Introduction

Most of the chapters in this volume are concerned with applying activity theory to different aspects of individual development and social transformation. From that point of view, the subject of this chapter (the relevance of L. S. Vygotsky's ideas to the philosophical theory of knowledge) may be peripheral. Still, something is gained if, for once, we stand back and view activity theory itself against its larger background in intellectual history. The questions to be raised here, then, have to do with the history of Western epistemology, and with the ways in which the work of Vygotsky and his successors helps throw light on current problems in this area.

To explain my personal interest in this subject: I have admired the work of Vygotsky and A. R. Luria for more than 20 years, having come to their writings through the American clinical neuroanatomist Norman Geschwind (1974). Geschwind's work on the aphasias and apraxias was closely related to the neurological work that Luria did during and after World War II. As Geschwind saw it, Luria's approach opened a new direction of attack on the cerebral localization of higher mental functions, and so on our whole understanding of sensory and cognitive systems (Luria, 1973). But that is not all: Going beyond neurology and psychology (he thought), Luria also suggested new ways of resolving other larger, more long-standings issues in the tradition of Western epistemology.