How extensive is morality? Must every deed be done ‘from duty’? Should all actions possess moral worth? On closer inspection, these questions are not as straightforward as they first appear because the correct answer crucially depends on the identity criteria one applies to actions. On the one hand, Kant makes it quite clear that no action can be entirely exempt from the moral law – see, for example, his dismissive discussion of morally indifferent actions at VI 23 fn. in his Religion. If so, all actions ought to possess moral worth in the weak sense that human beings must always pay due attention to the restrictions imposed by the moral law. It is never acceptable to act on a maxim that is altogether devoid of moral content. This does not, on the other hand, entail that every single action must have moral worth in a stronger and perhaps more obvious sense: as there is no obligation to maximise moral worth, there is no need to maximise instances (tokens) of action from duty either. Not every single act need be motivated by duty alone – which would leave no actions to fall in the category of the morally permissible. Kant endorses the commonsense position that there are numerous cases in which acting on inclination is entirely legitimate.

If so, permissible action motivated by inclination must somehow be composite. A rare moral merchant may ask a decorator to refurbish her shop to attract more customers.