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  • Print publication year: 2000
  • Online publication date: March 2008

5 - Proposition and judgement

from II - Logic, language, and abstract objects
Seventeenth-century logicians commonly adhered to the usual distinction between two operations of the mind: on the one hand, simple conceptions, through which things are apprehended that, as categorematic terms, are capable of becoming the subject and the predicate of a categorical proposition; on the other, acts of predication, by which the contents of simple apprehensions are combined into a prepositional complex that is a suitable potential object of assent or dissent. The diverse kinds of both categorical and compound proposition may either be merely entertained, in the sense of being present to the mind without any commitment to their truth or falsity, or become the object of an act or attitude of assent or dissent. An author who was most keenly aware of the need to uphold this distinction was John of St. Thomas, who maintained that there are two forms of truth and falsity, one of the judgeable content as such, and another of the actually judged proposition.
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The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy
  • Online ISBN: 9781139055451
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Du Trieu, Philippe, in his Manuductio ad logicam of 1614 (Du Trieu, 1826, II, 1, 2, 2), and Geulincx, (Geulincx 1891–3, vol. I)
Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité of 1674
Risse, De augementis scientiarum 1964–70, vol. I.