In the previous chapter I considered a kind of moralism as the overweening of morality and, in response to this, what the proper scope or limits to moral thought and judgement might be. More explicitly, I suggested that the way in which certain moral theories (and particularly impartialist theories) conceive of the conflict between moral and other values distorts our understanding of important human values; in particular by undermining the kind of responsiveness to others through which such values are revealed. In this respect then, as I shall argue in this chapter, the kind of overweening of morality that I considered in the previous chapter rests on an inadequate conception of moral thought quite generally. More specifically, I shall argue that moralism involves a too narrow conception of moral thought, one in which moral thought is ultimately about making moral judgements. As I argued in Chapter 2, one thing that may be lacking in our judgements of another is scope for a kind of pity, a response through which we might recognize the humanity of those we would judge. Such responsiveness indicates an important dimension to moral thought that the moralizer may miss. My focus in Chapter 2 was on how particular moral judgements may be distorted by a lack of such responsiveness to those we would judge. But one need not be a moralizer in the sense I examined there to have the kind of overly narrow view of moral thought that concerns me.