At the broadest level, philosophical methods differ because people do philosophy in different ways (Tugendhat 1976: 3–4). Given that they also inevitably influence one another, as a result groups or lineages of philosophers do philosophy in similar ways and such broad methods can be typed to at least some extent. Giving the notion of philosophical method more precision – for instance, considering argument forms, heuristics, mandated starting places (first philosophy; common sense) or the like as matters of method – is rather more committal, but at least some of the standard questions of philosophical methodology can be put at this level. Are the methods of philosophy distinctively philosophical? If they are, are they remotely suitable to the tasks they are put to? If they are not, in virtue of what does philosophical work differ from other intellectual productions? Again, it is clear that analytic and continental philosophers differ in their ways of doing philosophy, even where ways are picked out fairly broadly. Philosophers working in each tradition are influenced by different work, communicate with different groups, distribute authority and trust differently, and so on. Indeed, questions of philosophical methodology are closely bound up with the largely separate development of each tradition.

Analytic philosophy began in something of a methodological revolution, as we have briefly outlined in Part I, and the method was that of logical analysis. In his 1914 lecture at Oxford, Russell characterizes (analytic) philosophy as “the science of the possible”, and in turn identifies this entirely with the deliverances of a particular a priori method, analysis directed at uncovering the logical forms of propositions: