Even as the final touches were being applied to Ahtisaari's plan and recommendations, the political tide was running in the wrong direction, although prompt support was expressed in some quarters. On the same date that Ahtisaari's Report and Plan reached the Security Council, the U.S. State Department issued a press statement supporting Ahtisaari's recommendations. Britain followed immediately.

Ahtisaari's reputation and status as a former president of an EU member state was expected to give his report and comprehensive plan special traction in Europe. Ahtisaari had good relationships with the senior U.S. diplomats closely involved with the final status negotiations. His reputation for constructive engagement in negotiating the 1999 Kosovo crisis preceded him. The United States was enthusiastic about the process Ahtisaari managed. Ahtisaari's reputation and the contents of his plan thus provided a bridge between the United States and Europe.

Rather than moving to formal consideration of the report, however, the Security Council began a period of “consultations,” with Russia urging further bilateral negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. The effort to derail Ahtisaari's work had begun.

Presentation of the plan had been delayed with the hope that moderates would gain power in Serbia's January 2007 elections. In New York, at the Security Council, it was difficult to oppose arguments that consideration of the Ahtisaari Plan should wait until things were sorted out in Serbia.