The ethical significance of motivation has generally been misrepresented by the major ethical theories. Classical utilitarianism and social contract theory have vastly underestimated its importance, while the theoretical friends of motive have tended to make implausible claims that either, like those of Hume, exaggerate the function of motive, or, like Kant's ignore all motives but one. Consider classical utilitarianism. Bentham applies the test of utility directly to motives: “If they [motives] are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad, on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure.” Robert Adams (1976) says that Bentham is inconsistent in his approach to the evaluation of motives, since Bentham also says that motives are to be evaluated by the utility of the intentions to which they give rise. But, as Adams points out, the consequences of the intention to which a motive leads are not identical to the consequences of the motive itself. Mill, on the other hand, barely treats motive at all, and when he does mention it in a footnote (in Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism), he says that the motive of an act counts not at all toward the morality of the act, although it is important in the evaluation of the person who performs the act: