The principal argument of this book, laid out in Chapter 2, takes off from the observation that the decisions of a constitutional court like the Bundesverfassungsgericht are not self-enforcing. Implementation of judicial decisions often requires the cooperation of other actors who may not wish to comply with a specific ruling, most importantly – for our purposes – legislative majorities. As a result, the incentives that legislators face in deciding how to respond to a judicial ruling take on central significance. The greater the pressure to implement a court's rulings faithfully, the more influential and effective a court will be. One important mechanism that creates such pressure for elected officials like legislators is the potential for a public backlash if they are perceived to flaunt a judicial decision. As I argued in greater detail in Chapter 2, two factors are central to this mechanism:

1. The degree of public support a court enjoys and

2. The likelihood that a sufficiently large number of citizens will become aware/convinced that a judicial decision has not been complied with if evasion is attempted (transparency).

As I stated at the end of Chapter 2, the second condition (transparency) is conditioned by a range of factors that work to decrease or increase the likelihood that citizens will become aware of evasive attempts by a legislative majority. Thus, transparency is generally higher in cases that are salient and attract more public attention.