Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I WHY HAVE HIERARCHY?
- PART II MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS
- 4 Horizontal dilemmas: Social choice in a decentralized hierarchy
- 5 Vertical dilemmas: Piece-rate incentives and credible commitments
- 6 Hidden action in hierarchies: Principals, agents, and teams
- 7 Hidden information in hierarchies: The logical limits of mechanism design
- 8 Hierarchical failures and market solutions: Can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy?
- PART III COOPERATION AND LEADERSHIP
- Epilogue: Politics, rationality, and efficiency
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
8 - Hierarchical failures and market solutions: Can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I WHY HAVE HIERARCHY?
- PART II MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS
- 4 Horizontal dilemmas: Social choice in a decentralized hierarchy
- 5 Vertical dilemmas: Piece-rate incentives and credible commitments
- 6 Hidden action in hierarchies: Principals, agents, and teams
- 7 Hidden information in hierarchies: The logical limits of mechanism design
- 8 Hierarchical failures and market solutions: Can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy?
- PART III COOPERATION AND LEADERSHIP
- Epilogue: Politics, rationality, and efficiency
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
It is commonly thought that a widely held corporation that is not being run in the interests of its shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. … [But] shareholders can free ride on the raider's improvement of the corporation, thereby seriously limiting the raider's profit.
Grossman and Hart (1980: 42)The first chapter established that markets can break down due to team production externalities, market power, and information asymmetry. These failures provide the theoretical justification for hierarchy. The analysis so far, however, has established only that hierarchy has the capacity to work ideally in the absence of team production externalities, market power, and information asymmetry. The same factors that promote market failure promote hierarchical failure.
As long as information about employee types is hidden, it is impossible for managers to say exactly what behaviors they expect from subordinates. Therefore, it is impossible to write the kind of joint forcing contract suggested by Holmstrom. Subordinates are left in a state of ambiguity that affords them the opportunity to shirk strategically, hiding behind a veil of ignorance about which team member, or which external shock, is responsible for unsatisfactory observed outcomes.
Hierarchical superiors are not just the victims of team production externalities and information asymmetries. Hierarchy, by its very nature, gives each hierarchical superior monopsony powers as “buyer” of team efforts. In piece-rate organizations, the incentive to lower piece rates to take advantage of this position is at odds with efficiency.
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- Information
- Managerial DilemmasThe Political Economy of Hierarchy, pp. 159 - 178Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992