deeper significance of the scriptures, nor that they pervert them into a demand for good works, but that they fail to perceive that the period of the old covenant has passed. Notice in particular the frequent uses of forms of καταργεīν (vv. 7, 11, 13 f.). The purpose of the ‘veil’ according to v. 13 was to keep the Israelites from looking είς τό τέλος τοū καταγουμένου, presumably we are to see here a reference to the passing of the old dispensation itself (cf. Barrett, C. K., A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. London, 1973, p. 119).Google Scholar ‘This same veil’, i.e. that which conceals the transitory nature of the old covenant, is present when Jews read the scriptures even today, so that they do not see ‘that in Christ it is being abolished’ (v. 14). See further Bläser, P., Das Gesetz beiPaulus (Münster, 1941), pp. 207–13.Google Scholar

[34] E.g. Moule, , op. cit., pp. 394 f.Google Scholar

[35] E.g. Cranfield, , ‘Law’, p. 67Google Scholar; Wendland, H.-D., Ethik des Neuen Testaments (Göttingen, ³ 1978), p. 57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

[36] Cf. Linton, , op. cit., p. 178Google Scholar, and especially Bläser, op. cit., pp. 41–4. Bläser rightly points out (pp. 228 f.) that the question raised in Rom. 6. 15 and the exhortation of Gal. 5. 13 would be meaningless had Paul meant by Christian freedom only a release from the law's ritual demands.

[37 ] Cf. Weiss, J., The History of Primitive Christianity, 2 (New York, 1937), p. 556Google Scholar; Furnish, V. P., Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville, 1968), pp. 188 f.Google Scholar

[38] Cf. Gerhardsson, B., ‘Bibelns ethos’, in Etik och kristen tro. Ed. Wingren, G. (Lund, 1971), pp. 57 f.Google Scholar

[39] According to Bläser, , op. cit., pp. 42 f.Google Scholar, the law is quoted in passages like Rom. 13. 8–10 only when its content is in accord with the demands of Christ; it is because love is in accord with those demands, not because it is commanded in Torah, that it is required of the Christian.

[40] Cf. especially the work of Schrage mentioned in n. 12.

[41] Cf. Linton, , op. cit., p. 177.Google Scholar

[42] Cf. Bornkamm, , op. cit., pp. 80–2.Google Scholar

[43] See Holmberg, B., Paul and Power. The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline Epistles (Lund, 1978), pp. 84 f.Google Scholar for a discussion of cases where Paul apparently leaves it up to his readers to decide between alternative courses of action, though he clearly believes one alternative is to be preferred.

[44] Similarly, those responsible for exhortation in the local church do so, according to Paul, on the basis ofacharisma of the spirit (1 Cor. 12. 7 f., 11,14. 3; cf. Rom. 12. 6–8). The contrast with Pharisaism, where trained experts in the law provide guidance as to the proper course of behaviour, also witnesses to the change from letter-service to spirit-service.

[45] Cf. von Campenhausen, H. F., Die Begründung kirchlicher Entscheidungen beim Apostel Paulus (Heidelberg, 1957), p. 20Google Scholar; Holmberg, , op. cit., p. 189.Google Scholar

[46] Cf. Dahl, N. A., Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church (Minneapolis, 1976), p. 15.Google Scholar

[47] I have treated the Pharisaic view of law in some detail in my Jesus and Scribal Authority (Lund, 1978), pp. 12–52.Google Scholar