Introduction

In 1899 Secretary of State Hamilton complained of the ‘see-saw’ policy pursued by successive Indian governments on famine prevention and relief. Administrations from the 1870s onwards had been criticized for being too frugal or generous. The cost of famine relief had risen dramatically, while budgets were constrained. By the early twentieth century, the financial burden of the South African War had imposed further economies on Indian expenditure. Hamilton resisted parliamentary pressure for ‘free grants’ to India and a grain export ban in the midst of the most acute and widespread famine of the Raj. British sympathy and charitable contributions were best targeted at the soldiers fighting in South Africa, rather than India's starving peasants. However, the last ‘famine relief/ protection’ item be trimmed were railways. Viceroy Curzon declared after the appalling famine of 1899/1900 that he was not ‘frightened’ of adding to the ‘bogey’ of Home Charges through rail expenditure. Long-term trade benefits from railways overrode all short term considerations. At the India Office, there was consensus that long term rail investment would pay off in more efficient famine relief efforts than achieved in earlier famines of 1896–7 and 1876–8. A network had been constructed which could transport grain and rice from sea ports to major interior cities via trunk lines, and from there to more remote areas by branch lines. That investment programme had given benefits through the equalization in food prices, as railways allowed rapid movements of grain to the areas where prices were highest.