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The Face of Roman Battle*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2012

Philip Sabin
Philip Sabin
Affiliation:
King's College, London
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Extract

Our perspectives on ancient history can sometimes be significantly affected by contributions from scholars of other disciplines. An obvious example from the military field is Edward Luttwak's 1976 book on The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. Luttwak is a respected and insightful commentator on modern strategic issues, and his distinctive contribution was to analyse Roman military affairs in terms of modern concepts such as ‘armed suasion’ and the distinction between ‘power’ and ‘force’. His book has prompted considerable debate among specialist ancient historians, and although much of this has been critical of his ideas (largely due to the alleged anachronism of applying them in the Roman context), there is no doubt that the injection of this new dimension has helped to influence subsequent thinking on Roman imperial defence.

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Articles
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The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 90 , November 2000 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Philip Sabin 2000. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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References

1 For examples of Luttwak's more modern writings, see his Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (1987), and ‘Toward post-heroic warfare’, Foreign Affairs 74/ 3 (1995), 109–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 The debate is well summarized in Wheeler, E. L., ‘Methodological limits and the mirage of Roman strategy’, Journal of Military History 57 (1993), 7–41, 215–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25 The 5,700 dead which Hannibal suffered at Cannae represented 11 per cent of his force, but this is easily explicable in terms of the effort needed to annihilate a much larger Roman army.

26 See Lendon, op. cit. (n. 13).

27 As with other aspects of Roman battle, not much has been written on the topic recently. A good summary of the historical debate is in Holmes, T. Rice, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (1911), 587-99Google Scholar, and more recently in Wheeler, op. cit. (n. 14). I hope to publish my own thoughts on the subject soon.

28 On the problems of Livy's account, see Rawson, E., ‘Literary sources for the pre-Marian army’, PBSR ns 26 (1971), 26–31Google Scholar.

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41 This process is nicely illustrated in Warry, J., Warfare in the Classical World (1980), 126–7.Google Scholar

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43 See Fuller, J. F. C., Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant (1965), 90–1.Google Scholar

44 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 208, 257–8.

45 For example, even if we assume that just 5 percent of the troops were in the front rank, and that they struck their adversaries only every five seconds, and that less than 1 per cent of these attacks caused death or mortal injury, each army would suffer 5 per cent fatalities every ten minutes.

46 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), ch. 5. Cf. Kromayer and Veith, op. cit. (n. 6), 361–2.

47 ibid., 219.

48 Marshall, S. L. A., Men against Fire (1947).Google Scholar

49 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 222.

50 ibid., 224–7.

51 Zhmodikov, op. cit. (n. 8).

52 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 199.

53 The Mainz relief is illustrated in Goldsworthy, A. J., Roman Warfare (2000), 76.Google Scholar

54 Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8).

55 See Griffith, P., Forward into Battle (2nd edn, 1990), ch. 2Google Scholar; idem, Rally Once Again: Battle Tactics in the American Civil War (1987) 140–5.Google Scholar

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57 ibid., 74.

58 See Hanson, op. cit. (n. 3, 1989), 160–1; Xenophon, An. 1.8, 1.10.

59 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 21), 10–11.

60 Griffith, op. cit. (n. 55, 1990), ch. 2.

61 See van Wees, H., ‘Kings in combat: battles and heroes in the Iliad’, Classical Quarterly 38/1 (1988), 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., The Biology of Peace and War (1979), 129–87.Google Scholar

62 See Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8), 73–7.

63 Penguin translation by A. de Selincourt.

64 Polybius (15.13) in this instance does not support the physical pressure interpretation, since he says that the key Roman advantages lay in the steadiness of their ranks and the superiority of their equipment, and that the principes gave support by cheering on, rather than shoving, their comrades.

65 The theoretical lethality of ancient missile weapons, and the importance of shields in reducing this, are discussed in Gabriel and Metz, op. cit. (n. 24), 70–5.

66 On the role of junior leaders such as centurions, see Isaac, B., ‘Hierarchy and command structure in the Roman army’, in le Bohec, Y. (ed.), La Hierarchie (Rangordnung) de l'armée romaine sous le haut-empire (1995), 23–31.Google Scholar

67 See Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8), 76–7.

68 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 219–27.

69 Du Picq, op. cit. (n. 56), 79.

70 Keegan, op. cit. (n. 20), 99.

71 ibid., 100–1.

72 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 283–4.