Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T21:18:03.163Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

21 - Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2017

Ali E. Abbas
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Milind Tambe
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Detlof von Winterfeldt
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Get access

Summary

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Albers, , H. (2010). Spatial modeling of extraction and enforcement in developing country protected areas. Resource and Energy Economics, 32(2), 165179.Google Scholar
An, B., Brown, M., Vorobeychik, Y., & Tambe, M. (2013). Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 223230).Google Scholar
An, B., Jain, M., Tambe, M., & Kiekintveld, C. (2011). Mixed-initiative optimization in security games: A preliminary report. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Help Me Help You: Bridging the Gaps in Human–Agent Collaboration (pp. 811).Google Scholar
An, B., Kempe, D., Kiekintveld, C., Shieh, E., Singh, S., Tambe, M., & Vorobeychik, Y. (2012). Security games with limited surveillance. In Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 12411248).Google Scholar
An, B., Ordóñez, F., Tambe, M., Shieh, E., Yang, R., Baldwin, C., DiRenzo, J., Moretti, K., Maule, B., & Meyer, G. (2013). A deployed quantal response-based patrol planning system for the U.S. Coast Guard. Interfaces, 43(5), 400420.Google Scholar
An, B., Pita, J., Shieh, E., Tambe, M., Kiekintveld, C., & Marecki, J. (2011, March). GUARDS and PROTECT: Next generation applications of security games. SIGECOM, 10, 3134.Google Scholar
An, B., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., Shieh, E., & Kiekintveld, C. (2011) Refinement of strong Stackelberg equilibria in security games. In Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 587593).Google Scholar
Basilico, N., Gatti, N., & Amigoni, F. (2009). Leader-follower strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with arbitrary topologies. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 500503).Google Scholar
Blocki, J., Christin, N., Datta, A., Procaccia, A. D., & Sinha, A. (2013). Audit games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 41–47).Google Scholar
Blocki, J., Christin, N., Datta, A., Procaccia, A. D., & Sinha, A. (2015). Audit games with multiple defender resources. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 791–797).Google Scholar
Fang, F., Jiang, A. X., & Tambe, M. (2013). Optimal patrol strategy for protecting moving targets with multiple mobile resources. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 957964).Google Scholar
Fang, F., Nguyen, T. H., Pickles, R., Lam, W. Y., Clements, G. R., An, B., Singh, A., Tambe, M., & Lemieux, A. (2016). Deploying PAWS: Field optimization of the protection assistant for wildlife security. In IAAI (pp. 3966–3973).Google Scholar
Fang, F., Stone, P., & Tambe, M. (2015). When security games go green: Designing defender strategies to prevent poaching and illegal fishing. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 2589–2595).Google Scholar
Fave, F. M., Brown, M., Zhang, C., Shieh, E., Jiang, A., Rosoff, H., Tambe, M., & Sullivan, J. (2014). Security games in the field: Deployments on a transit system. In Dalpiaz, F., Dix, J., & van Riemsdijk, M. (Eds.), Engineering multi-agent systems, volume 8758 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 103126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jain, M., Kardes, E., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2010). Security games with arbitrary schedules: A branch and price approach. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 792797).Google Scholar
Jain, M., Korzhyk, D., Vanek, O., Pechoucek, M., Conitzer, V., & Tambe, M. (2011). A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 327334).Google Scholar
Jain, M., Tambe, M., & Conitzer, V. (n.d.). Security scheduling for real-world networks. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 215222).Google Scholar
Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Kiekintveld, C., Rathi, S., Tambe, M., & Ordóñez, F. (2010). Software assistants for randomized patrol planning for the LAX airport police and the federal air marshal service. Interfaces, 40(4), 267290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jiang, A. X., Nguyen, T. H., Tambe, M., & Procaccia, A. D. (2013). Monotonic maximin: A robust Stackelberg solution against boundedly rational followers. In Proceedings of the Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec) (pp. 119139).Google Scholar
Jiang, A., Yin, Z., Kraus, S., Zhang, C., & Tambe, M. (n.d.) Game-theoretic randomization for security patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 207214).Google Scholar
Johnson, M., Fang, F., Yang, R., Tambe, M., & Albers, H. (2012). Patrolling to maximize pristine forest area. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., & Tvesky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263291.Google Scholar
Kiekintveld, C., Marecki, J., & Tambe, M. (2011). Approximation methods for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games: Modeling distributional uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 10051012).Google Scholar
Korzhyk, D., Conitzer, V., & Parr, R. (2010). Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 805810).Google Scholar
Kukreja, N., Halfond, W. G., & Tambe, M. (2013). Randomizing regression tests using game theory. In Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 2013 IEEE/ACM 28th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 616–621).Google Scholar
Li, Y., & Conitzer, V. (2013). Game-theoretic question selection for tests. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 254–262).Google Scholar
Luber, S., Yin, Z., Fave, F. D., Jiang, A. X., Tambe, M., & Sullivan, J. P. (2013). Game-theoretic patrol strategies for transit systems: The trusts system and its mobile app (demonstration). In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)[Demonstrations Track] (pp. 1377–1378).Google Scholar
McKelvey, R.D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 638.Google Scholar
Nguyen, T., Yadav, A., An, B., Tambe, M., & Boutilier, C. (2014). Regret-based optimization and preference elicitation for Stackelberg security games with uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 756762).Google Scholar
Nguyen, T. H., Yang, R., Azaria, A., Kraus, S., & Tambe, M. (2013). Analyzing the effectiveness of adversary modeling in security games. In Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 718–724).Google Scholar
Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J. P., Marecki, J., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., & Kraus, S. (2008). Playing games with security: An efficient exact algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 895902).Google Scholar
Pita, J., Jain, M., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., & Kraus, S. (2010). Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition. Artificial Intelligence, 174(15) 11421171.Google Scholar
Pita, J., Jain, M., Western, C., Portway, C., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., Kraus, S., & Parachuri, P. (2008). Deployed ARMOR protection: The application of a game-theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 125132).Google Scholar
Pita, J., Tambe, M., Kiekintveld, C., Cullen, S., & Steigerwald, E. (2011). GUARDS – game theoretic security allocation on a national scale. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 3744).Google Scholar
Qian, Y., Haskell, W. B., Jiang, A. X., & Tambe, M. (2014). Online planning for optimal protector strategies in resource conservation games. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 733740).Google Scholar
Shieh, E., An, B., Yang, R., Tambe, M., Baldwin, C., DiRenzo, J., Maule, B., & Meyer, G. (2012). PROTECT: An application of computational game theory for the security of the ports of the United States. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 21732179).Google Scholar
Short, M. B., D’Orsogna, M. R., Pasour, V. B., Tita, G. E., Brantingham, P. J., Bertozzi, A. L., & Chayes, L. B. (2008). A statistical model of criminal behavior. Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences, 18, 12491267.Google Scholar
Tambe, M., & An, B. (2012). Game theory for security: A real-world challenge problem for multiagent systems and beyond. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health (pp. 6974).Google Scholar
Tsai, J., Rathi, S., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2009). IRIS: A tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 3744).Google Scholar
Varakantham, P., Lau, H. C., & Yuan, Z. (2013). Scalable randomized patrolling for securing rapid transit networks. In Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI) (pp. 15631568).Google Scholar
von Stengel, B., & Zamir, S. (2004). Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. Technical Report LSE-CDAM-2004-01, Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Google Scholar
Yang, R., Ford, B. J., Tambe, M., & Lemieux, A. (2014). Adaptive resource allocation for wildlife protection against illegal poachers. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 453460).Google Scholar
Yang, R., Jiang, A. X., Tambe, M., & Ordóñez, F. (2013). Scaling-up security games with boundedly rational adversaries: A cutting-plane approach. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 404410).Google Scholar
Yang, R., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., Tambe, M., & John, R. (2011). Improving resource allocation strategy against human adversaries in security games. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 458464).Google Scholar
Yin, Y., An, B., & Jain, M. (2014). Game-theoretic resource allocation for protecting large public events. In Proceedings of the 28th Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 826834).Google Scholar
Yin, Y., Jain, M., Tambe, M., & Ordóñez, F. (2011). Risk-averse strategies for security games with execution and observational uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (pp. 758763).Google Scholar
Yin, Y., Xu, H., Gan, J., An, B., & Jiang, A. (2015). Computing optimal mixed strategies for security games with dynamic payoffs. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 681688).Google Scholar
Yin, Z., Korzhyk, D., Kiekintveld, C., Conitzer, V., & Tambe, M (2010). Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 11391146).Google Scholar
Yin, Z., & Tambe, M. (2012). A unified method for handling discrete and continuous uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg games. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (pp. 855862).Google Scholar
Zhang, C., Jiang, A. X., Short, M. B., Brantingham, P. J., & Tambe, M. (2014). Defending against opportunistic criminals: new game-theoretic frameworks and algorithms. In Decision and game theory for security (pp. 3–22). Springer.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×