Between 1996 and the adoption of the new constitution under President Rafael Correa in 2006, Ecuador saw an unprecedented level of domestic instability. As the head of the Alianza Pais movement, President Correa pitched himself as an anti-establishment figure who needed to convene a constituent assembly for the “Citizen’s Revolution” to be a success. Correa’s crusade against the establishment had far-reaching consequences on Ecuador’s constitution-making process. Correa was often forced to play “hardball” with his opponents on the right and used popular mobilization to bolster his cause. The role of the people in the constitution-making process led to important gains for the indigenous community and the environment. However, the centrality of Correa’s views often hampered the effectiveness of the process as he sometimes stood at odds with his coalition or started fights with the media, such as on the issue of natural resources and the environment. The constitution-making and reform process in Ecuador was distinct from the “Pink-Tide” happening in the rest of Latin America and was typified by Ecuador’s particular conditions and recent history.

Nepal’s constitution-making process took several years and two constituent assemblies to achieve. It was the result of a series of crises and transformations, including a "People’s War" and mass mobilization in the southern part of the country.The iterated set of negotiations led eventually to the adoption of a new kind of federalism, desginated as "Proportionate Inclusive Federalism" to provide a new basis for the state going forward.

South Africa’s 1996 constitution has been described as the birth certificate of a new, non-apartheid state. Following the Harare declaration in 1989, the process of ending apartheid accelerated, in which the writing of a new constitution played an important role. Throughout the process, there was gridlock involving the makeup of the constituent assembly and constitutional stipulations involving the death penalty, lockout clauses, the language of education, the appointment of judges and other issues. In the twenty-five years since the adoption of the constitution, it has proven to be a robust bulwark against infighting and instability. There are several lessons from South Africa’s constitutive process. While the constitution is best understood within the context of South Africa’s history and the ANC’s resistance to apartheid, an essential aspect of the process was that many of the disputes were settled collectively in “package deals” and through novel deadlock-breaking mechanisms.

Constitution-making has changed dramatically in recent decades. Compared with constitutional processes in earlier eras, we observe the increasing role of the international community in constitution making, often as part of a broader intervention into a conflict, and increasing penetration of international norms into national contexts. There has also been a trend toward public participation in the process of constitution-making. In addition, constitution making is now iterated over time, with multiple rounds of decision making and bargaining.This chapter draws on the framework of Jon Elster to frame the seven case studies in the volume, drawing toegether themes and trends.

The process of drafting Tunisia’s post revolution constitution began in February 2012 and endedtwo years later in February 2014, when the final vote by the Constituent Assembly took place. The two year process was characterized by multiple crises and interruptions.Despite this extremely difficult and rocky post-revolutionary context, in which the counterrevolutionary forces sought to destabilize the country, Tunisians were able to overcome the crisis. However, despite characterizations of the outside observers about the success of the process, counterrevolutionaries ended up derailing the country’s democratic and popular gains. This chapter provides a blow-by-blow account of the process.

In August of 2000, after the intervention of international mediators, the government of Burundi and seventeen political parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi with a constitution finally being signed in 2005. Burundi’s iterative cycles of ethnic violence and the underlying mistrust between the minority Tutsi, which controlled the military, and the majority Hutu are the backdrop on which the constitutional process was set. The entire process, based on the Peace of Arusha, was plagued by anxiety and insecurity, and the country to this day has not managed to find stable footing. From the debates over parliamentary apportionment to more recent struggles of the CNDD-FDD party to erase or rewrite the agreements made at Arusha, questions remain over the constitution’s initial intentions as well as its future.

After a constitutional amendment in 1992 ended one-party rule and introduced presidential term limits, Kenya had two full-blown constitution-making processes in relatively quick succession: the first ran from 2000 to 2005, ending when a draft constitution was rejected in a referendum; the second, from 2008 to 2010, “succeeded” in August 2010 when Kenya adopted a new constitution. The second process was designed with hindsight – the politicians who devised it consciously sought to avoid the problems that had beset its predecessor. The adoption of a new constitution in 2010 has not led to constitutional stability, however, and reform proposals continue to be debated. The chapter also reflects on the role of a foreign member of the Committee of Experts charged with the drafting of the initial text.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, after more than thirty years of political limbo, constitutional ambiguity and tension that culminated in the Kosovo War of 1998–1999. The following years witnessed a series of internationally sponsored peace talks, culminating in a Comprehensive Proposal for the Status Settlement in 2007, which Kosovo accepted but Serbia rejected. The Status Settlement proposal served as the basis for Kosovo’s Independence Constitution, which in terms of process, reflects a dynamic interplay between formally internationally-led negotiations on the political status and an informal internationally-supported constitution-making process. In terms of content, it reflects a combination of locally driven choices within internationally imposed guidelines. Therefore, the Kosovo case contributes to the scholarly debate on the legality and legitimacy of internationalized constituting-making processes. While criticism dominates this debate, Kosovo’s experience sheds light on the advantages of such a process in post-conflict contexts. It shows that the internationally influenced constitutional design constraints can also be “enabling” and that the role of external actors can help balance the motivational factors affecting a constitutional design. Furthermore, it reflects how an effectively coordinated partnership between local and external forces can lead to an outcome, which is compatible with the “will of the people”.