Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- 195 Sandel, Michael
- 196 Scanlon, T. M.
- 197 Self-interest
- 198 Self-respect
- 199 Sen, Amartya
- 200 Sense of justice
- 201 Sidgwick, Henry
- 202 Sin
- 203 Social choice theory
- 204 Social contract
- 205 Social minimum
- 206 Social union
- 207 Socialism
- 208 Society of peoples
- 209 Soper, Philip
- 210 Sovereignty
- 211 Stability
- 212 Statesman and duty of statesmanship
- 213 Strains of commitment
- 214 Supreme Court and judicial review
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
197 - Self-interest
from S
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s texts
- Introduction
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- 195 Sandel, Michael
- 196 Scanlon, T. M.
- 197 Self-interest
- 198 Self-respect
- 199 Sen, Amartya
- 200 Sense of justice
- 201 Sidgwick, Henry
- 202 Sin
- 203 Social choice theory
- 204 Social contract
- 205 Social minimum
- 206 Social union
- 207 Socialism
- 208 Society of peoples
- 209 Soper, Philip
- 210 Sovereignty
- 211 Stability
- 212 Statesman and duty of statesmanship
- 213 Strains of commitment
- 214 Supreme Court and judicial review
- T
- U
- W
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
A person is self-interested, in the narrow sense of selish or egoistic, if her most fundamental ends are focused on herself, such as her own health, wealth, social position, influence, or prestige (TJ 111; LHPP 58; JF 62). Someone is self-interested in a broader sense if she regards her aims and aspirations, whether selfish or not, as “worthy of recognition” and “deserving satisfaction” (TJ 110). More specifically, Rawls proposes that the interests of a self, which are not necessarily interests in oneself, are not merely determined by her tastes and preferences or her pains and pleasures. Her interests are instead determined by her conception of the good, which is the consistent and coherent plan of life she would choose under favorable conditions, with full information after careful reflection (TJ 358).
Egoism is one conception of the good, but personal ties, affections, and concern for the interests of others are likely to figure in the rational life plans of most people. Indeed egoism, according to Rawls, is incompatible with friendship and mutual trust because these relationships presuppose caring about others for their own sake. Egoism is also inconsistent with resentment and guilt because these moral feelings presuppose acceptance of principles of right or justice, which are necessarily general and universal (TJ 427). Egoism in its various forms is not a moral doctrine either because it fails to satisfy these formal constraints of morality and justice.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon , pp. 760 - 761Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014