Book contents
- Resisting Scientific Realism
- Resisting Scientific Realism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Against Realism
- 1 The Copernican Revolution in Astronomy
- 2 The Underdetermination of Theory Choice by Evidence
- 3 The Argument from Underconsideration
- 4 Epistemic Privilege
- 5 Four Pessimistic Inductions
- 6 Pessimism, Optimism, and the Exponential Growth of Science
- 7 The Nature of Radical Theory Change
- 8 Do the Theoretical Values Really Support Scientific Realism?
- Part II Strengthening Anti-Realism
- References
- Index
1 - The Copernican Revolution in Astronomy
from Part I - Against Realism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 October 2018
Book contents
- Resisting Scientific Realism
- Resisting Scientific Realism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Against Realism
- 1 The Copernican Revolution in Astronomy
- 2 The Underdetermination of Theory Choice by Evidence
- 3 The Argument from Underconsideration
- 4 Epistemic Privilege
- 5 Four Pessimistic Inductions
- 6 Pessimism, Optimism, and the Exponential Growth of Science
- 7 The Nature of Radical Theory Change
- 8 Do the Theoretical Values Really Support Scientific Realism?
- Part II Strengthening Anti-Realism
- References
- Index
Summary
Reviews the various arguments related to the underdetermination of theory chocie by evidence. Begins with a reveiw of Duhem's and Quine's interest in underdetermination. Argues that Quine's focus on radical underdetermination is irrelevant to the contemporary debate in philosophy of science. The mere logical possibility that there might exist a theory that can account for the data as well as the theory we currently accept should not persuade us to be anti-realists.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Resisting Scientific Realism , pp. 9 - 29Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018