In many respects, the outcome of the Yom Kippur War was as much a surprise to military analysts and pundits as the stunning victory the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had gained in the Six-Day War five years earlier. In October 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armies caught Israel's military forces by surprise, not so much because the Arabs misled Israeli intelligence as to the timing of the offensive but because the Arab armies displayed tactical capabilities with which no one in Israel had credited them and that for a time seemed to threaten the existence of the Jewish state.*

Under the pressures of combat in adverse circumstances, the Israelis made significant combat adaptations in a short period. Despite, or perhaps because of, their initial setbacks, they adapted in some areas with considerable agility and turned the tables on their opponents. However, what makes this case study so interesting lies not only in the areas in which the Israelis successfully adapted but also in the areas where they found it more difficult, if not impossible, to adapt. The causes of their failures may be even more important to thinking about war in the future than the reasons underlying their successes.